Narrative:

While on approach into atlanta (atl) we were told to follow a heavy 747 on the visual approach. I was the pilot monitoring (pm) and the first officer (first officer) was the pilot flying (PF). Upon joining the localizer at 3;000 feet we encountered wake turbulence from the 747. At this point the first officer decided to hand fly the approach to stay above the wake turbulence and maintain a path to the runway above the glide slope. We were instructed to maintain 170 knots until the final approach fix and to contact tower at the final approach fix. As the first officer was configuring for landing; he called 'flaps 5; vee-approach.' I was immediately confused by what he was asking for and while selecting flaps to the 5 position I asked what he meant. He again said 'vee-approach' and I still didn't know what he wanted; thinking he wanted me to select some sort of approach mode. His intention was for me to bug the vapp speed. At this point he changed the speed selector to FMS speeds to begin a slowdown of the aircraft and by this time the flaps had moved to 5 and the overspeed limit came down to our current airspeed which was just below 180. We then encountered more wake turbulence which increased the speed to 181 knots causing a brief overspeed of the flaps. This was immediately corrected by the first officer and he began decreasing to approach speed. Due to the flap overspeed; I was side-tracked thinking about the maintenance implications and a potential event being triggered. Also as the first officer was flying; I was paying attention to his approach in reference to the 747 to assure that if we encountered any more wake turbulence; we would both be ready to deal with it. In the midst of all of this happening; I forgot to switch over to the tower frequency at the final approach fix. Just prior to the 500 feet call out; we encountered more wake turbulence; so we again were distracted by this; ultimately resulting in landing without receiving a landing clearance. We realized what happened once we taxied clear of the runway and queried the tower. They responded with taxi instructions; and eventually had us switch to ground control without a mention of the incident. Once I arrived at the gate; and after calling maintenance for the over speed inspection; I called the tower and spoke with mr. X to assure there was no conflict. He told me that there were no issues whatsoever due to this event and they understood we got distracted by our flight duties and said not to worry about it. This event was caused by a chain of events beginning with the concern for the wake turbulence. If the first officer would have made a more specific call out for the speed reduction; the flap overspeed would not have occurred and I would not have been distracted from my pm duties. Additionally; if I would have verified the speed was below company limits prior to selecting flaps 5; I could have potentially avoided the overspeed. As far as landing without clearance; I should have confirmed the landing light switches were turned on at 500 feet; but due to the wake turbulence and overspeed distraction; I overlooked this. The first officer also should have confirmed with me that we were cleared to land prior to his callout of 'landing.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ERJ-175 flight crew reported landing without clearance in ATL when they were distracted by several events; including a wake vortex encounter.

Narrative: While on approach into Atlanta (ATL) we were told to follow a heavy 747 on the visual approach. I was the Pilot Monitoring (PM) and the First Officer (FO) was the Pilot Flying (PF). Upon joining the localizer at 3;000 feet we encountered wake turbulence from the 747. At this point the FO decided to hand fly the approach to stay above the wake turbulence and maintain a path to the runway above the glide slope. We were instructed to maintain 170 knots until the final approach fix and to contact tower at the final approach fix. As the FO was configuring for landing; he called 'Flaps 5; Vee-Approach.' I was immediately confused by what he was asking for and while selecting flaps to the 5 position I asked what he meant. He again said 'Vee-Approach' and I still didn't know what he wanted; thinking he wanted me to select some sort of approach mode. His intention was for me to bug the VAPP speed. At this point he changed the speed selector to FMS speeds to begin a slowdown of the aircraft and by this time the flaps had moved to 5 and the overspeed limit came down to our current airspeed which was just below 180. We then encountered more wake turbulence which increased the speed to 181 knots causing a brief overspeed of the flaps. This was immediately corrected by the FO and he began decreasing to approach speed. Due to the flap overspeed; I was side-tracked thinking about the maintenance implications and a potential event being triggered. Also as the FO was flying; I was paying attention to his approach in reference to the 747 to assure that if we encountered any more wake turbulence; we would both be ready to deal with it. In the midst of all of this happening; I forgot to switch over to the tower frequency at the final approach fix. Just prior to the 500 feet call out; we encountered more wake turbulence; so we again were distracted by this; ultimately resulting in landing without receiving a landing clearance. We realized what happened once we taxied clear of the runway and queried the tower. They responded with taxi instructions; and eventually had us switch to ground control without a mention of the incident. Once I arrived at the gate; and after calling maintenance for the over speed inspection; I called the tower and spoke with Mr. X to assure there was no conflict. He told me that there were no issues whatsoever due to this event and they understood we got distracted by our flight duties and said not to worry about it. This event was caused by a chain of events beginning with the concern for the wake turbulence. If the FO would have made a more specific call out for the speed reduction; the flap overspeed would not have occurred and I would not have been distracted from my PM duties. Additionally; if I would have verified the speed was below company limits prior to selecting flaps 5; I could have potentially avoided the overspeed. As far as landing without clearance; I should have confirmed the landing light switches were turned on at 500 feet; but due to the wake turbulence and overspeed distraction; I overlooked this. The FO also should have confirmed with me that we were cleared to land prior to his callout of 'landing.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.