Narrative:

We were cleared to cross 40 NM west of linden VOR to maintain FL270. The captain and I began discussing the best method to program the CDU to allow the performance management system to descend the aircraft. We had a difference of opinion on how to best accomplish this task (since we are trained to use all possible on-board performance systems). We wanted to use the aircraft's capabilities to its fullest. As a result, a late descent was started using conventional autoplt capabilities (vertical speed, maximum indicated mach/airspeed and speed brakes). Near the end of descent, the aircraft was descending at 340 KIAS and 6000' FPM rate of descent. The aircraft crossed the fix approximately 250-500' high. Unfortunately, we made no call to ATC to advise them of the possibility of not meeting the required altitude/fix. This possible altitude excursion resulted because: 1) captain and first officer had differences of opinion on how to program the descent. A) both thought their method was best: the captain's of programming (fooling) the computer to believe anti-ice would be used during descent, which starts the descent earlier; the first officer's of subtracting 5 mi from the navigation fix and programming the computer to cross 5 mi prior to linden at FL270. B) a minor personality clash between the captain and first officer brought about by differences of opinion on general flying duties, techniques of flying and checklist discipline. C) time wasted by both captain and first officer (especially first officer) in incorrectly programming CDU and FMS for descent, which obviously wasted time at level flight, which should have been used for descent. Observation: as a pilot for a large commercial carrier at its largest base, we seldom fly with the same cockpit crew member. This normally does not create a problem. I do, however, feel that with the 'new generation' glass cockpits being on the property approximately 6 yrs; this can cause a bit more difficult transition than, say month to month cockpit crew change on a 727 or pre-EFIS dc-9. I have flown commercially for 10 yrs, and have flown 2-MAN crew aircraft for 8 of those 10. The toughest transition for me is to determine who shares PF and PNF duties. This historically (3 yrs) has been most difficult when the other crew member has transferred from a 3-MAN cockpit to a 2-MAN 'glass cockpit.' this is especially pertinent when the crew member has been on a 3-MAN crew aircraft for a # of yrs. As first officer, when you are the PNF, you accomplish your normal duties. However, often times when one is the PF, the also has to do the PNF duties because the other crew member has not been used to doing PNF duties to the extent that it is required on 2-MAN cockpits, whether they be conventional or EFIS. This obviously can lead to a myriad of problems. Add WX problems or an airport such as washington national, lga or orange county, and problems can accelerate with alarming rapidity.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: LGT FLT CREW MISSED CROSSING RESTRICTION DUE TO TIME SPENT DISCUSSING HOW TO PROGRAM FMS.

Narrative: WE WERE CLRED TO CROSS 40 NM W OF LINDEN VOR TO MAINTAIN FL270. THE CAPT AND I BEGAN DISCUSSING THE BEST METHOD TO PROGRAM THE CDU TO ALLOW THE PERFORMANCE MGMNT SYS TO DSND THE ACFT. WE HAD A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION ON HOW TO BEST ACCOMPLISH THIS TASK (SINCE WE ARE TRAINED TO USE ALL POSSIBLE ON-BOARD PERFORMANCE SYSTEMS). WE WANTED TO USE THE ACFT'S CAPABILITIES TO ITS FULLEST. AS A RESULT, A LATE DSCNT WAS STARTED USING CONVENTIONAL AUTOPLT CAPABILITIES (VERT SPD, MAX INDICATED MACH/AIRSPD AND SPD BRAKES). NEAR THE END OF DSCNT, THE ACFT WAS DSNDING AT 340 KIAS AND 6000' FPM RATE OF DSCNT. THE ACFT CROSSED THE FIX APPROX 250-500' HIGH. UNFORTUNATELY, WE MADE NO CALL TO ATC TO ADVISE THEM OF THE POSSIBILITY OF NOT MEETING THE REQUIRED ALT/FIX. THIS POSSIBLE ALT EXCURSION RESULTED BECAUSE: 1) CAPT AND F/O HAD DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON HOW TO PROGRAM THE DSCNT. A) BOTH THOUGHT THEIR METHOD WAS BEST: THE CAPT'S OF PROGRAMMING (FOOLING) THE COMPUTER TO BELIEVE ANTI-ICE WOULD BE USED DURING DSCNT, WHICH STARTS THE DSCNT EARLIER; THE F/O'S OF SUBTRACTING 5 MI FROM THE NAV FIX AND PROGRAMMING THE COMPUTER TO CROSS 5 MI PRIOR TO LINDEN AT FL270. B) A MINOR PERSONALITY CLASH BTWN THE CAPT AND F/O BROUGHT ABOUT BY DIFFERENCES OF OPINION ON GENERAL FLYING DUTIES, TECHNIQUES OF FLYING AND CHKLIST DISCIPLINE. C) TIME WASTED BY BOTH CAPT AND F/O (ESPECIALLY F/O) IN INCORRECTLY PROGRAMMING CDU AND FMS FOR DSCNT, WHICH OBVIOUSLY WASTED TIME AT LEVEL FLT, WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN USED FOR DSCNT. OBSERVATION: AS A PLT FOR A LARGE COMMERCIAL CARRIER AT ITS LARGEST BASE, WE SELDOM FLY WITH THE SAME COCKPIT CREW MEMBER. THIS NORMALLY DOES NOT CREATE A PROB. I DO, HOWEVER, FEEL THAT WITH THE 'NEW GENERATION' GLASS COCKPITS BEING ON THE PROPERTY APPROX 6 YRS; THIS CAN CAUSE A BIT MORE DIFFICULT TRANSITION THAN, SAY MONTH TO MONTH COCKPIT CREW CHANGE ON A 727 OR PRE-EFIS DC-9. I HAVE FLOWN COMMERCIALLY FOR 10 YRS, AND HAVE FLOWN 2-MAN CREW ACFT FOR 8 OF THOSE 10. THE TOUGHEST TRANSITION FOR ME IS TO DETERMINE WHO SHARES PF AND PNF DUTIES. THIS HISTORICALLY (3 YRS) HAS BEEN MOST DIFFICULT WHEN THE OTHER CREW MEMBER HAS TRANSFERRED FROM A 3-MAN COCKPIT TO A 2-MAN 'GLASS COCKPIT.' THIS IS ESPECIALLY PERTINENT WHEN THE CREW MEMBER HAS BEEN ON A 3-MAN CREW ACFT FOR A # OF YRS. AS F/O, WHEN YOU ARE THE PNF, YOU ACCOMPLISH YOUR NORMAL DUTIES. HOWEVER, OFTEN TIMES WHEN ONE IS THE PF, THE ALSO HAS TO DO THE PNF DUTIES BECAUSE THE OTHER CREW MEMBER HAS NOT BEEN USED TO DOING PNF DUTIES TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS REQUIRED ON 2-MAN COCKPITS, WHETHER THEY BE CONVENTIONAL OR EFIS. THIS OBVIOUSLY CAN LEAD TO A MYRIAD OF PROBS. ADD WX PROBS OR AN ARPT SUCH AS WASHINGTON NATL, LGA OR ORANGE COUNTY, AND PROBS CAN ACCELERATE WITH ALARMING RAPIDITY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.