Narrative:

The lead flight attendant called the cockpit and reported a slight haze and an oily; burning smell in the cabin. She called again in less than two minutes and reported cabin smoke; haze and an oily burning smell. I confirmed that she was reporting cabin smoke. The aircraft engine and airfoil ice protection systems had been selected on for less than fifteen minutes. I began the air conditioning smoke/fumes checklist on QRH. I inadvertently pulled the incorrect circuit breaker. I did not complete the cabin fire/smoke QRH checklist on QRH.ATC was having difficulty understanding my transmissions using the oxygen mask microphone. I unsuccessfully attempted to answer a SELCAL from radio. I intermittently used the hand microphone in order that ATC could understand my transmissions. As we descended and cabin conditions improved; I eventually used the hand microphone or my headset microphone exclusively. The first officer's oxygen mask microphone was not audible to me or ATC. This fact caused CRM issues in regard to delegation of duties and time management. No smoke; fumes; or smells were ever detected in the cockpit. I informed ATC; the lead flight attendant; the passengers; and operations of my decision to conduct a precautionary diversion to [a nearby] airport. We were only 80 NM north of [diversion airport] and at FL330. I also requested emergency vehicles on the ground. I requested repeated updates on the cabin conditions as we approached the airport. I was told that cabin smoke and haze had dissipated as we approached the airport. I instructed the lead flight attendant to inform me immediately of any degradation in cabin conditions. I told the lead flight attendant that an evacuation would be commanded if conditions again worsened. I made a decision not to command an evacuation due to the improved cabin conditions. I also decided not to have the passengers assume a brace condition because we were conducting a normal approach/landing. I made the decision to have crash; fire and rescue (crash fire rescue equipment) vehicles meet the aircraft immediately upon clearing runway. We landed without incident. The crash fire rescue equipment exterior inspection was completed with no abnormalities noted. I requested the cabin conditions again from the lead flight attendant immediately upon landing. She indicated that no smoke or haze remained in the cabin. Upon this information; I made the decision to taxi to gate and deplane the passengers normally. We blocked in safely with no reports of any passenger injuries or needing medical assistance of any type.I do not know the cause of the cabin smoke. I will list a couple of unusual events that occurred earlier in the flight. I do not know if they are related in any way. The APU was deferred. We therefore conducted the 'engine start using ground pneumatic source' and 'cross bleed start' procedures. The cabin/cockpit temperatures were uncomfortable in [departure station] due to the APU deferral and the subsequent failure of the ground conditioned air. No replacement ground conditioned air could be found in a timely fashion. Use of the oxygen mask and their associated microphones caused CRM difficulties that involved ATC/crew communication; crew/crew communication and time management/delegation of duties.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80 Captain reported receiving a report from the Lead Flight Attendant that there was smoke and haze in the cabin; so the flight diverted to a suitable nearby airport.

Narrative: The lead flight attendant called the cockpit and reported a slight haze and an oily; burning smell in the cabin. She called again in less than two minutes and reported cabin smoke; haze and an oily burning smell. I confirmed that she was reporting cabin smoke. The aircraft engine and airfoil ice protection systems had been selected on for less than fifteen minutes. I began the Air Conditioning Smoke/Fumes checklist on QRH. I inadvertently pulled the incorrect circuit breaker. I did not complete the Cabin Fire/Smoke QRH checklist on QRH.ATC was having difficulty understanding my transmissions using the oxygen mask microphone. I unsuccessfully attempted to answer a SELCAL from Radio. I intermittently used the hand microphone in order that ATC could understand my transmissions. As we descended and cabin conditions improved; I eventually used the hand microphone or my headset microphone exclusively. The First Officer's oxygen mask microphone was not audible to me or ATC. This fact caused CRM issues in regard to delegation of duties and time management. No smoke; fumes; or smells were ever detected in the cockpit. I informed ATC; the lead flight attendant; the passengers; and operations of my decision to conduct a precautionary diversion to [a nearby] airport. We were only 80 NM north of [diversion airport] and at FL330. I also requested emergency vehicles on the ground. I requested repeated updates on the cabin conditions as we approached the airport. I was told that cabin smoke and haze had dissipated as we approached the airport. I instructed the lead flight attendant to inform me immediately of any degradation in cabin conditions. I told the lead flight attendant that an evacuation would be commanded if conditions again worsened. I made a decision not to command an evacuation due to the improved cabin conditions. I also decided not to have the passengers assume a brace condition because we were conducting a normal approach/landing. I made the decision to have Crash; Fire and Rescue (CFR) vehicles meet the aircraft immediately upon clearing runway. We landed without incident. The CFR exterior inspection was completed with no abnormalities noted. I requested the cabin conditions again from the lead flight attendant immediately upon landing. She indicated that no smoke or haze remained in the cabin. Upon this information; I made the decision to taxi to gate and deplane the passengers normally. We blocked in safely with no reports of any passenger injuries or needing medical assistance of any type.I do not know the cause of the cabin smoke. I will list a couple of unusual events that occurred earlier in the flight. I do not know if they are related in any way. The APU was deferred. We therefore conducted the 'engine start using ground pneumatic source' and 'cross bleed start' procedures. The cabin/cockpit temperatures were uncomfortable in [departure station] due to the APU deferral and the subsequent failure of the ground conditioned air. No replacement ground conditioned air could be found in a timely fashion. Use of the oxygen mask and their associated microphones caused CRM difficulties that involved ATC/crew communication; crew/crew communication and time management/delegation of duties.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.