Narrative:

While enroute to dca direct to shilo the crew was given direct to balance. Although the crew had not yet been assigned a transition to fly subsequent to eyess; they anticipated that they would be flying the river visual to 19. The captain briefed the visual approach; but because no transition had yet been given he did not load any transition into the FMS. Upon approaching eyess the pilot monitoring first officer and jump-seater noted that the aircraft altitude (10;000 feet) appeared high for the river visual into 19. The captain (ca) agreed; but added that he expected a right turn for a left downwind. Having flown this exact approach many times the ca was seeing out the windows (weather conditions were almost ideal VMC) exactly what he expected to see; and had the south transition been loaded into the FMS the aircraft would have flown that course he was expecting. However; because the transition was not loaded the aircraft did not make the turn at eyess which resulted in potomac asking if the crew had been given the south transition. The crew agreed (as did the jumpseater) that they had not heard anything about a transition. Potomac then issued vectors and a stern admonishment to the crew after which the aircraft was landed without any further comment from ATC.after landing and reconstructing what had occurred the crew recalled that at some point potomac had informed them to expect the 'river visual 19'. Although the term transition was not utilized; there was nevertheless sufficient information available to the have alerted the pilot flying ca to load the appropriate flight plan into the FMS.in summary; the root cause of this [report] was a fatigued captain who became complacent in anticipating a VMC visual approach with which he was very familiar. As a consequence; and not withstanding any nuance in communication with ATC; he neglected to load the appropriate transition into the FMS due to his fixation on expectations based on considerable previous experience under the same circumstances.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A crew expecting the DCA Runway 19 River Visual did not hear the clearance issued so they did not program the FMS transition. When the aircraft did not turn to EYESS; PCT noted the track deviation but then chastised the crew for not asking about the clearance after the EXPECT had been issued.

Narrative: While enroute to DCA direct to SHILO the crew was given direct to BAL. Although the crew had not yet been assigned a transition to fly subsequent to EYESS; they anticipated that they would be flying the river visual to 19. The Captain briefed the visual approach; but because no transition had yet been given he did not load any transition into the FMS. Upon approaching EYESS the Pilot Monitoring First Officer and jump-seater noted that the aircraft altitude (10;000 feet) appeared high for the river visual into 19. The Captain (CA) agreed; but added that he expected a right turn for a left downwind. Having flown this exact approach many times the CA was seeing out the windows (weather conditions were almost ideal VMC) exactly what he expected to see; and had the south transition been loaded into the FMS the aircraft would have flown that course he was expecting. However; because the transition was not loaded the aircraft did not make the turn at EYESS which resulted in Potomac asking if the crew had been given the south transition. The crew agreed (as did the jumpseater) that they had not heard anything about a transition. Potomac then issued vectors and a stern admonishment to the crew after which the aircraft was landed without any further comment from ATC.After landing and reconstructing what had occurred the crew recalled that at some point Potomac had informed them to expect the 'river visual 19'. Although the term transition was not utilized; there was nevertheless sufficient information available to the have alerted the Pilot Flying CA to load the appropriate flight plan into the FMS.In summary; the root cause of this [report] was a fatigued captain who became complacent in anticipating a VMC visual approach with which he was very familiar. As a consequence; and not withstanding any nuance in communication with ATC; he neglected to load the appropriate transition into the FMS due to his fixation on expectations based on considerable previous experience under the same circumstances.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.