Narrative:

Approximately 15 mi east of atl, descending from 5000 to 3500', the controller asked us to reduce speed to 180 KTS. At that point, the captain asked for flaps and we did not get slat extension. The F/east was requested to follow the abnormal procedure for slat extension failure. The slats still did not extend. At the same time, the controller was notified of the problem and that the approach speed would be higher than normal. The controller complained because he was not notified earlier. At this time, the flight was cleared to intercept the 27L localizer. It was north of the localizer on a 330 degree heading. The pilot turned southwest to intercept. The controller requested the final approach speed and was informed that it would be 150 KTS. The first officer was working on a new landing data card and going through the abnormal procedures. The localizer was intercepted; we were cleared for the approach and cleared to contact the tower. We were at 3500' and started to descend to 2800'. Upon contacting the tower, we were informed that we were high and told to 'get it down' twice. The pilot did not have the G/south indication, and thought he was high above the G/south. He tried to intercept from above and get it down as requested by the controller. We passed the OM below (slightly) the published altitude and a go around was initiated. A few seconds later the 'woop-woop' signal sounded. We completed the go around and there was no problem with the second approach and landing. I feel that several factors contributed to the unsuccessful first approach. Everything which occurred after the slats failed to extend was more rushed and pressured than it should have been. First, the approach controller who complained that he should have been informed earlier that a higher approach speed would be required apparently did not realize that he was given the information as soon as it was certain that the higher speed would be required. He apparently also doesn't realize that flaps and slats are normally not extended until an aircraft is close to the field. Furthermore, his complaint about something which could not be changed was unprofessional. It served only to add tension to an already abnormal situation. Saying nothing, or asking what assistance was required, if any, would have been better. The second contributing factor was the captain's lack of assertiveness in exercising his authority to request what he needed--holding (to allow more time for calculating new data cards and completing abnormal procedures), repositioning for a more extended and stabilized approach course, etc. Third, an apparent equipment malfunction (the G/south worked normally on the second approach, but not on the first). Fourth, the tower controller added tension to the situation, and was distracting with his repeated demands that we 'get it down.' it would have been better if he had given a single advisory that we appeared high and then said nothing, allowing us to concentrate on the approach and our instruments. The worst that could have happened then, is that we would not have descended enough due to the G/south malfunction, and we would have had to do a go around. The difference is that it would have been a more calm and controled situation and the GPWS probably would not have been activated. Supplemental information from acn 125694: I feel the go around would not have been necessary had I known I would not get slats and the controller had not rushed us into the approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR WDB HAS PROBLEM WITH THE LEADING EDGE SLATS NOT EXTENDING ON 15 MILE VECTOR TO FINAL IN DESCENT. PIC ELECTS ATTEMPT TO MAKE APCH IN MARGINAL WX AND HAS TO MAKE A MISSED APCH AFTER AN UNSTABILIZED APCH. SECOND ATTEMPT SUCCESSFUL.

Narrative: APPROX 15 MI E OF ATL, DSNDING FROM 5000 TO 3500', THE CTLR ASKED US TO REDUCE SPD TO 180 KTS. AT THAT POINT, THE CAPT ASKED FOR FLAPS AND WE DID NOT GET SLAT EXTENSION. THE F/E WAS REQUESTED TO FOLLOW THE ABNORMAL PROC FOR SLAT EXTENSION FAILURE. THE SLATS STILL DID NOT EXTEND. AT THE SAME TIME, THE CTLR WAS NOTIFIED OF THE PROB AND THAT THE APCH SPD WOULD BE HIGHER THAN NORMAL. THE CTLR COMPLAINED BECAUSE HE WAS NOT NOTIFIED EARLIER. AT THIS TIME, THE FLT WAS CLRED TO INTERCEPT THE 27L LOC. IT WAS N OF THE LOC ON A 330 DEG HDG. THE PLT TURNED SW TO INTERCEPT. THE CTLR REQUESTED THE FINAL APCH SPD AND WAS INFORMED THAT IT WOULD BE 150 KTS. THE F/O WAS WORKING ON A NEW LNDG DATA CARD AND GOING THROUGH THE ABNORMAL PROCS. THE LOC WAS INTERCEPTED; WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH AND CLRED TO CONTACT THE TWR. WE WERE AT 3500' AND STARTED TO DSND TO 2800'. UPON CONTACTING THE TWR, WE WERE INFORMED THAT WE WERE HIGH AND TOLD TO 'GET IT DOWN' TWICE. THE PLT DID NOT HAVE THE G/S INDICATION, AND THOUGHT HE WAS HIGH ABOVE THE G/S. HE TRIED TO INTERCEPT FROM ABOVE AND GET IT DOWN AS REQUESTED BY THE CTLR. WE PASSED THE OM BELOW (SLIGHTLY) THE PUBLISHED ALT AND A GAR WAS INITIATED. A FEW SECS LATER THE 'WOOP-WOOP' SIGNAL SOUNDED. WE COMPLETED THE GAR AND THERE WAS NO PROB WITH THE SECOND APCH AND LNDG. I FEEL THAT SEVERAL FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THE UNSUCCESSFUL FIRST APCH. EVERYTHING WHICH OCCURRED AFTER THE SLATS FAILED TO EXTEND WAS MORE RUSHED AND PRESSURED THAN IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN. FIRST, THE APCH CTLR WHO COMPLAINED THAT HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN INFORMED EARLIER THAT A HIGHER APCH SPD WOULD BE REQUIRED APPARENTLY DID NOT REALIZE THAT HE WAS GIVEN THE INFO AS SOON AS IT WAS CERTAIN THAT THE HIGHER SPD WOULD BE REQUIRED. HE APPARENTLY ALSO DOESN'T REALIZE THAT FLAPS AND SLATS ARE NORMALLY NOT EXTENDED UNTIL AN ACFT IS CLOSE TO THE FIELD. FURTHERMORE, HIS COMPLAINT ABOUT SOMETHING WHICH COULD NOT BE CHANGED WAS UNPROFESSIONAL. IT SERVED ONLY TO ADD TENSION TO AN ALREADY ABNORMAL SITUATION. SAYING NOTHING, OR ASKING WHAT ASSISTANCE WAS REQUIRED, IF ANY, WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER. THE SECOND CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE CAPT'S LACK OF ASSERTIVENESS IN EXERCISING HIS AUTHORITY TO REQUEST WHAT HE NEEDED--HOLDING (TO ALLOW MORE TIME FOR CALCULATING NEW DATA CARDS AND COMPLETING ABNORMAL PROCS), REPOSITIONING FOR A MORE EXTENDED AND STABILIZED APCH COURSE, ETC. THIRD, AN APPARENT EQUIP MALFUNCTION (THE G/S WORKED NORMALLY ON THE SECOND APCH, BUT NOT ON THE FIRST). FOURTH, THE TWR CTLR ADDED TENSION TO THE SITUATION, AND WAS DISTRACTING WITH HIS REPEATED DEMANDS THAT WE 'GET IT DOWN.' IT WOULD HAVE BEEN BETTER IF HE HAD GIVEN A SINGLE ADVISORY THAT WE APPEARED HIGH AND THEN SAID NOTHING, ALLOWING US TO CONCENTRATE ON THE APCH AND OUR INSTRUMENTS. THE WORST THAT COULD HAVE HAPPENED THEN, IS THAT WE WOULD NOT HAVE DSNDED ENOUGH DUE TO THE G/S MALFUNCTION, AND WE WOULD HAVE HAD TO DO A GAR. THE DIFFERENCE IS THAT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A MORE CALM AND CTLED SITUATION AND THE GPWS PROBABLY WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ACTIVATED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 125694: I FEEL THE GAR WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN NECESSARY HAD I KNOWN I WOULD NOT GET SLATS AND THE CTLR HAD NOT RUSHED US INTO THE APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.