Narrative:

This event was bound to happen. We had all warning areas active. W4645A and W465B were capped and active FL300 and below. W174 was active FL500 and below. Our mnate departures were deviating into our miami arrivals. All aircraft filed over canoa and maxim were deviating into the warning area. I advised the controller in charge (controller in charge) that this is a problem and that the aircraft will not make it over canoa or maxim and that our departures are deviating into the arrivals. I also asked the controller in charge for miles in trail out of the mnate departure transition area (dta) due to the added complexity. The controller in charge returned and said that missions and the traffic management unit (tmu) advised us to call tarpon (the controlling agency over the warning areas) to make point-outs for the aircraft and that we will basically have to point them out until tarpon says unable and then missions and tmu will have to come up with another plan. I called with several point-outs and tarpon approved many of them. I took radar on aircraft X from havana and was aware the aircraft was deviating to the right towards W465A and B. I called tarpon with that point out and the r-side requested I point out a mnate departure in addition to aircraft X that was heading southbound also towards W465A and B that could not turn westbound. Tarpon denied the point-outs saying they were no longer in communication with aircraft Y in W465A and B. I advised the r-side and controller in charge and aircraft Z clipped the west side of W465A. The r-side was able to force the mnate departure to the west remaining clear of the warning areas. This was horrible and completely unsafe. I have heard of this happening before. When we have the warning areas active and tarpon is unable to cap W174 or W465 to an altitude that will actually give us an out. We need another plan and cannot just 'bet' on tarpon accepting point-outs from us. It puts the controllers in a bad situation and especially the aircraft involved in a very unsafe situation. The lack of urgency in working out a plan is unacceptable. We needed help from tmu and we had to basically deal with our situation without help of forming a plan before an unsafe situation developed. I recommend shutting down canoa/maxim and tadpo immediately when weather prevents aircraft from remaining on route when the warning areas are active and there is weather. These aircraft need to be safely rerouted to avoid these areas. We cannot just depend on tarpon to accept our point-outs. This should be the 'norm'; not waiting until something bad happens and then reacting afterwards.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZMA Controllers report of aircraft deviations due to weather. Controllers ask for a plan of action from the Traffic Management Unit (TMU) and are instructed to point out aircraft. The Controllers do so until the other facility no longer accepts point outs which results in airspace deviations due to aircraft deviating for weather.

Narrative: This event was bound to happen. We had all warning areas active. W4645A and W465B were capped and active FL300 and below. W174 was active FL500 and below. Our MNATE departures were deviating into our Miami arrivals. All aircraft filed over CANOA and MAXIM were deviating into the warning area. I advised the Controller in Charge (CIC) that this is a problem and that the aircraft will not make it over CANOA or MAXIM and that our departures are deviating into the arrivals. I also asked the CIC for miles in trail out of the MNATE Departure Transition Area (DTA) due to the added complexity. The CIC returned and said that Missions and the Traffic Management Unit (TMU) advised us to call TARPON (the controlling agency over the warning areas) to make point-outs for the aircraft and that we will basically have to point them out until TARPON says unable and then Missions and TMU will have to come up with another plan. I called with several point-outs and TARPON approved many of them. I took radar on Aircraft X from Havana and was aware the aircraft was deviating to the right towards W465A and B. I called TARPON with that point out and the R-Side requested I point out a MNATE departure in addition to Aircraft X that was heading southbound also towards W465A and B that could not turn westbound. TARPON denied the point-outs saying they were no longer in communication with Aircraft Y in W465A and B. I advised the R-Side and CIC and Aircraft Z clipped the west side of W465A. The R-Side was able to force the MNATE departure to the west remaining clear of the warning areas. This was horrible and completely unsafe. I have heard of this happening before. When we have the warning areas active and TARPON is unable to cap W174 or W465 to an altitude that will actually give us an out. We need another plan and cannot just 'bet' on TARPON accepting point-outs from us. It puts the controllers in a bad situation and especially the aircraft involved in a very unsafe situation. The lack of urgency in working out a plan is unacceptable. We needed help from TMU and we had to basically deal with our situation without help of forming a plan before an unsafe situation developed. I recommend shutting down CANOA/MAXIM and TADPO IMMEDIATELY when weather prevents aircraft from remaining on route when the warning areas are active and there is weather. These aircraft need to be safely rerouted to avoid these areas. We cannot just depend on TARPON to accept our point-outs. This should be the 'norm'; not waiting until something bad happens and then reacting afterwards.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.