Narrative:

During preflight I entered the flight plan that was amended via pre departure clearance to the Gumby1. I entered runway 9 for departure. After the receiving flow and checklist the first officer briefed the GUMBY1 and the waypoints were checked. We had a slow boarding and slow pushback waiting on bags. When we finally got underway I was pushing to get off the ground and finish the day. We were given a different spot for ramp exit than the one I was expecting. I did not change the departure runway in the FMS. We accomplished the taxi and before takeoff checklists and were immediately cleared onto 15L to line up and wait. I transferred the controls to the first officer; pilot flying (PF); and we waited for takeoff clearance and to complete the before takeoff checklist. We were cleared for take off RNAV crtmn; 'confirmed' crtmn in the FMS and completed the checklist. We began the take off roll. At about 60 KIAS after I was confident the engines were stable and making good power I widened my scan to double check the FMS. That's when I noticed the mistake at around 75 KIAS I called it out and told the PF to continue. My thought was that I could make the correction before the turn at 600 feet and that it would be safer than doing an abort at 75 KIAS. We called pos rate; gear up; speed. After setting speed I re-entered the departure and crtmn still did not show up. We immediately asked for a vector to get the aircraft cleaned up and then try to sort out the screw up. I asked for direct dwsun and they gave us direct gumby and we were back onto the departure. With no further issues. After we cleared 10;000 feet I started to back track [to] find my error and then realized that I had not entered the correct runway. Threats for this day were an early morning wake up to commute in after little sleep helping care for a sick child. A new hire first officer with low time in the aircraft. My error in not realizing that my first officer was swamped in the hustle to get airborne. The unwanted situation was a result of the error in entering the wrong runway and not catching it on the cross check. We looked at the FMS and saw the magenta where it was supposed to be and said crtmn was in the box before we advanced the thrust. Slow down! Put a finger on the FMS and confirm the first fix! Complacency creeped and amplified by fatigue that led to this situation. Also fatigue played a role in me not being able to realize exactly what mistake was made and correcting it immediately. In the future I will take measures to assure that I get an adequate amount of sleep before the start of my trip. I will also slow my pace in the cockpit to help keep errors at bay.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: EMB-145 crew failed to change the departure runway in their FMS when cleared to Runway 15R at IAH (vice their planned Runway 9). They took off with the wrong waypoints displayed for their clearance via the GUMBY RNAV SID. Assistance from ATC got them back on course. Fatigue and an inexperienced First Officer were cited as contributing factors.

Narrative: During preflight I entered the flight plan that was amended via PDC to the Gumby1. I entered RWY 9 for departure. After the receiving flow and checklist the First Officer briefed the GUMBY1 and the waypoints were checked. We had a slow boarding and slow pushback waiting on bags. When we finally got underway I was pushing to get off the ground and finish the day. We were given a different spot for ramp exit than the one I was expecting. I did not change the departure runway in the FMS. We accomplished the taxi and before takeoff checklists and were immediately cleared onto 15L to Line up and wait. I transferred the controls to the First Officer; pilot flying (PF); and we waited for takeoff clearance and to complete the before takeoff checklist. We were cleared for take off RNAV CRTMN; 'confirmed' CRTMN in the FMS and completed the checklist. We began the take off roll. At about 60 KIAS after I was confident the engines were stable and making good power I widened my scan to double check the FMS. That's when I noticed the mistake at around 75 KIAS I called it out and told the PF to continue. My thought was that I could make the correction before the turn at 600 feet and that it would be safer than doing an abort at 75 KIAS. We called pos rate; gear up; speed. After setting speed I re-entered the departure and CRTMN still did not show up. We immediately asked for a vector to get the aircraft cleaned up and then try to sort out the screw up. I asked for direct DWSUN and they gave us direct GUMBY and we were back onto the departure. With no further issues. After we cleared 10;000 feet I started to back track [to] find my error and then realized that I had not entered the correct runway. Threats for this day were an early morning wake up to commute in after little sleep helping care for a sick child. A new hire First Officer with low time in the aircraft. My error in not realizing that my First Officer was swamped in the hustle to get airborne. The unwanted situation was a result of the error in entering the wrong runway and not catching it on the cross check. We looked at the FMS and saw the magenta where it was supposed to be and said CRTMN was in the box before we advanced the thrust. SLOW DOWN! Put a finger on the FMS and CONFIRM the first fix! Complacency creeped and amplified by fatigue that led to this situation. Also fatigue played a role in me not being able to realize exactly what mistake was made and correcting it immediately. In the future I will take measures to assure that I get an adequate amount of sleep before the start of my trip. I will also slow my pace in the cockpit to help keep errors at bay.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.