Narrative:

After rollout on 4R at jfk, taxi instructions were to use runway 32, yankee, hold short of 4L. During taxi on yankee the after landing checklist was accomplished. As the rule nowadays, because of my airline's non standard large transport fleet, several items were being challenged rather than simply completed. I was aware of departing 4L traffic which was airborne and anticipated crossing clearance prior to commuter traffic on about 5-8 mi final. Both aircraft were visible and were displaying landing lights. Just as I reached a repos, my airport diagram (it had slipped prior to landing and I had replaced it on the approach plate holder upside down), a very strange and loud audio warning began which could not be immediately silenced. It was as loud as the takeoff warning horn, but a chirping sound--not standard on our fleet. These distrs, I believe, created the environment in which I was unaware of how taxiway yankee intercepted runway 4L at such an acute angle. As I was right at 4L, rather than slam on the brakes and continue into 4L, I simultaneously added thrust, threw on the landing lights and called for the first officer to notify tower of our crossing. In retrospect, one cannot predict the impact of non standard cockpits. Normal flow patterns are interrupted, additional checklist challenges required and many times a search is required to locate transponder, DME, radars, strobe lights, etc--and no way can you prepare for unfamiliar sounds. It turned out to be an altitude alerter/1000' warning (non standard) malfunction. In this type of cockpit, every thought is subject to an interruption and has to be restarted.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR LGT UNAUTH RWY CROSS AFTER LNDG AT JFK. REPORTER CLAIMS FLEET INCONSISTENCY DISTR HIM.

Narrative: AFTER ROLLOUT ON 4R AT JFK, TAXI INSTRUCTIONS WERE TO USE RWY 32, YANKEE, HOLD SHORT OF 4L. DURING TAXI ON YANKEE THE AFTER LNDG CHKLIST WAS ACCOMPLISHED. AS THE RULE NOWADAYS, BECAUSE OF MY AIRLINE'S NON STANDARD LGT FLEET, SEVERAL ITEMS WERE BEING CHALLENGED RATHER THAN SIMPLY COMPLETED. I WAS AWARE OF DEPARTING 4L TFC WHICH WAS AIRBORNE AND ANTICIPATED XING CLRNC PRIOR TO COMMUTER TFC ON ABOUT 5-8 MI FINAL. BOTH ACFT WERE VISIBLE AND WERE DISPLAYING LNDG LIGHTS. JUST AS I REACHED A REPOS, MY ARPT DIAGRAM (IT HAD SLIPPED PRIOR TO LNDG AND I HAD REPLACED IT ON THE APCH PLATE HOLDER UPSIDE DOWN), A VERY STRANGE AND LOUD AUDIO WARNING BEGAN WHICH COULD NOT BE IMMEDIATELY SILENCED. IT WAS AS LOUD AS THE TKOF WARNING HORN, BUT A CHIRPING SOUND--NOT STANDARD ON OUR FLEET. THESE DISTRS, I BELIEVE, CREATED THE ENVIRONMENT IN WHICH I WAS UNAWARE OF HOW TXWY YANKEE INTERCEPTED RWY 4L AT SUCH AN ACUTE ANGLE. AS I WAS RIGHT AT 4L, RATHER THAN SLAM ON THE BRAKES AND CONTINUE INTO 4L, I SIMULTANEOUSLY ADDED THRUST, THREW ON THE LNDG LIGHTS AND CALLED FOR THE F/O TO NOTIFY TWR OF OUR XING. IN RETROSPECT, ONE CANNOT PREDICT THE IMPACT OF NON STANDARD COCKPITS. NORMAL FLOW PATTERNS ARE INTERRUPTED, ADDITIONAL CHKLIST CHALLENGES REQUIRED AND MANY TIMES A SEARCH IS REQUIRED TO LOCATE XPONDER, DME, RADARS, STROBE LIGHTS, ETC--AND NO WAY CAN YOU PREPARE FOR UNFAMILIAR SOUNDS. IT TURNED OUT TO BE AN ALT ALERTER/1000' WARNING (NON STANDARD) MALFUNCTION. IN THIS TYPE OF COCKPIT, EVERY THOUGHT IS SUBJECT TO AN INTERRUPTION AND HAS TO BE RESTARTED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.