Narrative:

Working a moderately busy session on ground control; aircraft X; had taxied to a FBO; but after pulling onto the ramp found out they needed to go to another FBO; on the other side of the runway. [City vehicle] and tow was headed north on bravo; holding short of runway 16R at Q; also destined for the FBO. I also had several aircraft calling for taxi clearance and taxi back to parking. I authorized the tug southbound on taxiway a and then authorized aircraft X to taxi south on B to hold short of runway 16R at P.during this time I was scanning the LC1 traffic; and looking for the best opportunity to cross both aircraft X and the city vehicle. I observed a C172 on short final for runway 16R and also a jet about 4 miles in trail. I coordinated with LC1; 'after short final cessna; beat the jet traffic; cross runway 16R at P and Q.' LC1 responded 'approved as requested; cross RY16R at P and Q'. I observed the landing cessna at taxiing speed and starting to make its turn off of runway 16R. I issued clearance for aircraft X to 'cross runway 16R at P and then straight ahead to the FBO.' aircraft X began to move; I then issued instructions for city vehicle to cross runway 16R at Q; as I did this I observed the C172 becoming airborne abeam intersection H and issued instructions for the city vehicle to hold position. I then inquired from the LC1 controller as to why they had not told me that their short final was a touch-and-go. The response from the LC1 controller was 'I don't have to tell you that'. Aircraft X was clear of runway 16R by the time the C172 was approximately 1500-1800 feet north of the intersection; southbound; airborne over runway 16R.the LC1 controller was relieved from position soon after the incident. Expectation bias; that the aircraft was a full stop and also that the LC1 would tell me if they were not; led up to this incident. I believed that they had made a full stop; I also believed that I saw the aircraft turning to exit. Had I waited just a little bit longer; I would have noticed that the aircraft was not in fact exiting but was powering up. I believe that the LC1 also thought the C172 was a full stop and forgot that they had approved a touch-and-go and a crossing. LC1 was [name removed]. When giving conditional crossings; ensure that you know or confirm exactly what the traffic is doing that you are giving conditions based on. Don't offer conditions. Let the appropriate local control controller impose conditions on your request.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: VNY Tower Ground Controller describes a situation where he asked Local Control to cross traffic after aircraft on short final and before traffic on 4 mile final. Local approved the request. Ground then observed traffic landing; told aircraft to cross; and then observed aircraft landing make a touch and go. Ground held crossing aircraft; and asked Local as to why he didn't tell him it was a touch and go.

Narrative: Working a moderately busy session on ground control; Aircraft X; had taxied to a FBO; but after pulling onto the ramp found out they needed to go to another FBO; on the other side of the runway. [City Vehicle] and tow was headed north on Bravo; holding Short of runway 16R at Q; also destined for the FBO. I also had several aircraft calling for taxi clearance and taxi back to parking. I authorized the tug southbound on taxiway A and then authorized Aircraft X to taxi south on B to hold short of runway 16R at P.During this time I was scanning the LC1 traffic; and looking for the best opportunity to cross both Aircraft X and the city vehicle. I observed a C172 on short final for RWY 16R and also a jet about 4 miles in trail. I Coordinated with LC1; 'After short final Cessna; beat the jet traffic; Cross runway 16R at P and Q.' LC1 responded 'Approved as requested; cross RY16R at P and Q'. I observed the landing Cessna at taxiing speed and starting to make its turn off of runway 16R. I issued clearance for Aircraft X to 'Cross runway 16R at P and then straight ahead to the FBO.' Aircraft X began to move; I then issued instructions for city vehicle to cross runway 16R at Q; as I did this I observed the C172 becoming airborne abeam intersection H and issued instructions for the city vehicle to hold position. I then inquired from the LC1 controller as to why they had not told me that their short final was a touch-and-go. The response from the LC1 controller was 'I don't have to tell you that'. Aircraft X was clear of runway 16R by the time the C172 was approximately 1500-1800 feet north of the intersection; southbound; airborne over RWY 16R.The LC1 controller was relieved from position soon after the incident. Expectation bias; that the aircraft was a full stop and also that the LC1 would tell me if they were not; led up to this incident. I believed that they had made a full stop; I also believed that I saw the aircraft turning to exit. Had I waited just a little bit longer; I would have noticed that the aircraft was not in fact exiting but was powering up. I believe that the LC1 also thought the C172 was a full stop and forgot that they had approved a touch-and-go and a crossing. LC1 was [name removed]. When giving conditional crossings; ensure that you know or confirm exactly what the traffic is doing that you are giving conditions based on. Don't offer conditions. Let the appropriate LC controller impose conditions on your request.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.