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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 124735 |
Time | |
Date | 198909 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : mht |
State Reference | NH |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 0 msl bound upper : 10000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : mht |
Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : approach |
Qualification | controller : radar |
Experience | controller military : 4 controller radar : 8 |
ASRS Report | 124735 |
Events | |
Anomaly | other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | none taken : unable |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | other |
Situations | |
ATC Facility | other physical facility procedure or policy : unspecified |
Narrative:
Manchester approach control, prior to apr/xx/89, was located within boston ARTCC. This setup allowed manchester's primary and secondary radar systems to be backed up by the ARTCC's NAS radar system. Manchester approach control was relocated to the manchester ATC tower on apr/xx/89. Since that date, manchester's radar controllers have not received any local non-radar procedures or training. Whenever a radar outage occurs, the controllers must rely on their own judgement and limited non-radar experience. Some radar controllers have no experience in non-radar environments. Since the relocation, our radar has failed on at least 5 occasions. Most failures have not extended beyond 1/2 to 1 hour in length, however, on 9/xx/89 the outage was over 5 hours long. During this outage, boston ARTCC assumed control of the upper 5000' of airspace and manchester controled the lower portion, thus concentrating on arrs and departures. The lack of training and charts, maps, and 'crutches' is causing an extreme safety problem. Controllers have to 'guesstimate' what airspace clears what, what DME clears adjacent facs, when 2 apches are okay to use, etc. Facility management, to this date, appears to feel that this problem is not a high priority, a belief radar controllers do not share.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: RELOCATION OF RADAR APCH FAC CAUSES CONFUSION DUE TO INADEQUATE TRAINING.
Narrative: MANCHESTER APCH CTL, PRIOR TO APR/XX/89, WAS LOCATED WITHIN BOSTON ARTCC. THIS SETUP ALLOWED MANCHESTER'S PRIMARY AND SECONDARY RADAR SYSTEMS TO BE BACKED UP BY THE ARTCC'S NAS RADAR SYSTEM. MANCHESTER APCH CTL WAS RELOCATED TO THE MANCHESTER ATC TWR ON APR/XX/89. SINCE THAT DATE, MANCHESTER'S RADAR CTLRS HAVE NOT RECEIVED ANY LCL NON-RADAR PROCS OR TRAINING. WHENEVER A RADAR OUTAGE OCCURS, THE CTLRS MUST RELY ON THEIR OWN JUDGEMENT AND LIMITED NON-RADAR EXPERIENCE. SOME RADAR CTLRS HAVE NO EXPERIENCE IN NON-RADAR ENVIRONMENTS. SINCE THE RELOCATION, OUR RADAR HAS FAILED ON AT LEAST 5 OCCASIONS. MOST FAILURES HAVE NOT EXTENDED BEYOND 1/2 TO 1 HR IN LENGTH, HOWEVER, ON 9/XX/89 THE OUTAGE WAS OVER 5 HRS LONG. DURING THIS OUTAGE, BOSTON ARTCC ASSUMED CTL OF THE UPPER 5000' OF AIRSPACE AND MANCHESTER CTLED THE LOWER PORTION, THUS CONCENTRATING ON ARRS AND DEPS. THE LACK OF TRAINING AND CHARTS, MAPS, AND 'CRUTCHES' IS CAUSING AN EXTREME SAFETY PROBLEM. CTLRS HAVE TO 'GUESSTIMATE' WHAT AIRSPACE CLEARS WHAT, WHAT DME CLEARS ADJACENT FACS, WHEN 2 APCHES ARE OKAY TO USE, ETC. FAC MGMNT, TO THIS DATE, APPEARS TO FEEL THAT THIS PROBLEM IS NOT A HIGH PRIORITY, A BELIEF RADAR CTLRS DO NOT SHARE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.