37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 1280119 |
Time | |
Date | 201507 |
Local Time Of Day | 1801-2400 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | Mixed |
Light | Dusk |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | Climb |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Function | Pilot Flying Captain |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 172 |
Person 2 | |
Function | Pilot Not Flying First Officer |
Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 87 Flight Crew Type 2000 |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Deviation - Procedural MEL |
Narrative:
I was the PF on a maintenance ferry flight. When I talked to maintenance control; I was instructed to maintain a cabin differential pressure of 4.0 or less; with no speed restrictions. I then spoke multiple times with dispatch and the chief pilot on call about flight procedures; and again was instructed to not to exceed 4.0 psid and not exceed FL220. There were no other instructions to reference mels to follow or pressurization procedures to follow. We set the flight altitude pressurization controller at FL220 and the land alt controller at 1150 feet for [destination]. Climbing thru 13;000 feet the psid was rising rapidly approaching 4.0 psid; and it peaked at approximately 5.0 psid. We asked ATC for a leveloff; and ended up descending all the way back down to 10;000 feet to control the differential pressure. We had to get new routing from ATC to comply with their MSA enroute to [destination]. We landed without further event.we were not instructed to follow special cabin pressurization procedures by maintenance; dispatch; or the chief pilot on call. We did not have an MEL on the aircraft which would have directed us to follow unusual cabin pressurization procedures for the flt alt controller and the land alt controller. I had never flown a maintenance ferry flight; and my unfamiliarity with the requirements for the flight caused us to mis-set the pressurization panel. Not one of us in the loop thought to look at abnormal pressurization procedures; because the reason we were ferrying the aircraft was for a previous lightning strike; not a pressurization problem. This was a very frustrating and unique event. I don't know how this could have been prevented on the pilot's part.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737 flight crew reported they were not properly briefed on how to fly a maintenance ferry. During the flight they failed to comply with the special procedures.
Narrative: I was the PF on a maintenance ferry flight. When I talked to maintenance control; I was instructed to maintain a cabin differential pressure of 4.0 or less; with no speed restrictions. I then spoke multiple times with dispatch and the Chief Pilot on Call about flight procedures; and again was instructed to not to exceed 4.0 PSID and not exceed FL220. There were no other instructions to reference MELs to follow or pressurization procedures to follow. We set the Flight Altitude pressurization controller at FL220 and the Land Alt controller at 1150 feet for [destination]. Climbing thru 13;000 feet the PSID was rising rapidly approaching 4.0 PSID; and it peaked at approximately 5.0 PSID. We asked ATC for a leveloff; and ended up descending all the way back down to 10;000 feet to control the differential pressure. We had to get new routing from ATC to comply with their MSA enroute to [destination]. We landed without further event.We were not instructed to follow special cabin pressurization procedures by maintenance; dispatch; or the Chief Pilot on Call. We did not have an MEL on the aircraft which would have directed us to follow unusual cabin pressurization procedures for the Flt Alt controller and the Land Alt controller. I had never flown a maintenance ferry flight; and my unfamiliarity with the requirements for the flight caused us to mis-set the pressurization panel. Not one of us in the loop thought to look at abnormal pressurization procedures; because the reason we were ferrying the aircraft was for a previous lightning strike; not a pressurization problem. This was a very frustrating and unique event. I don't know how this could have been prevented on the pilot's part.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.