Narrative:

Upon entering korean airspace from the west; we asked about our route of flight after rebit. We were told to expect the coway 1P arrival for rksi runway 34. This was what we had anticipated and had programmed. Later; incheon control had us descend; below profile; and passed us to seoul approach. We asked if we still needed a high descent rate and were told 'no.' then we were put on vectors. The vectors and descent became tight and steep; it was clear that we were not going to follow the STAR. To comply with the profile; we had to fully configure the aircraft with gear and flaps 35 earlier than normal. On base leg; we were told to accelerate to 190 KTS; requiring us to retract flaps to 28. Within a minute; we were given a dogleg heading; cleared for the approach; and told to contact tower. (If the controller stated the frequency; I did not hear it.) earlier in the descent; I heard seoul approach pass another aircraft to tower on 118.1. I selected that frequency in VHF#1 standby. So when we were told to contact the tower; that's the frequency I selected. That frequency is for gimpo airport. I looked at the approach plate; selected the first of three tower frequencies; 118.2; and reported in. They told me to switch to 118.8. Meanwhile; with all the configuration changes; the slam dunk approach; the fly fast; fly slow; and the radio frequencies; we overshot the localizer. Once established on a re-intercept heading the airplane; on autopilot; was not responding quickly enough to capture both localizer and glide path. We got too high on the glide path and were too close to the runway to make the required; aggressive dive to capture it (in IMC and below 2;000 ft AGL). We executed a go-around at about 1;500 ft AGL due to being 'unstable' on approach. During those critical seconds; tower was calling; approach control was calling and I think someone was on guard. [We concentrated on] aviate! Navigate! Communicate! And; as a result; took a few seconds before re-establishing communication. Through it all; safety was not compromised at all and we were never without positive localizer course guidance. But we were; by definition; 'off course' on final approach; which is why I am submitting this report. If vectors are given to landing; ATC should consider giving track miles to touchdown when it is not obvious. In our case; we were on a radar vectored downwind with no real idea of how long a final we would have until turning base leg. Once configured; we should not have accepted a speed change that required us to change configuration.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Following a series of vectors off their planned RNAV STAR to RKSI and uncertain of their likely track distance to landing the flight crew of an MD11 found themselves in an unstabilized configuration and deviating from the localizer. They executed a missed approach and returned for a stabilized approach and landing.

Narrative: Upon entering Korean airspace from the west; we asked about our route of flight after REBIT. We were told to expect the COWAY 1P arrival for RKSI Runway 34. This was what we had anticipated and had programmed. Later; Incheon Control had us descend; below profile; and passed us to Seoul Approach. We asked if we still needed a high descent rate and were told 'no.' Then we were put on vectors. The vectors and descent became tight and steep; it was clear that we were not going to follow the STAR. To comply with the profile; we had to fully configure the aircraft with gear and Flaps 35 earlier than normal. On base leg; we were told to accelerate to 190 KTS; requiring us to retract flaps to 28. Within a minute; we were given a dogleg heading; cleared for the approach; and told to contact Tower. (If the Controller stated the frequency; I did not hear it.) Earlier in the descent; I heard Seoul Approach pass another aircraft to Tower on 118.1. I selected that frequency in VHF#1 standby. So when we were told to contact the Tower; that's the frequency I selected. That frequency is for Gimpo Airport. I looked at the approach plate; selected the first of three Tower frequencies; 118.2; and reported in. They told me to switch to 118.8. Meanwhile; with all the configuration changes; the slam dunk approach; the fly fast; fly slow; and the radio frequencies; we overshot the localizer. Once established on a re-intercept heading the airplane; on autopilot; was not responding quickly enough to capture both localizer and glide path. We got too high on the glide path and were too close to the runway to make the required; aggressive dive to capture it (in IMC and below 2;000 FT AGL). We executed a go-around at about 1;500 FT AGL due to being 'unstable' on approach. During those critical seconds; Tower was calling; Approach Control was calling and I think someone was on Guard. [We concentrated on] Aviate! Navigate! Communicate! And; as a result; took a few seconds before re-establishing communication. Through it all; safety was not compromised at all and we were never without positive localizer course guidance. But we were; by definition; 'off course' on final approach; which is why I am submitting this report. If vectors are given to landing; ATC should consider giving track miles to touchdown when it is not obvious. In our case; we were on a radar vectored downwind with no real idea of how long a final we would have until turning base leg. Once configured; we should not have accepted a speed change that required us to change configuration.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2013 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.