Narrative:

On downwind to runway xxl at ZZZ; we began reducing speed and selected flaps 1 which operated normally. Upon reducing speed further; we selected flaps 2 and receive a flight ctrl; flaps locked misalignment ECAM message. The slats appeared to operate normally however the flaps were locked between the 1 & 2 position. We ran the QRH & ECAM actions and follow ups until we ran low on fuel; and landed on runway yy uneventfully. Mx met the aircraft and we entered the discrepancy in the logbook.we experienced several issues with this event that were related to the procedures and policies in dealing with malfunctions. Firstly; I as captain had the first officer; who was the PF; remain as PF and handle the ATC communications so that I could 'manage' the situation; in accordance with the [company] operational philosophy. What this resulted in was a situation where I was so completely consumed attention-wise by the in-depth research of landing performance and checklists and notifications; that I found myself entirely removed from the 'management' of the flight and later discovered that my first officer had realized this and began acting as the PIC and covered us by making the decisions for the flight that I was not aware of. Now; you can claim that this was great CRM; but that would be ignoring the real problem of me being so preoccupied by doing secretarial work that I was removed from the situation and no longer 'managing'. Our checklists are way too long and are inefficient; impractical and largely unusable unless you have hours of extra fuel to play with which we did not. We ran low on fuel and landed without completing all the performance calculations required by the checklist. In addition; the computed ref speeds would have had us landing in what erroneously appeared to be well below vls; so we increased speed manually to keep us out of the alpha protection range which may have been inaccurate. This resulted in lowering the pitch attitude and gave us about 2 degrees of 'flare' capability to max pitch of 7.5 degrees. With this; it resulted in a very firm landing.the current event management philosophy of the captain doing the busy work while the first officer sits over there and glances at the autopilot flying the airplane around; is flawed. The PF has much more time and mental capacity to 'manage' since it requires very little effort to monitor the autopilot. Doing checklists and calculations and notifications however; is all-consuming leaving no attention or time to 'manage' the flight. The captain could most effectively manage the situation if he were the PF. The captain should then delegate to the first officer the tasks of checklists; calculations; research and notifications; and this is the way I intend to handle failures in the future. It's simply the most conservative; safest approach to dealing with problems. Furthermore; our checklists and calculations procedures need to be more concise. If you can't complete a checklist with the appropriate performance calculations in less than 3 minutes; it's useless. I would challenge anyone in the company to complete every checklist and calculation for our failure; without advanced warning; in less than 20 minutes. We couldn't.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A321 Captain reported flap problems on approach that required checklists that were; in the Captain's words; 'way too long and are inefficient and largely unusable.' They were unable to complete them because of their fuel situation.

Narrative: On downwind to RWY XXL at ZZZ; we began reducing speed and selected flaps 1 which operated normally. Upon reducing speed further; we selected flaps 2 and receive a FLT CTRL; FLAPS LOCKED MISALIGNMENT ECAM message. The slats appeared to operate normally however the flaps were locked between the 1 & 2 position. We ran the QRH & ECAM actions and follow ups until we ran low on fuel; and landed on RWY YY uneventfully. MX met the aircraft and we entered the discrepancy in the logbook.We experienced several issues with this event that were related to the procedures and policies in dealing with malfunctions. Firstly; I as Captain had the FO; who was the PF; remain as PF and handle the ATC communications so that I could 'Manage' the situation; in accordance with the [Company] operational philosophy. What this resulted in was a situation where I was so completely consumed attention-wise by the in-depth research of landing performance and checklists and notifications; that I found myself entirely removed from the 'management' of the flight and later discovered that my FO had realized this and began acting as the PIC and covered us by making the decisions for the flight that I was not aware of. Now; you can claim that this was great CRM; but that would be ignoring the real problem of me being so preoccupied by doing secretarial work that I was removed from the situation and no longer 'managing'. Our checklists are WAY TOO LONG and are inefficient; impractical and largely unusable unless you have hours of extra fuel to play with which we did not. We ran low on fuel and landed without completing all the performance calculations required by the checklist. In addition; the computed ref speeds would have had us landing in what erroneously appeared to be well below VLS; so we increased speed manually to keep us out of the Alpha Protection range which may have been inaccurate. This resulted in lowering the pitch attitude and gave us about 2 degrees of 'flare' capability to max pitch of 7.5 degrees. With this; it resulted in a very firm landing.The current event management philosophy of the Captain doing the busy work while the FO sits over there and glances at the autopilot flying the airplane around; is flawed. The PF has MUCH MORE TIME AND MENTAL CAPACITY to 'Manage' since it requires very little effort to monitor the autopilot. Doing checklists and calculations and notifications however; is all-consuming leaving no attention or time to 'Manage' the flight. The Captain could most effectively manage the situation if he were the PF. The Captain should then delegate to the FO the tasks of checklists; calculations; research and notifications; and this is the way I intend to handle failures in the future. It's simply the most conservative; safest approach to dealing with problems. Furthermore; our checklists and calculations procedures need to be more concise. If you can't complete a checklist with the appropriate performance calculations in less than 3 minutes; it's useless. I would challenge anyone in the company to complete every checklist and calculation for our failure; without advanced warning; in less than 20 minutes. We couldn't.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.