Narrative:

On the pushback; we were notified by one of the rampers that one of our tires looked 'low'. We asked for clarification; if it looked flat; etc. He said it looked 'a little low'. We didn't feel any sort of indication in the flight deck that one of our tires may have been low or flat; and completed the after start checklist and began to taxi. On taxi out; both the captain and I agreed that a visual inspection of the tire would put our minds at ease; and I went to the cabin to look out a passenger window to investigate. The tire that the ramper claimed was flat looked perfectly fine from the cabin (level with the other tire; etc) and I passed this information on to the captain. We continued our taxi and got ready to depart.on departure; after the nose came off the ground; we felt a slight shimmy but didn't think anything of it. Climbing through approximately 3;700 feet; the a flight attendant called us and said we had blown a tire. I thanked him for the information. The captain; being the pilot flying; directed me to the QRH and other manuals to see what the books said about this incident; and he handled the radios with ATC. Finding nothing in the books; I contacted maintenance control. They advised us to continue to destination. I conferred with the captain; and after discussing the idea of burning off fuel and landing lighter; landing at an airport we were more familiar with; one with our maintenance personnel; longer runways; etc. We decided that continuing to destination was the appropriate course of action.in flight; captain and I discussed what to expect on landing; what runway we would request; etc. We ensured the flight attendants were kept in the loop; as well as the passengers. The amount of CRM exercised in this scenario was quite high. We further discussed putting the gear down early to burn off extra fuel and land lighter; ensure that the other tire was not damaged; etc. We also continually monitored our hydraulic systems in both pressure and quantity; ensuring that there was no damage to that system.approximately 100 miles from destination; we descended to 13;000 feet and lowered the landing gear. I went back for a visual inspection. I saw a tire that had definitely popped; but didn't see any damage to the aircraft gear doors; the flaps; or the other tire on the landing gear. I had the captain go back for an inspection as well. He came back and concurred with me that what I saw was what he saw. I then briefed the flight attendants that we would not be evacuating on the runway. I emphasized this with them; being that they were both new.on the landing; the captain touched the aircraft down very gently; keeping the pressure of the aircraft on the right mains. We touched the left mains down at around 109 knots. I reminded him to not use the brakes; to gently slow it down; etc. We slowed the aircraft down and taxied clear of the runway. Operations inspected the landing gear and advised us that aside from the tire; there appeared to be no damage. Our own maintenance personnel came out a short time later and asked if we could deplane the passengers to take weight off the wheels before we taxied in. We agreed with this decision and coordinated with operations for some passenger buses to take the passengers to the terminal. After we deplaned; maintenance hooked us up to a super tug and pulled us in.the main thing I'm thinking about right now with this; hindsight being 20/20; is that if something is brought to our attention by a ramper/gate agent; it never hurts to take a second peek. A mistrust of ramp personnel has become common with more 3rd party vendors being brought in. One out of five flights; rampers bring issues that they think are issues to our attention; 99% of which are nothing to be concerned about. Compounding that lack of confidence in the ramp person is the fact that our baggage loading sheet was incorrect (they had put too many bags in the back and needed to move some).having the fortitude to go look back at the tire during taxi; I should have been smarter and realized that the perspective from inside the aircraft is going to be far different than one from outside the aircraft. I do believe that what I saw as an adequate tire and did not notice any abnormalities or anything that would concern me; however; in this situation; it would have been more prudent to understand that I cannot have the proper perspective from inside the cabin.furthermore; one of the biggest issues I see with this is two captains flying. While a legal procedure; and done somewhat frequently; it is difficult on a captain who has to continually jump from the left seat to the right seat and back again. While trained in walk around procedures; and certainly proficient in them; we as captains do not do the walk arounds nearly as consistently as first officers. With that being said; the perspective that a captain who only does walk arounds when he or she is in the right seat or doing one for a fellow captain out of courtesy; it can breed complacency.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Q400 Flight Crew is advised by the push back crew that the left inboard tire appears soft. The tire appears to be properly inflated when the First Officer checks from the cabin and the taxi to the runway continues. On takeoff the tire fails and the flight continues to destination.

Narrative: On the pushback; we were notified by one of the rampers that one of our tires looked 'low'. We asked for clarification; if it looked flat; etc. He said it looked 'a little low'. We didn't feel any sort of indication in the flight deck that one of our tires may have been low or flat; and completed the after start checklist and began to taxi. On taxi out; both the Captain and I agreed that a visual inspection of the tire would put our minds at ease; and I went to the cabin to look out a passenger window to investigate. The tire that the ramper claimed was flat looked perfectly fine from the cabin (level with the other tire; etc) and I passed this information on to the Captain. We continued our taxi and got ready to depart.On departure; after the nose came off the ground; we felt a slight shimmy but didn't think anything of it. Climbing through approximately 3;700 feet; the A Flight Attendant called us and said we had blown a tire. I thanked him for the information. The Captain; being the pilot flying; directed me to the QRH and other manuals to see what the books said about this incident; and he handled the radios with ATC. Finding nothing in the books; I contacted Maintenance Control. They advised us to continue to destination. I conferred with the Captain; and after discussing the idea of burning off fuel and landing lighter; landing at an airport we were more familiar with; one with our maintenance personnel; longer runways; etc. we decided that continuing to destination was the appropriate course of action.In flight; Captain and I discussed what to expect on landing; what runway we would request; etc. We ensured the flight attendants were kept in the loop; as well as the passengers. The amount of CRM exercised in this scenario was quite high. We further discussed putting the gear down early to burn off extra fuel and land lighter; ensure that the other tire was not damaged; etc. We also continually monitored our hydraulic systems in both pressure and quantity; ensuring that there was no damage to that system.Approximately 100 miles from destination; we descended to 13;000 feet and lowered the landing gear. I went back for a visual inspection. I saw a tire that had definitely popped; but didn't see any damage to the aircraft gear doors; the flaps; or the other tire on the landing gear. I had the Captain go back for an inspection as well. He came back and concurred with me that what I saw was what he saw. I then briefed the flight attendants that we would not be evacuating on the runway. I emphasized this with them; being that they were both new.On the landing; the Captain touched the aircraft down very gently; keeping the pressure of the aircraft on the right mains. We touched the left mains down at around 109 knots. I reminded him to not use the brakes; to gently slow it down; etc. We slowed the aircraft down and taxied clear of the runway. Operations inspected the landing gear and advised us that aside from the tire; there appeared to be no damage. Our own maintenance personnel came out a short time later and asked if we could deplane the passengers to take weight off the wheels before we taxied in. We agreed with this decision and coordinated with operations for some passenger buses to take the passengers to the terminal. After we deplaned; maintenance hooked us up to a super tug and pulled us in.The main thing I'm thinking about right now with this; hindsight being 20/20; is that if something is brought to our attention by a ramper/gate agent; it never hurts to take a second peek. A mistrust of ramp personnel has become common with more 3rd party vendors being brought in. One out of five flights; rampers bring issues that they think are issues to our attention; 99% of which are nothing to be concerned about. Compounding that lack of confidence in the ramp person is the fact that our baggage loading sheet was incorrect (they had put too many bags in the back and needed to move some).Having the fortitude to go look back at the tire during taxi; I should have been smarter and realized that the perspective from inside the aircraft is going to be far different than one from outside the aircraft. I do believe that what I saw as an adequate tire and did not notice any abnormalities or anything that would concern me; however; in this situation; it would have been more prudent to understand that I cannot have the proper perspective from inside the cabin.Furthermore; one of the biggest issues I see with this is two captains flying. While a legal procedure; and done somewhat frequently; it is difficult on a Captain who has to continually jump from the left seat to the right seat and back again. While trained in walk around procedures; and certainly proficient in them; we as captains do not do the walk arounds nearly as consistently as first officers. With that being said; the perspective that a captain who only does walk arounds when he or she is in the right seat or doing one for a fellow captain out of courtesy; it can breed complacency.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.