Narrative:

We were landing our small transport on runway 1R, and told to hold short of runway 28R due to landing traffic. The winds were at 280 at 17 KTS. The captain felt he could make the landing with enough runway to stop short of 28R. The captain was at the controls and on the visual approach for 1R. He was a little high on glide path due to ATC's delay on our descent. During the flare we were a few KTS fast, that along with the turbulence we encountered plus the fact that the captain had the power levers advanced beyond flight idle caused the aircraft to float down the runway. While in the flare captain did not use enough rudder control to keep the aircraft straight down the runway. I felt in the interest of safety it was necessary to make the call out 'captain you need more rudder'. The captain said jokingly 'I've got full rudder in there now'. I felt in the interest of safety that I should back him up on rudder control. There was enough rudder travel left to bring the nose of the aircraft straight. Instead of doing this he broke the sterile cockpit rule and went to tell me that I should not tell a 9000 hour pilot how to land an airplane. Due to his frustration about trying to land the aircraft in a x-wind situation, and the fact that it was necessary for me to tell him he needed more rudder control, he forgot about 28R. I saw the landing traffic the entire time and knew that it was too late to try and stop short of the runway. We had enough speed to cross the runway safely. The other aircraft had just touched down with the nose of the aircraft still in the air when we crossed. I felt it was safe to cross the runway without saying anything to the captain. After crossing the runway safely with time to spare, I then told the captain he had crossed 28R to his surprise. In the interest of safety they should not have aircraft land on 1R while there is landing traffic on 28R. San francisco int'l airport is very busy and they are trying to get as many aircraft in as they can, but the incident that happened to us can happen to any aircraft and its crew. Supplemental information from acn 124033: due to the strong x-winds and turbulence I was carrying additional power till touchdown which caused my landing to be long. I was told to call the tower. The supervisor said she was turning it over to the local FSDO.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER SMT UNAUTH RWY CROSSING AFTER LNDG WHEN MULTIPLE INTERSECTING RWYS IN USE AT SFO.

Narrative: WE WERE LNDG OUR SMT ON RWY 1R, AND TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 28R DUE TO LNDG TFC. THE WINDS WERE AT 280 AT 17 KTS. THE CAPT FELT HE COULD MAKE THE LNDG WITH ENOUGH RWY TO STOP SHORT OF 28R. THE CAPT WAS AT THE CONTROLS AND ON THE VISUAL APCH FOR 1R. HE WAS A LITTLE HIGH ON GLIDE PATH DUE TO ATC'S DELAY ON OUR DSCNT. DURING THE FLARE WE WERE A FEW KTS FAST, THAT ALONG WITH THE TURBULENCE WE ENCOUNTERED PLUS THE FACT THAT THE CAPT HAD THE POWER LEVERS ADVANCED BEYOND FLT IDLE CAUSED THE ACFT TO FLOAT DOWN THE RWY. WHILE IN THE FLARE CAPT DID NOT USE ENOUGH RUDDER CONTROL TO KEEP THE ACFT STRAIGHT DOWN THE RWY. I FELT IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY IT WAS NECESSARY TO MAKE THE CALL OUT 'CAPT YOU NEED MORE RUDDER'. THE CAPT SAID JOKINGLY 'I'VE GOT FULL RUDDER IN THERE NOW'. I FELT IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY THAT I SHOULD BACK HIM UP ON RUDDER CONTROL. THERE WAS ENOUGH RUDDER TRAVEL LEFT TO BRING THE NOSE OF THE ACFT STRAIGHT. INSTEAD OF DOING THIS HE BROKE THE STERILE COCKPIT RULE AND WENT TO TELL ME THAT I SHOULD NOT TELL A 9000 HR PLT HOW TO LAND AN AIRPLANE. DUE TO HIS FRUSTRATION ABOUT TRYING TO LAND THE ACFT IN A X-WIND SITUATION, AND THE FACT THAT IT WAS NECESSARY FOR ME TO TELL HIM HE NEEDED MORE RUDDER CONTROL, HE FORGOT ABOUT 28R. I SAW THE LNDG TFC THE ENTIRE TIME AND KNEW THAT IT WAS TOO LATE TO TRY AND STOP SHORT OF THE RWY. WE HAD ENOUGH SPEED TO CROSS THE RWY SAFELY. THE OTHER ACFT HAD JUST TOUCHED DOWN WITH THE NOSE OF THE ACFT STILL IN THE AIR WHEN WE CROSSED. I FELT IT WAS SAFE TO CROSS THE RWY WITHOUT SAYING ANYTHING TO THE CAPT. AFTER XING THE RWY SAFELY WITH TIME TO SPARE, I THEN TOLD THE CAPT HE HAD CROSSED 28R TO HIS SURPRISE. IN THE INTEREST OF SAFETY THEY SHOULD NOT HAVE ACFT LAND ON 1R WHILE THERE IS LNDG TFC ON 28R. SAN FRANCISCO INT'L ARPT IS VERY BUSY AND THEY ARE TRYING TO GET AS MANY ACFT IN AS THEY CAN, BUT THE INCIDENT THAT HAPPENED TO US CAN HAPPEN TO ANY ACFT AND ITS CREW. SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FROM ACN 124033: DUE TO THE STRONG X-WINDS AND TURBULENCE I WAS CARRYING ADDITIONAL POWER TILL TOUCHDOWN WHICH CAUSED MY LNDG TO BE LONG. I WAS TOLD TO CALL THE TWR. THE SUPVR SAID SHE WAS TURNING IT OVER TO THE LOCAL FSDO.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.