Narrative:

We began using new checklists and numerous new procedures recently. My safety concerns revolve around the unsafe manner in which these procedures have been implemented and the lack of oversight of my company by the FSDO. The new procedures introduced today would require several weeks of training for a new hire. I got a 100 page revision to the cfm and an 8 page handout.the level of non-compliance that I am sure existed on my flight deck; and every other un-trained crew here at my company since these procedures were introduced with no training; I'm sure was unacceptably high. I'm sure my performance would necessitate a long debrief on a line check or loe or even a failure. Why is it that we accept such an unsafe turn of events? While doing an interview prep the constantly stressed litmus test for every 'situational' interview question was 'if your wife and children were on that flight; would you want this to go on?' my answer is; if my family was traveling this week don't fly on my airline!I don't know what the FSDO does but apparently stopping unsafe practices is not one of them. Just like the -200 to -900 transition course that we use; the worst 121 training event I've ever attended; they have signed off on the introduction of a large quantity of new procedures with no training required.I did receive a multi-page handout; I did not receive any live instruction from an lca or other teaching pilot; I did not have any simulator based instruction; I did not see an instructional video of how the new procedures were to be implemented.while doing her master's degree my wife was given a definition of ethical patient contact. If 60 minutes walked in with a full video of your patient's visit would you be ashamed of anything you did with that patient? So extending this to our situation - if; god forbid; we bend some metal this week and the press and the NTSB get their teeth into our recent change of procedures; do you think that the press and the NTSB would give us glowing reviews for our commitment to safety? Just because we apparently have a relationship with the local FSDO that results in them rubber stamping our bad ideas does not mean that they are not still the wrong thing for us to do. While in the transition course mentioned above I had a mem FSDO inspector auditing the course; at every break he was shaking his head and muttering 'how did they get this approved?' please do not use the bad decisions of the local FSDO to justify bad decision making here at my company. We cannot go into an NTSB hearing and defend ourselves by saying: 'the FAA approved our actions.' our managers owe the employees; the mainline carrier; and the traveling public better than what we have done. While our sole business goal is to produce cheap seat miles; we cannot sustain a business plan that allows for those cheap seat miles to be made in an unsafe manner.company management needs to elevate their game and increase the caliber of this training evolution. Supposedly we are doing this transition project so that we mirror the mainline carrier procedures; I doubt that they implements sweeping new procedures with no training for their crews. Executive management needs to furnish the training and standards managers with sufficient budgetary support for the remaining 2 phases of this project so as not to repeat the mistakes of the first two. Secondly the threshold of compliance needs not be the low of the approval of an uncaring or compromised FSDO; the standard should be no less than the best practices used in the industry. While the system chief pilot seems disinterested in hearing about possible issues here because 'look at how far we've come'; I think that we are perfectly capable of being better given some guidance and training.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Captain lamented the training he received for new procedures instituted by his company in order to mirror the procedures of a main line carrier. He also does not believe that the CRJ200 to CRJ900 differences training is adequate.

Narrative: We began using new checklists and numerous new procedures recently. My safety concerns revolve around the unsafe manner in which these procedures have been implemented and the lack of oversight of my company by the FSDO. The new procedures introduced today would require several weeks of training for a new hire. I got a 100 page revision to the CFM and an 8 page handout.The level of non-compliance that I am sure existed on my flight deck; and every other un-trained crew here at my company since these procedures were introduced with NO TRAINING; I'm sure was unacceptably high. I'm sure my performance would necessitate a long debrief on a line check or LOE or even a failure. Why is it that we accept such an unsafe turn of events? While doing an interview prep the constantly stressed litmus test for every 'situational' interview question was 'If your wife and children were on that flight; would you want this to go on?' My answer is; if my family was traveling this week DON'T fly on my airline!I don't know what the FSDO does but apparently stopping unsafe practices is not one of them. Just like the -200 to -900 transition course that we use; the WORST 121 training event I've ever attended; they have signed off on the introduction of a large quantity of new procedures with no training required.I did receive a multi-page handout; I DID NOT receive any live instruction from an LCA or other teaching pilot; I DID NOT have any simulator based instruction; I DID NOT see an instructional video of how the new procedures were to be implemented.While doing her Master's Degree my wife was given a definition of ethical patient contact. If 60 Minutes walked in with a full video of your patient's visit would you be ashamed of anything you did with that patient? So extending this to our situation - If; God forbid; we bend some metal this week and the press and the NTSB get their teeth into our recent change of procedures; do you think that the press and the NTSB would give us glowing reviews for our commitment to safety? Just because we apparently have a relationship with the local FSDO that results in them rubber stamping our bad ideas DOES NOT mean that they are not still the WRONG thing for us to do. While in the transition course mentioned above I had a MEM FSDO inspector auditing the course; at every break he was shaking his head and muttering 'How did they get this approved?' Please do not use the bad decisions of the local FSDO to justify bad decision making here at my company. We cannot go into an NTSB hearing and defend ourselves by saying: 'The FAA approved our actions.' Our managers owe the employees; the mainline carrier; and the traveling public better than what we have done. While our sole business goal is to produce cheap seat miles; we cannot sustain a business plan that allows for those cheap seat miles to be made in an unsafe manner.Company Management needs to elevate their game and increase the caliber of this training evolution. Supposedly we are doing this transition project so that we mirror the mainline carrier procedures; I doubt that they implements sweeping new procedures with NO TRAINING for their crews. Executive management needs to furnish the training and standards managers with sufficient budgetary support for the remaining 2 phases of this project so as not to repeat the mistakes of the first two. Secondly the threshold of compliance needs not be the low of the approval of an uncaring or compromised FSDO; the standard should be no less than the best practices used in the industry. While the system chief pilot seems disinterested in hearing about possible issues here because 'Look at how far we've come'; I think that we are perfectly capable of being better given some guidance and TRAINING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.