Hcf controller reports of a new procedure where they tag up aircraft; not related to a primary radar...

Narrative:

I was working D7 when aircraft X checked in on frequency at FL340. The R7 controller issued this aircraft a beacon code of [XXXX] then proceeded to start a track (as per hcf facility directive) for aircraft X over fapis. A minute or two later aircraft Y checked in on frequency at FL360 and the R7 controller did the same thing for this aircraft; beacon code and started a track. The track for aircraft X showed a mode C altitude of FL360. This occurred for a couple of sweeps and I proceeded to bring this erroneous altitude readout to the attention to the R7 controller. The R7 controller then proceeded to reposition the track for aircraft X off of the target it was tracking (aircraft Y). I have noticed this happening several times before. This is totally unacceptable to have data for one aircraft being started on a target of another aircraft. Before this track starting procedure was implemented; this had never happened before. The procedure requiring controllers to start tracks on no visible targets must be discontinued. Auto acquisition must be reemployed as a way of radar identification to ensure the data from the aircraft's transponder matches the data in the tab list. Starting a track does nothing to ensure IFR separation is maintained and only causes potential erroneous data being displayed as demonstrated above as well as unnecessarily increasing controller workload on the busiest sector in hcf.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: HCF Controller reports of a new procedure where they tag up aircraft; not related to a primary radar return. Data tags swap at times causing confusion about the aircraft's position.

Narrative: I was working D7 when Aircraft X checked in on frequency at FL340. The R7 controller issued this aircraft a beacon code of [XXXX] then proceeded to start a track (as per HCF facility directive) for Aircraft X over FAPIS. A minute or two later Aircraft Y checked in on frequency at FL360 and the R7 controller did the same thing for this aircraft; beacon code and started a track. The track for Aircraft X showed a mode C altitude of FL360. This occurred for a couple of sweeps and I proceeded to bring this erroneous altitude readout to the attention to the R7 controller. The R7 controller then proceeded to reposition the track for Aircraft X off of the target it was tracking (Aircraft Y). I have noticed this happening several times before. This is totally unacceptable to have data for one aircraft being started on a target of another aircraft. Before this track starting procedure was implemented; this had never happened before. The procedure requiring controllers to start tracks on no visible targets must be discontinued. Auto acquisition must be reemployed as a way of radar identification to ensure the data from the aircraft's transponder matches the data in the tab list. Starting a track does nothing to ensure IFR separation is maintained and only causes potential erroneous data being displayed as demonstrated above as well as unnecessarily increasing controller workload on the busiest sector in HCF.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	1235904
Time
Date	201501
Local Time Of Day	1801-2400
Place
Locale Reference	HCF.TRACON
State Reference	HI
Environment
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	Military Transport
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 91
Flight Phase	Cruise
Flight Plan	IFR
Aircraft 2
Make Model Name	Large Transport
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Cruise
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Function	Approach Enroute
Qualification	Air Traffic Control Fully Certified
Experience	Air Traffic Control Time Certified In Pos 1 (yrs) 20
Events
Anomaly	ATC Issue All Types Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy

Hcf controller reports of a new procedure where they tag up aircraft; not related to a primary radar return. Data tags swap at times causing confusion about the aircraft's position.