Narrative:

I released a flight to den with 15.9 (8.6 FOD (fuel over destination)) and a cos alternate to accommodate the planned full payload. Due to subsequent amended tafs; tsra developing; and the corporate desire to keep diversions online; I sent a new release for 18.8 (11.5 FOD) and an ama alternate. I left intact a previous release remark that advised the pilot in command that if actual ZFW (zero fuel weight); as verified by the operations agent; allowed additional fuel; taking some for addition options; and to call me to discuss the amount. The pilot in command did so. Sometime after the flight was airborne I received an ACARS message that stated 'could have added 600 pounds but operations agent overruled me.' I replied that I hope it didn't make the difference between getting in and not; and asked why the operations agent hadn't loaded it. The flight replied 'he said it wasn't worth waiting for 35 gals and he wasn't going over the ATOG duh' (I make that closer to 100 gallons).I don't know which I was more surprised at reading--that an operations agent made a fueling decision overriding a pilot in command; or that a pilot in command allowed an operations agent to dictate their fuel load. As I messaged the flight; there are two FAA-licensed individuals jointly responsible for determining a fuel load; and an operations agent isn't one of them. I kept the flight updated on den radar; weather (now ts); and ATC conditions. Mother nature cooperated; allowing the flight to land unscathed with 11.0 fob.since the flight had the minimum 18.8 onboard; I don't feel that 121.639 or 121.647 were violated; nor even 91.13; but 121.533(b) may be another matter. As I was not even advised the extra 600 lbs wasn't loaded until after the flight was airborne; the error was out of my hands. If I'd been advised while the flight was still on the ground (at the gate or off it) I'd have ensured the extra fuel was loaded. Even though the flight successfully landed at den; my more global concern is that there is a lack of fundamental contextual understanding with the work groups involved about the basic concepts of operational control; what it entails; and who is responsible for what. It's about more than just sending dispatch releases. In fairness; I have to observe that many of these (and similar) situations are very commonly created by increased/heavier ZFW aircraft (but that have the same mlw (maximum landing weight) from before the additional seats were added) that serve to reduce the overall fuel-carrying 'envelope' of the aircraft. To the extent we continue to ignore the ramifications of this business choice (the choice; specifically; not paying boeing for available increased mlw certification(s) and associated increases in mlw-based landing fees); the greater risk we collectively run for violations of the above-referenced fars; the increased frequency of diversions (especially to offline airports); as well as exposure to potentially costly tarmac delay-related fines of $27;500 per passenger. Full aircraft that run afoul of the max tarmac delay fines run $3.767 million and $4.813 million; each; respectively. Must we experience these levels of fines before we take meaningful action to avoid them? As things stand today; the functional utility of the aircraft fleets have been compromised; and it also has the real potential of damaging our brand.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Dispatcher reports discussing with a Captain taking the maximum allowable fuel to accommodate weather and a more distant alternate. Once airborne; a message is received from the Captain indicating that 600 pounds more fuel could have been carried but the Operations Agent overruled the request.

Narrative: I released a flight to DEN with 15.9 (8.6 FOD (fuel over destination)) and a COS alternate to accommodate the planned full payload. Due to subsequent amended TAFs; TSRA developing; and the corporate desire to keep diversions online; I sent a new release for 18.8 (11.5 FOD) and an AMA alternate. I left intact a previous release remark that advised the pilot in command that if actual ZFW (zero fuel weight); as verified by the Operations Agent; allowed additional fuel; taking some for addition options; and to call me to discuss the amount. The pilot in command did so. Sometime after the flight was airborne I received an ACARS message that stated 'COULD HAVE ADDED 600 LBS BUT OPS AGENT OVERRULED ME.' I replied that I hope it didn't make the difference between getting in and not; and asked why the Operations Agent hadn't loaded it. The flight replied 'HE SAID IT WASN'T WORTH WAITING FOR 35 GALS AND HE WASN'T GOING OVER THE ATOG DUH' (I make that closer to 100 gallons).I don't know which I was more surprised at reading--that an Operations Agent made a fueling decision overriding a pilot in command; or that a pilot in command allowed an Operations Agent to dictate their fuel load. As I messaged the flight; there are two FAA-licensed individuals jointly responsible for determining a fuel load; and an Operations Agent isn't one of them. I kept the flight updated on DEN radar; weather (now TS); and ATC conditions. Mother Nature cooperated; allowing the flight to land unscathed with 11.0 FOB.Since the flight had the minimum 18.8 onboard; I don't feel that 121.639 or 121.647 were violated; nor even 91.13; but 121.533(b) may be another matter. As I was not even advised the extra 600 lbs wasn't loaded until after the flight was airborne; the error was out of my hands. If I'd been advised while the flight was still on the ground (at the gate or off it) I'd have ensured the extra fuel was loaded. Even though the flight successfully landed at DEN; my more global concern is that there is a lack of fundamental contextual understanding with the work groups involved about the basic concepts of operational control; what it entails; and who is responsible for what. It's about more than just sending dispatch releases. In fairness; I have to observe that many of these (and similar) situations are very commonly created by increased/heavier ZFW aircraft (but that have the same MLW (maximum landing weight) from before the additional seats were added) that serve to reduce the overall fuel-carrying 'envelope' of the aircraft. To the extent we continue to ignore the ramifications of this business choice (the choice; specifically; not paying Boeing for available increased MLW certification(s) and associated increases in MLW-based landing fees); the greater risk we collectively run for violations of the above-referenced FARs; the increased frequency of diversions (especially to offline airports); as well as exposure to potentially costly tarmac delay-related fines of $27;500 per passenger. Full aircraft that run afoul of the max tarmac delay fines run $3.767 million and $4.813 million; each; respectively. Must we experience these levels of fines before we take meaningful action to avoid them? As things stand today; the functional utility of the aircraft fleets have been compromised; and it also has the real potential of damaging our brand.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.