Narrative:

I was settling in to the controller in charge (controller in charge) position and began observing local control's (local control) traffic situation. Aircraft X was on a right downwind to 12L; along with aircraft Y. After the outgoing controller in charge departed; I observed aircraft Z tagged for runway 30R; but was not aware of any odo (opposite direction operation) coordination for aircraft Z. In hindsight; perhaps the coordination took place while the other controller in charge was on and it did not get passed to me. I started to get up to ask local control about aircraft Z; but traffic suddenly picked up and he became very busy working to sequence the inbounds for 12L and 12R; and ensure they would not conflict for aircraft X turning final. Next thing I knew; aircraft Z was already inside the airspace; but yet there were still other aircraft making their initial calls tying up the frequency. Finally; local control confirmed that aircraft Z was on frequency; advised him of the opposite direction traffic for runway 12L; and issued circling instructions prior to aircraft Z reaching the runway 30R.I became concerned about watching a potential conflict between aircraft X and another helicopter that was north of the final for 12L. Once that situation was no longer an issue; I saw that aircraft Z appeared to be inside the 2 mile cutoff on runway 30R with aircraft X on short final for runway 12L. I stood up and was trying to find a chance to get local control's attention to alert him of the need to get aircraft Z off the final and circle to the ramp; but traffic was still very busy and I did not get a chance to safely get his attention and let him know. Then; at least one of the aircraft on final for runway 12L or 12R urgently alerted local control that there was an aircraft 'flying the wrong way' near the final for runway 12L. Local control immediately took appropriate action to correct that situation and get aircraft Y out of the way of the aircraft on final. Aircraft Y was re-sequenced to follow traffic inbound to runway 12L. Finally; I became aware that it appeared aircraft a was on a mile final and did not lower his landing gear. I advised local control; who then reminded the pilot to lower his gear; and aircraft a landed safely. Aircraft X had exited without incident; aircraft Z circled to land the ramp; and aircraft Y also landed safely. I would describe this whole situation as a series of events that came together to overload local control (as well as the controller in charge trying to monitor) and thus resulted in the new odo procedures not being followed. Specifically; with a high performance (jet) aircraft on the final; local procedures specify the opposite direction traffic needed to have abandoned the opposite direction approach prior to reaching a 2 mile final for runway 30R. In hindsight; this could have be issued to the odo pilot on their initial call. Additionally; I don't believe complete traffic information was exchanged and I am not sure if the coordination was complete (it may have occurred before I was in the operation). With that said; I think local control otherwise kept priorities straight and was focused on ensuring that a safe operation took place; specifically with IFR jet traffic operating close to other VFR traffic on the finals. The situation became incredibly complex when it appeared one of the VFR pilots became confused and was flying towards the other traffic on final trying to land; in conjunction with a situation where a pilot appeared to overlook lowering his landing gear on final. Looking back; I believe these highest priority; critical duties (mitigating a possible near midair collision or gear-up landing) made it unfeasible for local control to take action sooner to get the odo traffic off the final inside the cutoff point. There are a number of opportunities to learn from these events; and that includes that odo operations must be approached with great caution; especially when there is a potential for heavy/complex traffic situations. (On a side note; the 2 mile cutoff point seems reasonable to protect for a high performance aircraft going around). The trap thatcan occur is that odos are approved during a period of light or routine traffic; but then traffic suddenly increased resulting in the odo being overlooked or not handled in compliance with new rules and procedures. Further; with a series of different rules and cutoffs depending on aircraft types; parallel runways; IFR vs. VFR; etc.; controllers are undoubtedly facing a learning curve for these operations. The advice I have discussed with many of my coworkers is to err to the side of caution while we adjust to the new odo procedures. Suggestions include: asking for help when needed (such as having another position call approach to disapprove a previously approved odo); and if necessary due to volume (or even simply forgetting what's needed to run a specific operation); immediately taking corrective action to safely break odo traffic off the final and eliminate the issue.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: BJC Controller reports of an Opposite Direction Operation that Local Controller is unaware of its close proximity and violates the facilities ODO Policy.

Narrative: I was settling in to the Controller in charge (CIC) position and began observing Local Control's (LC) traffic situation. Aircraft X was on a right downwind to 12L; along with Aircraft Y. After the outgoing CIC departed; I observed Aircraft Z tagged for RWY 30R; but was not aware of any ODO (Opposite Direction Operation) coordination for Aircraft Z. In hindsight; perhaps the coordination took place while the other CIC was on and it did not get passed to me. I started to get up to ask LC about Aircraft Z; but traffic suddenly picked up and he became very busy working to sequence the inbounds for 12L and 12R; and ensure they would not conflict for Aircraft X turning final. Next thing I knew; Aircraft Z was already inside the airspace; but yet there were still other aircraft making their initial calls tying up the frequency. Finally; LC confirmed that Aircraft Z was on frequency; advised him of the opposite direction traffic for RWY 12L; and issued circling instructions prior to Aircraft Z reaching the RWY 30R.I became concerned about watching a potential conflict between Aircraft X and another helicopter that was north of the final for 12L. Once that situation was no longer an issue; I saw that Aircraft Z appeared to be inside the 2 mile cutoff on RWY 30R with Aircraft X on short final for RWY 12L. I stood up and was trying to find a chance to get LC's attention to alert him of the need to get Aircraft Z off the final and circle to the ramp; but traffic was still very busy and I did not get a chance to safely get his attention and let him know. Then; at least one of the aircraft on final for RWY 12L or 12R urgently alerted LC that there was an aircraft 'flying the wrong way' near the final for RWY 12L. LC immediately took appropriate action to correct that situation and get Aircraft Y out of the way of the aircraft on final. Aircraft Y was re-sequenced to follow traffic inbound to RWY 12L. Finally; I became aware that it appeared Aircraft A was on a mile final and did not lower his landing gear. I advised LC; who then reminded the pilot to lower his gear; and Aircraft A landed safely. Aircraft X had exited without incident; Aircraft Z circled to land the ramp; and Aircraft Y also landed safely. I would describe this whole situation as a series of events that came together to overload LC (as well as the CIC trying to monitor) and thus resulted in the new ODO procedures not being followed. Specifically; with a high performance (jet) aircraft on the final; local procedures specify the opposite direction traffic needed to have abandoned the opposite direction approach prior to reaching a 2 mile final for RWY 30R. In hindsight; this could have be issued to the ODO pilot on their initial call. Additionally; I don't believe complete traffic information was exchanged and I am not sure if the coordination was complete (it may have occurred before I was in the operation). With that said; I think LC otherwise kept priorities straight and was focused on ensuring that a safe operation took place; specifically with IFR jet traffic operating close to other VFR traffic on the finals. The situation became incredibly complex when it appeared one of the VFR pilots became confused and was flying towards the other traffic on final trying to land; in conjunction with a situation where a pilot appeared to overlook lowering his landing gear on final. Looking back; I believe these highest priority; critical duties (mitigating a possible NMAC or gear-up landing) made it unfeasible for LC to take action sooner to get the ODO traffic off the final inside the cutoff point. There are a number of opportunities to learn from these events; and that includes that ODO operations must be approached with great caution; especially when there is a potential for heavy/complex traffic situations. (On a side note; the 2 mile cutoff point seems reasonable to protect for a high performance aircraft going around). The trap thatcan occur is that ODOs are approved during a period of light or routine traffic; but then traffic suddenly increased resulting in the ODO being overlooked or not handled in compliance with new rules and procedures. Further; with a series of different rules and cutoffs depending on aircraft types; parallel runways; IFR vs. VFR; etc.; controllers are undoubtedly facing a learning curve for these operations. The advice I have discussed with many of my coworkers is to err to the side of caution while we adjust to the new ODO procedures. Suggestions include: asking for help when needed (such as having another position call approach to disapprove a previously approved ODO); and if necessary due to volume (or even simply forgetting what's needed to run a specific operation); immediately taking corrective action to safely break ODO traffic off the final and eliminate the issue.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.