Narrative:

The first officer (first officer) was flying his first arrival to crp; and I believe the last time I was there was more than a decade ago; but needless to say we were not familiar with the crp environment. We had been kept high on the arrival by ATC and were hurrying to descend to be stabilized for the approach. We realized that we would be too high for the approach and requested a 360 degree turn for our descent from the tower. They approved us to maneuver either left or right as requested and we initiated a go-around and a 360 degree left turn in VMC conditions. In retrospect this was probably not a good decision as we were not very familiar with the airport environment but the good weather conditions had me not worried about the maneuver. We initiated the go-around above 1;000 feet; but descended slightly during the first part of the turn. I directed the first officer to climb to 1;000 feet which he slowly did. I had referenced the approach plate and noticed that the obstacles on the plate in our quadrant were at 487 feet and our climb ensured clearance from them. During the 360 maneuver the first officer lost sight of the airport but I had it in sight and talked him through the turn back to the landing runway. The first officer completed the maneuver but we were again not in a position to make a safe landing as we were not well aligned with the landing runway and initiated another go-around again getting approval to stay with tower but we maneuvered in a right hand pattern so the first officer could see the runway in the turn. I directed a climb to 1;500 feet for the 579 foot towers west of the field. The first officer informed me he had lost sight of the field and wasn't sure what maneuver we were doing while on downwind. This is when I realized I had not adequately communicated my intentions for the pattern we were flying. We were maneuvering visually so I took control of the aircraft and directed the first officer to resequence the FMC course on the RNAV approach we were using as a backup; and extend the centerline. I completed the base turn; final turn; and landed uneventfully on runway 18. The simplest solution to this event was to accomplish a straight ahead go-around and let approach control vector us back to final. We had plenty of fuel for that option. But the desire to get the aircraft on the ground as quickly as possible led me to make a bad decision; and choose a visual maneuver which we don't practice. This was also the last leg on a day that began very early in domicile and I was sleep definitely feeling the effects of a poor night's and the fact that I have flown seven out of the last eight days on trips in the window of circadian low; and the additive effects of this were building up. I did brief the first officer at the beginning of our day that I was tired and that would be an additive condition for me today. While we were backing up the visual approach with the RNAV procedure; the visual maneuver we flew could have been made safer by allowing tower or approach control to call our pattern; even at the cost of additional time and fuel. I do give the first officer credit as he was very forward with his inexperience at crp and communicated with me that he wasn't sure what we were doing in the middle of the second maneuver. The safer option with all the conditions affecting this flight would have been to accept help from ATC in the form of vectors.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew reports being high and fast for a visual approach to Runway 18 at CRP; with the First Officer flying. The Captain requests a left 360 which results in a misalignment and a go around. The missed approach is turned into a visual right downwind prior to reaching the runway. Turning base to final the First Officer cannot pick up the runway and the Captain makes the landing.

Narrative: The First Officer (FO) was flying his first arrival to CRP; and I believe the last time I was there was more than a decade ago; but needless to say we were not familiar with the CRP environment. We had been kept high on the arrival by ATC and were hurrying to descend to be stabilized for the approach. We realized that we would be too high for the approach and requested a 360 degree turn for our descent from the Tower. They approved us to maneuver either left or right as requested and we initiated a go-around and a 360 degree left turn in VMC conditions. In retrospect this was probably not a good decision as we were not very familiar with the airport environment but the good weather conditions had me not worried about the maneuver. We initiated the go-around above 1;000 feet; but descended slightly during the first part of the turn. I directed the FO to climb to 1;000 feet which he slowly did. I had referenced the approach plate and noticed that the obstacles on the plate in our quadrant were at 487 feet and our climb ensured clearance from them. During the 360 maneuver the FO lost sight of the airport but I had it in sight and talked him through the turn back to the landing runway. The FO completed the maneuver but we were again not in a position to make a safe landing as we were not well aligned with the landing runway and initiated another go-around again getting approval to stay with Tower but we maneuvered in a right hand pattern so the FO could see the runway in the turn. I directed a climb to 1;500 feet for the 579 foot towers west of the field. The FO informed me he had lost sight of the field and wasn't sure what maneuver we were doing while on downwind. This is when I realized I had not adequately communicated my intentions for the pattern we were flying. We were maneuvering visually so I took control of the aircraft and directed the FO to resequence the FMC course on the RNAV Approach we were using as a backup; and extend the centerline. I completed the base turn; final turn; and landed uneventfully on Runway 18. The simplest solution to this event was to accomplish a straight ahead go-around and let Approach Control vector us back to final. We had plenty of fuel for that option. But the desire to get the aircraft on the ground as quickly as possible led me to make a bad decision; and choose a visual maneuver which we don't practice. This was also the last leg on a day that began very early in domicile and I was sleep definitely feeling the effects of a poor night's and the fact that I have flown seven out of the last eight days on trips in the window of circadian low; and the additive effects of this were building up. I did brief the FO at the beginning of our day that I was tired and that would be an additive condition for me today. While we were backing up the visual approach with the RNAV procedure; the visual maneuver we flew could have been made safer by allowing Tower or Approach Control to call our pattern; even at the cost of additional time and fuel. I do give the FO credit as he was very forward with his inexperience at CRP and communicated with me that he wasn't sure what we were doing in the middle of the second maneuver. The safer option with all the conditions affecting this flight would have been to accept help from ATC in the form of vectors.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.