Narrative:

As my student and I were returning to smo after a training flight, we reported 6 mi out as usual (palisades). Tower instructed us to make right traffic, runway 21, report downwind and also advised us that there was another aircraft with a similar call sign to ours. We acknowledged this and proceeded into the traffic pattern at 1400' MSL, reported downwind abeam and were cleared to land following the small aircraft downwind ahead. As we approached the abeam position to the runway threshold, the tower again cleared us to land following the small aircraft ahead. At this point I got heavily involved in talking my student through the steps to be followed during the approach and after looking for the traffic and not seeing it, I wrongly assumed it was already on the ground. We then started a descent and turned base leg. As we approached the point where a turn to final should be made, smo tower called us saying. 'Identification, you are cutting your traffic, proceed to the downwind south straight ahead and make left traffic 21'. I acknowledged this and complied, however, I had no idea how close my traffic was coming at us from our 9 O'clock. A couple of moments later I observed the other small aircraft take evasive action by climbing above us as it continued down on the approach. We continued to the south downwind and landed without any further incidents making this a full stop landing, after which, I talked to the other pilot (who is also an instructor at our FBO). She said we scared her and declined filing a NASA ASRS report. The contributing factors in this incident, in my opinion are: 1) my lack of concentration on looking and positively identifying our traffic before landing (as I routinely do) due to the heavy 'question and answer' situation that my student involved me in. 2) the lack of controller alertness in not identifying the hazard earlier and not making the other airplane go around instead of allowing it to continue the approach when a conflict existed. 3) the other pilot's judgement in not immediately starting a go around when the possible conflict should have been evident by listening to the radio and also watching the threshold environment when on final. 4) controller saying 'clear to land, follow the small aircraft...', I think this phrase should be avoided for in some cases a pilot may subconsciously accept the clearance without minding other traffic as carefully as if he was only 'cleared to land' when no other traffic is preceding. After this incident, I have made it a very clear point to all my students to minimize the cockpit 'pilot-to-pilot' chat during operations in the traffic pattern for it could have serious consequences by distracting the pilot from watching for other traffic. This incident also proved the motto I have always believed in: 'there are no perfect pilots, we all learn something new on every flight. Complacency is a killer'.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: 2 SMA'S IN PATTERN EXPERIENCED NMAC.

Narrative: AS MY STUDENT AND I WERE RETURNING TO SMO AFTER A TRAINING FLT, WE REPORTED 6 MI OUT AS USUAL (PALISADES). TWR INSTRUCTED US TO MAKE RIGHT TFC, RWY 21, REPORT DOWNWIND AND ALSO ADVISED US THAT THERE WAS ANOTHER ACFT WITH A SIMILAR CALL SIGN TO OURS. WE ACKNOWLEDGED THIS AND PROCEEDED INTO THE TFC PATTERN AT 1400' MSL, REPORTED DOWNWIND ABEAM AND WERE CLRED TO LAND FOLLOWING THE SMA DOWNWIND AHEAD. AS WE APCHED THE ABEAM POSITION TO THE RWY THRESHOLD, THE TWR AGAIN CLRED US TO LAND FOLLOWING THE SMA AHEAD. AT THIS POINT I GOT HEAVILY INVOLVED IN TALKING MY STUDENT THROUGH THE STEPS TO BE FOLLOWED DURING THE APCH AND AFTER LOOKING FOR THE TFC AND NOT SEEING IT, I WRONGLY ASSUMED IT WAS ALREADY ON THE GND. WE THEN STARTED A DSCNT AND TURNED BASE LEG. AS WE APCHED THE POINT WHERE A TURN TO FINAL SHOULD BE MADE, SMO TWR CALLED US SAYING. 'ID, YOU ARE CUTTING YOUR TFC, PROCEED TO THE DOWNWIND SOUTH STRAIGHT AHEAD AND MAKE LEFT TFC 21'. I ACKNOWLEDGED THIS AND COMPLIED, HOWEVER, I HAD NO IDEA HOW CLOSE MY TFC WAS COMING AT US FROM OUR 9 O'CLOCK. A COUPLE OF MOMENTS LATER I OBSERVED THE OTHER SMA TAKE EVASIVE ACTION BY CLIMBING ABOVE US AS IT CONTINUED DOWN ON THE APCH. WE CONTINUED TO THE SOUTH DOWNWIND AND LANDED WITHOUT ANY FURTHER INCIDENTS MAKING THIS A FULL STOP LNDG, AFTER WHICH, I TALKED TO THE OTHER PLT (WHO IS ALSO AN INSTRUCTOR AT OUR FBO). SHE SAID WE SCARED HER AND DECLINED FILING A NASA ASRS REPORT. THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS IN THIS INCIDENT, IN MY OPINION ARE: 1) MY LACK OF CONCENTRATION ON LOOKING AND POSITIVELY IDENTIFYING OUR TFC BEFORE LNDG (AS I ROUTINELY DO) DUE TO THE HEAVY 'QUESTION AND ANSWER' SITUATION THAT MY STUDENT INVOLVED ME IN. 2) THE LACK OF CTLR ALERTNESS IN NOT IDENTIFYING THE HAZARD EARLIER AND NOT MAKING THE OTHER AIRPLANE GO AROUND INSTEAD OF ALLOWING IT TO CONTINUE THE APCH WHEN A CONFLICT EXISTED. 3) THE OTHER PLT'S JUDGEMENT IN NOT IMMEDIATELY STARTING A GO AROUND WHEN THE POSSIBLE CONFLICT SHOULD HAVE BEEN EVIDENT BY LISTENING TO THE RADIO AND ALSO WATCHING THE THRESHOLD ENVIRONMENT WHEN ON FINAL. 4) CTLR SAYING 'CLEAR TO LAND, FOLLOW THE SMA...', I THINK THIS PHRASE SHOULD BE AVOIDED FOR IN SOME CASES A PLT MAY SUBCONSCIOUSLY ACCEPT THE CLRNC WITHOUT MINDING OTHER TFC AS CAREFULLY AS IF HE WAS ONLY 'CLRED TO LAND' WHEN NO OTHER TFC IS PRECEDING. AFTER THIS INCIDENT, I HAVE MADE IT A VERY CLEAR POINT TO ALL MY STUDENTS TO MINIMIZE THE COCKPIT 'PLT-TO-PLT' CHAT DURING OPERATIONS IN THE TFC PATTERN FOR IT COULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES BY DISTRACTING THE PLT FROM WATCHING FOR OTHER TFC. THIS INCIDENT ALSO PROVED THE MOTTO I HAVE ALWAYS BELIEVED IN: 'THERE ARE NO PERFECT PLTS, WE ALL LEARN SOMETHING NEW ON EVERY FLT. COMPLACENCY IS A KILLER'.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.