Narrative:

I took coordination on [aircraft X] deviating for weather at 11;000 ft. I took radar control and he checked on level at 11;000 ft. I advised him that before entering approaches airspace he will need to climb to 12;000 ft for terrain. He told me he could climb at that point. I then instructed him to maintain 12;000 ft. Once he reached 12;000 ft he advised me that he entered icing. He needed lower at that point. I told him to descend and maintain 11;000 ft. He reached 11;000 ft and was still in icing. I told him to maintain 10;700 ft and that was the lowest I could offer him due to the mia in that area. He asked for a vector to lower terrain so I gave him a 200 heading; vector for lower terrain. He began flying that heading and the icing became much worse. He said he needed lower. I told him the minimum IFR altitude in his area is 10;700 ft. The pilot then descended by himself to get out of the icing. I told him to maintain 10;700 ft and he said he couldn't. He continued to descend well below the mia. I told the pilot I was [accommodating] for him and again reminded him of the mia. The pilot concurred and said he [has a situation]. Once established out of the icing at 9;000 ft the pilot asked where to get to lower terrain and VMC conditions. I told the pilot to continue flying the previously issued heading and he would be able to have lower in 2 minutes. The pilot acknowleged and continued to fly the 200 heading I previously gave him towards lower terrain. Once in a lower mia area I issued the pilot to maintain 9;000 ft; which he said was out of the icing.I played a significant role in this pilot getting to lower terrain and altitude to get away from the icing. During the event I was constantly reminding myself of a briefing I had received via writing about issuing vectors/altitudes to aircraft below the mia. Having these conflicted thoughts about whether or not I could help a pilot that has [deviated] below the mia could have significantly changed the outcome. I am glad the pilot is ok and that I was able to help him as much as I could. When a pilot asks for assistance below the mia; we should be be able to help as much as we can; aka give a heading toward lower terrain or known VMC conditions.today I had a written briefing instructing controllers at ZLC that we are not to; under any circumstance; issue a heading or altitude to maintain that is below the mia. This was reiterated to the point of a specific briefing meant solely to advise controllers that there are no exceptions to that instructions; not even in a [critical situation].we need clarification from someone outside of ZLC. We either need relief from the current memo briefing or specific clarifications why our orders/instructions are different than the 7110.65. Controllers are confused and scared at what to do; which will result in very serious safety ramifications.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZLC Controller has an aircraft that is encountering icing conditions and requests lower altitude. The Controller issues the lowest altitude he can due to the MIA and the pilot is still getting icing on the aircraft. The Controller aids the aircraft and issues an even lower altitude and vectors it towards lower terrain. The aircraft eventually gets into VMC conditions and no longer is getting iced up. The Controller then gets a briefing that he shouldn't have done what he did and asks for clarification on how to help the pilot when in this type of condition.

Narrative: I took coordination on [Aircraft X] deviating for weather at 11;000 FT. I took radar control and he checked on level at 11;000 FT. I advised him that before entering approaches airspace he will need to climb to 12;000 FT for terrain. He told me he could climb at that point. I then instructed him to maintain 12;000 FT. Once he reached 12;000 FT he advised me that he entered icing. He needed lower at that point. I told him to descend and maintain 11;000 FT. He reached 11;000 FT and was still in icing. I told him to maintain 10;700 FT and that was the lowest I could offer him due to the MIA in that area. He asked for a vector to lower terrain so I gave him a 200 heading; vector for lower terrain. He began flying that heading and the icing became much worse. He said he needed lower. I told him the minimum IFR altitude in his area is 10;700 FT. The pilot then descended by himself to get out of the icing. I told him to maintain 10;700 FT and he said he couldn't. He continued to descend well below the MIA. I told the pilot I was [accommodating] for him and again reminded him of the MIA. The pilot concurred and said he [has a situation]. Once established out of the icing at 9;000 FT the pilot asked where to get to lower terrain and VMC conditions. I told the pilot to continue flying the previously issued heading and he would be able to have lower in 2 minutes. The pilot acknowleged and continued to fly the 200 heading I previously gave him towards lower terrain. Once in a lower MIA area I issued the pilot to maintain 9;000 FT; which he said was out of the icing.I played a significant role in this pilot getting to lower terrain and altitude to get away from the icing. During the event I was constantly reminding myself of a briefing I had received via writing about issuing vectors/altitudes to aircraft below the MIA. Having these conflicted thoughts about whether or not I could help a pilot that has [deviated] below the MIA could have significantly changed the outcome. I am glad the pilot is ok and that I was able to help him as much as I could. When a pilot asks for assistance below the MIA; we should be be able to help as much as we can; aka give a heading toward lower terrain or known VMC conditions.Today I had a written briefing instructing controllers at ZLC that we are not to; under any circumstance; issue a heading or altitude to maintain that is below the MIA. This was reiterated to the point of a specific briefing meant solely to advise controllers that there are no exceptions to that instructions; not even in a [critical situation].We need clarification from someone outside of ZLC. We either need relief from the current MEMO briefing or specific clarifications why our orders/instructions are different than the 7110.65. Controllers are confused and scared at what to do; which will result in very serious safety ramifications.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.