Narrative:

During the RNAV rnp approach to runway xy at airport ZZZZ our airspeed decreased to within a few knots of stall. The aircraft was dispatched on a scheduled 8 hour night sortie with inoperable autothrottles and an inoperable electronic engine control and 1 autopilot inoperative. The captain was the pilot flying and I was the [relief pilot] on the jumpseat during the approach. We were delayed [at the departure airport] for an APU problem as the jet was dispatched from the hangar and had numerous switches that were not in the 'normal' configuration during preflight. After a 45 minute delay we took off and the flight was uneventful until the approach portion. During the descent and below 10;000 MSL; I was working on logbook entries with the captain who had transferred aircraft control to the first officer. Just prior to the IAF the captain assumed control of the aircraft. We were inside the IAF when I completed my logbook entries and noticed that we were not on the proper final approach course. We were left of course and correcting back to the right. The approach has a holding fix built in as part of the approach and the FMS correctly commanded a left turn into holding at the IAF. The first officer directed captain to use heading select to prevent aircraft from turning any further to the left in holding and correct back to the final approach course. I was focused on the fact that we were no longer in VNAV path (which we should have been for this approach) and we were not on course. I was focused on captain's right mfd which has the ground track and I could see his altitude but I was unable to see and did not focus on the airspeed without leaning to the right to see his left mfd. At roughly 800 feet AGL in VMC conditions the first officer told the captain that his airspeed was too slow. The captain corrected the error but the airspeed was just a few knots above stall and immediate action had to be taken. The airspeed error was corrected and the approach was stabilized well before 500 feet AGL. The lack of autothrottles and the protections they provide; not recognizing that the RNAV rnp approach had a mandatory hold/procedure turn built into the procedure; and distraction with the logbook during the descent contributed to this event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767-300ER FO noted a track deviation and a low airspeed condition on approach to a South American destination. Autothrottles were out of service.

Narrative: During the RNAV RNP approach to runway XY at Airport ZZZZ our airspeed decreased to within a few knots of stall. The aircraft was dispatched on a scheduled 8 hour night sortie with inoperable autothrottles and an inoperable Electronic Engine Control and 1 autopilot inoperative. The captain was the pilot flying and I was the [Relief Pilot] on the jumpseat during the approach. We were delayed [at the departure airport] for an APU problem as the jet was dispatched from the hangar and had numerous switches that were not in the 'normal' configuration during preflight. After a 45 minute delay we took off and the flight was uneventful until the approach portion. During the descent and below 10;000 MSL; I was working on logbook entries with the Captain who had transferred aircraft control to the first officer. Just prior to the IAF the captain assumed control of the aircraft. We were inside the IAF when I completed my logbook entries and noticed that we were not on the proper final approach course. We were left of course and correcting back to the right. The approach has a holding fix built in as part of the approach and the FMS correctly commanded a left turn into holding at the IAF. The FO directed captain to use heading select to prevent aircraft from turning any further to the left in holding and correct back to the final approach course. I was focused on the fact that we were no longer in VNAV path (which we should have been for this approach) and we were not on course. I was focused on Captain's right MFD which has the ground track and I could see his altitude but I was unable to see and did not focus on the airspeed without leaning to the right to see his left MFD. At roughly 800 feet AGL in VMC conditions the FO told the captain that his airspeed was too slow. The captain corrected the error but the airspeed was just a few knots above stall and immediate action had to be taken. The airspeed error was corrected and the approach was stabilized well before 500 feet AGL. The lack of autothrottles and the protections they provide; not recognizing that the RNAV RNP approach had a mandatory hold/procedure turn built into the procedure; and distraction with the logbook during the descent contributed to this event.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.