Narrative:

I arrived at the airport and the instructor was finishing up with another student. I indicated I would preflight the plane in preparation for an XX30 departure. I conducted a preflight and noted that there were about 10 gals of fuel in each tank and the engine was one qt of oil low. I walked back to the FBO from the ramp and asked the lineman to fuel the plane and put in a qt of oil. I then went inside the wait for the return of the instructor. When the instructor returned we went out to the plane. I again checked the oil (they had put in one qt) and checked the oil cap (in a separate location than the filler) to ensure it was secure. At the time the instructor and I were carrying on a conversation. I did not check the fuel level again. We proceeded with an engine start-up. I began the preflight check using the checklist, following the procedure of reading the item and checking it. I recall checking to see that the fuel pumps were off and that the mixture was full rich. I then specifically checked to see that the fuel on/off valve was on (in) and that the selector was to the both position and then completed the remainder of the checklist. Airborne about 1 hour, the engine began to lose power. I recognized a problem was at hand and checked to see that we were out of fuel. While removing the hood, the instructor took control of the airplane. He flew while I held the fuel pumps on and watched the airspeed. Use of the fuel pump and rocking the wings allowed us enough fuel and power to land at the approach end of the runway, taxi off the runway and onto the taxiway. We checked the landing gear for potential leaks or damage, fueled and returned to omaha. Assessment of the problem: the problem was an error of omission on the part of the pilot. After preflting the plane I did again check to see if the oil had been put in and the cap was secure. I believe that I did not again check to see if fuel had been added because I was talking with the instructor and because I made the assumption that since oil had been added fuel had also been added. After a review and some considerable thought, it appears as though I read a checklist and checked the items, one or two items at a time and return to look at the checklist again. This procedure allows one to skip an item without realizing it. In this case though, the fuel quantity item rests between the on/off valve check and fuel selector check, and I believe that it was a mind-set belief that I had had the plane fueled (they put in oil therefore they put in fuel) and even though I looked at the gauges, it did not register that there was insufficient fuel. Then too in this particular plane the fuel gauges are on the lower console and easily omitted in a final pretkof instrument check. Corrective measures: do not leave the plane after a preflight. Had I stayed to insure that the oil and fuel were added, the problem would not have occurred. Do a second complete preflight if the plane is left unattended or if a modification is made to the plane. Checking the oil and filler was insufficient. Had I gone through a complete preflight again, I would have caught the problem. In use of checklists, do a numbered count of each of the checkpoints insuring that each number is accounted for. Had this been done it is possible that the error would have been caught on the before takeoff check.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FORCED LNDG CREATED BY FUEL STARVATION. INSTRUCTOR PLT DID NOT OBSERVE OTHER PLT'S PREFLT. OTHER PLT DID NOT OBSERVE GND CREW FUEL ACFT. DID NOT INCLUDE VISUAL CHECK OF FUEL ON PREFLT. GND CREW FAILED TO FUEL ACFT.

Narrative: I ARRIVED AT THE ARPT AND THE INSTRUCTOR WAS FINISHING UP WITH ANOTHER STUDENT. I INDICATED I WOULD PREFLT THE PLANE IN PREPARATION FOR AN XX30 DEP. I CONDUCTED A PREFLT AND NOTED THAT THERE WERE ABOUT 10 GALS OF FUEL IN EACH TANK AND THE ENGINE WAS ONE QT OF OIL LOW. I WALKED BACK TO THE FBO FROM THE RAMP AND ASKED THE LINEMAN TO FUEL THE PLANE AND PUT IN A QT OF OIL. I THEN WENT INSIDE THE WAIT FOR THE RETURN OF THE INSTRUCTOR. WHEN THE INSTRUCTOR RETURNED WE WENT OUT TO THE PLANE. I AGAIN CHECKED THE OIL (THEY HAD PUT IN ONE QT) AND CHECKED THE OIL CAP (IN A SEPARATE LOCATION THAN THE FILLER) TO ENSURE IT WAS SECURE. AT THE TIME THE INSTRUCTOR AND I WERE CARRYING ON A CONVERSATION. I DID NOT CHECK THE FUEL LEVEL AGAIN. WE PROCEEDED WITH AN ENGINE START-UP. I BEGAN THE PREFLT CHECK USING THE CHECKLIST, FOLLOWING THE PROC OF READING THE ITEM AND CHECKING IT. I RECALL CHECKING TO SEE THAT THE FUEL PUMPS WERE OFF AND THAT THE MIXTURE WAS FULL RICH. I THEN SPECIFICALLY CHECKED TO SEE THAT THE FUEL ON/OFF VALVE WAS ON (IN) AND THAT THE SELECTOR WAS TO THE BOTH POSITION AND THEN COMPLETED THE REMAINDER OF THE CHECKLIST. AIRBORNE ABOUT 1 HR, THE ENGINE BEGAN TO LOSE POWER. I RECOGNIZED A PROBLEM WAS AT HAND AND CHECKED TO SEE THAT WE WERE OUT OF FUEL. WHILE REMOVING THE HOOD, THE INSTRUCTOR TOOK CONTROL OF THE AIRPLANE. HE FLEW WHILE I HELD THE FUEL PUMPS ON AND WATCHED THE AIRSPEED. USE OF THE FUEL PUMP AND ROCKING THE WINGS ALLOWED US ENOUGH FUEL AND POWER TO LAND AT THE APCH END OF THE RWY, TAXI OFF THE RWY AND ONTO THE TXWY. WE CHECKED THE LNDG GEAR FOR POTENTIAL LEAKS OR DAMAGE, FUELED AND RETURNED TO OMAHA. ASSESSMENT OF THE PROBLEM: THE PROBLEM WAS AN ERROR OF OMISSION ON THE PART OF THE PLT. AFTER PREFLTING THE PLANE I DID AGAIN CHECK TO SEE IF THE OIL HAD BEEN PUT IN AND THE CAP WAS SECURE. I BELIEVE THAT I DID NOT AGAIN CHECK TO SEE IF FUEL HAD BEEN ADDED BECAUSE I WAS TALKING WITH THE INSTRUCTOR AND BECAUSE I MADE THE ASSUMPTION THAT SINCE OIL HAD BEEN ADDED FUEL HAD ALSO BEEN ADDED. AFTER A REVIEW AND SOME CONSIDERABLE THOUGHT, IT APPEARS AS THOUGH I READ A CHECKLIST AND CHECKED THE ITEMS, ONE OR TWO ITEMS AT A TIME AND RETURN TO LOOK AT THE CHECKLIST AGAIN. THIS PROC ALLOWS ONE TO SKIP AN ITEM WITHOUT REALIZING IT. IN THIS CASE THOUGH, THE FUEL QUANTITY ITEM RESTS BETWEEN THE ON/OFF VALVE CHECK AND FUEL SELECTOR CHECK, AND I BELIEVE THAT IT WAS A MIND-SET BELIEF THAT I HAD HAD THE PLANE FUELED (THEY PUT IN OIL THEREFORE THEY PUT IN FUEL) AND EVEN THOUGH I LOOKED AT THE GAUGES, IT DID NOT REGISTER THAT THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT FUEL. THEN TOO IN THIS PARTICULAR PLANE THE FUEL GAUGES ARE ON THE LOWER CONSOLE AND EASILY OMITTED IN A FINAL PRETKOF INSTRUMENT CHECK. CORRECTIVE MEASURES: DO NOT LEAVE THE PLANE AFTER A PREFLT. HAD I STAYED TO INSURE THAT THE OIL AND FUEL WERE ADDED, THE PROBLEM WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. DO A SECOND COMPLETE PREFLT IF THE PLANE IS LEFT UNATTENDED OR IF A MODIFICATION IS MADE TO THE PLANE. CHECKING THE OIL AND FILLER WAS INSUFFICIENT. HAD I GONE THROUGH A COMPLETE PREFLT AGAIN, I WOULD HAVE CAUGHT THE PROBLEM. IN USE OF CHECKLISTS, DO A NUMBERED COUNT OF EACH OF THE CHECKPOINTS INSURING THAT EACH NUMBER IS ACCOUNTED FOR. HAD THIS BEEN DONE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE ERROR WOULD HAVE BEEN CAUGHT ON THE BEFORE TKOF CHECK.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.