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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1210437 |
Time | |
Date | 201410 |
Local Time Of Day | 1201-1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | IMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | DA20-C1 Eclipse |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Initial Climb |
Route In Use | Direct |
Flight Plan | None |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Single Pilot |
Qualification | Flight Crew Private |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 40 Flight Crew Total 250 Flight Crew Type 190 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural FAR Inflight Event / Encounter VFR In IMC Inflight Event / Encounter Weather / Turbulence |
Narrative:
As a private pilot; I exercised extremely poor judgment with regard to taking off from an airfield that was IMC. As a VFR only pilot; I did not have the certifications (plane or pilot) to fly IFR nor did I use the appropriate procedures for IFR flight. Mission was a cross-country flight with two souls onboard. Getting to the destination was the main driving factor behind the decision to depart. Several times I had said it was not possible to fly - but continued to assess and look for a way to depart. I knew the ceiling issue was only in the immediate vicinity of the airport and within a few miles the weather was VFR. I did observe an area of lighter clouds and higher ceilings near the direction of flight. I mistakenly then chose to load up and depart using normal VFR procedures for a non-towered airport. For the five minutes it took to start up and taxi; there continued to be indications and feelings that this was a bad idea but in my mind I guess I was committed to my bad decision. Initially I intended to remain clear of clouds under the ceiling for approximately 6 miles where I had confidence that there was an ability to continue my ascent in normal VFR conditions. I knew that in only a few miles beyond that the weather would continue to improve with normal VFR flight for the remainder of the flight. Upon takeoff it quickly became apparent that 'scud running' under the ceiling was not a viable option. I quickly found myself in the soup and started ascending as quickly as I could. Guessing on the time lapse; I remained in the clouds for about 30-45 seconds before I broke out around 2;500 ft. During the first ten seconds of time my only effort was to maintain my climb. It was at that moment when I focused on my attitude indicator that showed I was in a 20 degree right bank and 10 degrees nose high. At that time I also experienced vertigo and knew I had no real sense of my attitude. Quite frankly I did not cross-check against my airspeed but I knew that this attitude would ultimately result in stall - and possibly a spin. I have never been previously in IMC conditions during my 200+ of logged flight time. I had completed the required 'ref to instruments' training for my ppl but that was simulated with a CFI. Being low; slow and not in control was a completely different feeling. With my passenger sitting next to me I quite frankly terrorized of losing complete control of the aircraft with fatal results. In those moments I would have given anything to have her back on the ground - but also knew that this situation was completely my fault as PIC. This month is my two year anniversary of my ppl check ride and I am in the process of getting a BFR from a seasoned military pilot who has converted all his qualification to a civilian cfii. I had expressed an interest working on an IFR rating so one week before this incident we had taken an intro flight into basic IFR work (we had not decided on what books to use or gotten a syllabus yet). I firmly believe that this basic IFR training flight is the only reason my passenger (and myself) survived my failure to exercise proper judgment before getting airborne. It probably took me 3 seconds to focus on the ai before acting. In those 3 seconds I realized that I needed to fix that indication. I remember seeing the HSI quickly rotating in my peripheral view; but my focus was clearly on the ai. I am also certain that nothing I learned from two years ago would have made me focus on that instrument as my primary indication of what needed to happen. As a VFR pilot; you can largely ignore the ai with a clear reference to the horizon outside. But his recent words of the ai being my primary instrument were fresh. I focused on the ai and rolled wings-level and then dropped the nose. It took about four seconds to resume a normal attitude. I then set the autopilot to hold the course and then I slowly raised the nose with backpressure on the stick to a 5 degree pitch (something else I had practiced a weekbefore during that intro IFR flight). Within a few more seconds we broke in VFR on top conditions. I was mentally a wreck but I also knew we were now safe. I pride myself on being a good pilot that gets better and better with each flight. On the day of this incident I was far from being that good pilot. From this incident I would submit to all that I will never let this happen again. I know that my lack of judgment on the ground was the primary cause. Once in the air; my only option was to fly into IMC. Without the proper training; I quickly lost directional and attitude control. Saying 'never again' is a start; but I believe being a good pilot requires more. For corrective action; I have self-imposed a safety stand-down on my flying. I fully disclosed this incident to my cfii. I gave the keys to my plane to him and thanked him for basically saving my passenger's life. The only way I want those keys back are to undergo a review of the lapses of VFR flying I exhibited on that day (risk management; judgment; etc.) to ensure I don't make the same mistake again. I also said I would not act as PIC again with any passengers until I had undergone more reference to instrument training to include unusual attitude recovery. I'm not sure if those maneuvers are mandated in a BFR but it is my belief that these skills must be practiced more frequently than every two years. While the last thing I want to do is get into IMC again - I also believe that 'inadvertent IMC' training is required after you get your ppl - especially if you are flying at night. Simply stating 'turn around and get out of IMC conditions' is an oversimplification of the necessary skills. Knowledge and demonstrated pilot skills are two different things that cannot be interchanged. Having said that; I also think that taking the wings safety course will help maintain my knowledge proficiency and avoid complacency and lapses in judgment. I previously ignored them; but will now be setting a schedule to take those courses. Getting my IFR rating is certainly still a goal as I now know that; even if you don't fly IFR; the skills that you gain during IFR training are essential when the wrong set of conditions and judgment combine to place you in danger of losing control of your aircraft. As a final observation; I also believe my choice of aircraft was a contributing reason to my successful recovery from an unusual attitude. The diamond eclipse is a very forgiving plane - when I approached the edge of its flying envelope; it kept itself stable until I could figure out how to recover.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A VFR rated private pilot with limited simulated instrument training laments his decision to depart when conditions were not conducive to VFR flight. Once airborne; he felt forced to penetrate the cloud cover and struggled to regain control of the aircraft. He has committed to additional instrument training and to avoid any similar operation.
Narrative: As a private pilot; I exercised extremely poor judgment with regard to taking off from an airfield that was IMC. As a VFR only pilot; I did not have the certifications (plane or pilot) to fly IFR nor did I use the appropriate procedures for IFR flight. Mission was a cross-country flight with two souls onboard. Getting to the destination was the main driving factor behind the decision to depart. Several times I had said it was not possible to fly - but continued to assess and look for a way to depart. I knew the ceiling issue was only in the immediate vicinity of the airport and within a few miles the weather was VFR. I did observe an area of lighter clouds and higher ceilings near the direction of flight. I mistakenly then chose to load up and depart using normal VFR procedures for a non-towered airport. For the five minutes it took to start up and taxi; there continued to be indications and feelings that this was a bad idea but in my mind I guess I was committed to my bad decision. Initially I intended to remain clear of clouds under the ceiling for approximately 6 miles where I had confidence that there was an ability to continue my ascent in normal VFR conditions. I knew that in only a few miles beyond that the weather would continue to improve with normal VFR flight for the remainder of the flight. Upon takeoff it quickly became apparent that 'scud running' under the ceiling was not a viable option. I quickly found myself in the soup and started ascending as quickly as I could. Guessing on the time lapse; I remained in the clouds for about 30-45 seconds before I broke out around 2;500 ft. During the first ten seconds of time my only effort was to maintain my climb. It was at that moment when I focused on my attitude indicator that showed I was in a 20 degree right bank and 10 degrees nose high. At that time I also experienced vertigo and knew I had no real sense of my attitude. Quite frankly I did not cross-check against my airspeed but I knew that this attitude would ultimately result in stall - and possibly a spin. I have never been previously in IMC conditions during my 200+ of logged flight time. I had completed the required 'ref to instruments' training for my PPL but that was simulated with a CFI. Being low; slow and not in control was a completely different feeling. With my passenger sitting next to me I quite frankly terrorized of losing complete control of the aircraft with fatal results. In those moments I would have given anything to have her back on the ground - but also knew that this situation was completely my fault as PIC. This month is my two year anniversary of my PPL check ride and I am in the process of getting a BFR from a seasoned military pilot who has converted all his qualification to a civilian CFII. I had expressed an interest working on an IFR rating so one week before this incident we had taken an intro flight into basic IFR work (we had not decided on what books to use or gotten a syllabus yet). I firmly believe that this basic IFR training flight is the only reason my passenger (and myself) survived my failure to exercise proper judgment before getting airborne. It probably took me 3 seconds to focus on the AI before acting. In those 3 seconds I realized that I needed to fix that indication. I remember seeing the HSI quickly rotating in my peripheral view; but my focus was clearly on the AI. I am also certain that nothing I learned from two years ago would have made me focus on that instrument as my primary indication of what needed to happen. As a VFR pilot; you can largely ignore the AI with a clear reference to the horizon outside. But his recent words of the AI being my primary instrument were fresh. I focused on the AI and rolled wings-level and then dropped the nose. It took about four seconds to resume a normal attitude. I then set the autopilot to hold the course and then I slowly raised the nose with backpressure on the stick to a 5 degree pitch (something else I had practiced a weekbefore during that intro IFR flight). Within a few more seconds we broke in VFR on top conditions. I was mentally a wreck but I also knew we were now safe. I pride myself on being a good pilot that gets better and better with each flight. On the day of this incident I was far from being that good pilot. From this incident I would submit to all that I will never let this happen again. I know that my lack of judgment on the ground was the primary cause. Once in the air; my only option was to fly into IMC. Without the proper training; I quickly lost directional and attitude control. Saying 'never again' is a start; but I believe being a good pilot requires more. For corrective action; I have self-imposed a safety stand-down on my flying. I fully disclosed this incident to my CFII. I gave the keys to my plane to him and thanked him for basically saving my passenger's life. The only way I want those keys back are to undergo a review of the lapses of VFR flying I exhibited on that day (risk management; judgment; etc.) to ensure I don't make the same mistake again. I also said I would not act as PIC again with ANY passengers until I had undergone more reference to instrument training to include unusual attitude recovery. I'm not sure if those maneuvers are mandated in a BFR but it is my belief that these skills must be practiced more frequently than every two years. While the last thing I want to do is get into IMC again - I also believe that 'inadvertent IMC' training is required after you get your PPL - especially if you are flying at night. Simply stating 'turn around and get out of IMC conditions' is an oversimplification of the necessary skills. Knowledge and demonstrated pilot skills are two different things that cannot be interchanged. Having said that; I also think that taking the Wings Safety Course will help maintain my knowledge proficiency and avoid complacency and lapses in judgment. I previously ignored them; but will now be setting a schedule to take those courses. Getting my IFR rating is certainly still a goal as I now know that; even if you don't fly IFR; the skills that you gain during IFR training are essential when the wrong set of conditions and judgment combine to place you in danger of losing control of your aircraft. As a final observation; I also believe my choice of aircraft was a contributing reason to my successful recovery from an unusual attitude. The Diamond Eclipse is a very forgiving plane - when I approached the edge of its flying envelope; it kept itself stable until I could figure out how to recover.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.