Narrative:

The aircraft had an inbound maintenance write-up of a 'bleed duct leak center'. ZZZ maintenance technicians conducted an inspection of the system and worked to troubleshoot the issue but after a thorough inspection they were unable to duplicate the problem or locate a cause of the fault message.maintenance reset the EICAS message and released the aircraft back into service. We departed the gate and taxied out to the runway and did not have any reoccurrence of the bleed duct leak center message. During the taxi out we reviewed the QRH for the bleed duct leak irregular procedure just in case the issue reoccurred. The takeoff and initial climb out from ZZZ was uneventful. Approximately 25 minutes after takeoff the EICAS 'bld duct leak C' message illuminated.we contacted dispatch via the sat phone and asked for a conference call to the B-747 [maintenance] controller. After confirming that we had properly accomplished all of the steps in the QRH for the bld duct leak C we asked that dispatch include the flight operations duty manager in the call.we were continuing to climb to altitude while we discussed the issue with [maintenance]; dispatch and the duty manager. We were also having difficulty controlling the cabin temperature (as a result of having turned the trim air switch off during the QRH procedure) and noted that although we were asking for 64 degree air for the passenger cabin; the temperature was increasing in the cabin with significant differences between zones. Zone a was 75 degrees; zone B was 84 degrees; zone C was 81 degrees; zone D was 82 degrees; zone east was 83 degrees. The flight deck was 84 degrees and the upper deck was 82.we advised dispatch that live animals had been boarded on the flight and if we were to continue the [transpacific] flight they may not survive the 11 hour and 10 minute flight.after our discussion with [maintenance]; dispatch and the duty manager; I determined that the safest course of action would be to land prior making a night pacific ocean crossing. This decision was based on the fact that we had a full passenger load in an aircraft that we could not reasonably control the cabin temperature as a result of conducting the bleed duct leak center checklist. We also did not have any cargo smoke detection and did not know what; if any; damage might be associated with a duct leak that may have caused the illumination of the bleed duct leak sensor.we worked with dispatch and the duty manager to determine the most suitable landing point and after obtaining their input I decided that a return to ZZZ was preferable over attempting to land in [other locations] which was experiencing lengthy delays due to severe weather. We advised dispatch that we would return to ZZZ. I then discussed with the [flight operations] the options of a landing over weight vs. Dumping over 150;000 lbs of fuel; which would have delayed our landing by at least 35 minutes or more. I determined that the overweight landing was just as safe as taking an inflight delay to be vectored to an area to dump fuel so we returned to ZZZ and planned a landing on runway 36R. Since we did not have landing data for the ZZZ runway we asked dispatch to provide that via an ACARS message. After 5 to 10 minutes of not receiving any reply to our ACARS message we contacted dispatch by sat comm and they stated that they would re-send the landing data for runways 01 and 36R. We never did receive any landing data.we had planned a 30 flaps landing at 760;000 lbs. On runway 36R but due to the high approach speed; the flaps load relief would not allow the flaps to extend to 30. Since we did not want to have flaps moving during the landing flair possibly resulting in an unwanted and unexpected pitching moment; I elected to land flaps 25. The touchdown was smooth with autobrakes 4 and we rolled to the end of the runway w re we exited the runway and taxied to remote parking which is located a few hundredfeet from the runway turnoff. Once parked on the ramp the wheels were chocked and the brakes released but four of the main gear fuse plugs melted and four tires deflated.all passengers were accommodated at local hotels and rebooked; maintenance was debriefed regarding our maintenance issues and [maintenance] wrote up the over weight landing. The flight was cancelled and the crew was sent to the hotel for a 23 hour layover.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B747 flight crew reported they returned to departure airport after receiving a 'Bleed Duct Leak Center' EICAS message.

Narrative: The aircraft had an inbound maintenance write-up of a 'Bleed Duct Leak Center'. ZZZ maintenance technicians conducted an inspection of the system and worked to troubleshoot the issue but after a thorough inspection they were unable to duplicate the problem or locate a cause of the fault message.Maintenance reset the EICAS message and released the aircraft back into service. We departed the gate and taxied out to the runway and did not have any reoccurrence of the bleed duct leak center message. During the taxi out we reviewed the QRH for the bleed duct leak irregular procedure just in case the issue reoccurred. The takeoff and initial climb out from ZZZ was uneventful. Approximately 25 minutes after takeoff the EICAS 'BLD DUCT LEAK C' message illuminated.We contacted dispatch via the SAT phone and asked for a conference call to the B-747 [maintenance] controller. After confirming that we had properly accomplished all of the steps in the QRH for the BLD DUCT LEAK C we asked that dispatch include the flight operations duty manager in the call.We were continuing to climb to altitude while we discussed the issue with [maintenance]; dispatch and the duty manager. We were also having difficulty controlling the cabin temperature (as a result of having turned the trim air switch off during the QRH procedure) and noted that although we were asking for 64 degree air for the passenger cabin; the temperature was increasing in the cabin with significant differences between zones. Zone A was 75 degrees; zone B was 84 degrees; zone C was 81 degrees; zone D was 82 degrees; zone E was 83 degrees. The flight deck was 84 degrees and the upper deck was 82.We advised dispatch that live animals had been boarded on the flight and if we were to continue the [transpacific] flight they may not survive the 11 hour and 10 minute flight.After our discussion with [maintenance]; dispatch and the duty manager; I determined that the safest course of action would be to land prior making a night Pacific Ocean crossing. This decision was based on the fact that we had a full passenger load in an aircraft that we could not reasonably control the cabin temperature as a result of conducting the bleed duct leak center checklist. We also did not have any cargo smoke detection and did not know what; if any; damage might be associated with a duct leak that may have caused the illumination of the bleed duct leak sensor.We worked with dispatch and the duty manager to determine the most suitable landing point and after obtaining their input I decided that a return to ZZZ was preferable over attempting to land in [other locations] which was experiencing lengthy delays due to severe weather. We advised dispatch that we would return to ZZZ. I then discussed with the [flight operations] the options of a landing over weight vs. dumping over 150;000 lbs of fuel; which would have delayed our landing by at least 35 minutes or more. I determined that the overweight landing was just as safe as taking an inflight delay to be vectored to an area to dump fuel so we returned to ZZZ and planned a landing on runway 36R. Since we did not have landing data for the ZZZ runway we asked dispatch to provide that via an ACARS message. After 5 to 10 minutes of not receiving any reply to our ACARS message we contacted dispatch by SAT comm and they stated that they would re-send the landing data for runways 01 and 36R. We never did receive any landing data.We had planned a 30 flaps landing at 760;000 lbs. on runway 36R but due to the high approach speed; the flaps load relief would not allow the flaps to extend to 30. Since we did not want to have flaps moving during the landing flair possibly resulting in an unwanted and unexpected pitching moment; I elected to land flaps 25. The touchdown was smooth with autobrakes 4 and we rolled to the end of the runway w re we exited the runway and taxied to remote parking which is located a few hundredfeet from the runway turnoff. Once parked on the ramp the wheels were chocked and the brakes released but four of the main gear fuse plugs melted and four tires deflated.All passengers were accommodated at local hotels and rebooked; maintenance was debriefed regarding our maintenance issues and [maintenance] wrote up the over weight landing. The flight was cancelled and the crew was sent to the hotel for a 23 hour layover.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.