Narrative:

I arrived for my shift and went right to work at a high altitude radar position where aircraft were deviating due to thunderstorms that had impacted the area. Traffic was high enough that I had a d-side to help with coordination. The area had been dealing with weather all evening and everyone was happy that myself and another 'midnighter' had arrived earlier than normal to help. After an 1:36 minutes on position at the high altitude sector; it was determined that traffic had lessened enough to combine sectors into our 'midnight' configuration. I was still not up for break and people were getting close to the end of their shifts. I agreed to move over and work the two high sectors (eck/gam) that I had been already working as well as the two low altitude sectors (lan/fnt) underlying them. This is our normal midnight configuration. I was offered a break shortly thereafter and left position. I returned and took over that same position. During the time that I was on break; the three approach controls that we take over for on the midnight shift had closed. The briefing that I received was 'rushed' due to workload. After the previous controller unplugged and I sat down; we continued to talk; to clear up what approaches were left on at the airports that had closed. I work many midnight shifts and have a certain system that I use to keep track of the ILS's that were left on. I keep track of this information by writing them on my scope in addition to any other pertinent information the approach control gives to me when they go home for the night. He had written the ILS for one airport on a scrap piece of paper and showed it to me when I asked for confirmation. When I took position; I wrote the ILS's on my scope. There was no mention of runway 18/36 being closed. I had seen this runway closed over the last few weeks and in hindsight; of course; wish I would have remembered. This being my first shift back however; I did not. There is and has been NOTAM out stating this closure.traffic was moderate with complaints on rides and deviations. I received an indication that my first aircraft that I would need to clear for an approach was on its way. Aircraft X. Once again; as a habit; I always pull up the airport of landing on my erids so that I can access the approach plates and any NOTAMS at the touch of a button. When I went to do this; I noticed that my display was not working and called the ops manager on duty to ask if they were aware that it was out. I decided to work around the outage by getting up and walking to an unused position to use a different sector's erids display. I commented in a joking manner to the controller next to me that I felt kind of 'naked' without it being at my sector and that it was kind of like a security blanket to have that information right next to me. I asked aircraft X if they had the current weather and NOTAMS for their destination. They advised that they did have the weather and NOTAMS and then advised that they were requesting the RNAV18 approach. Due to workload; the non-ease of the placement of a working erids; and the comment that the pilot had the NOTAMS; I did not open the current NOTAMS for the airport. I issued aircraft X an approach clearance and cleared him to advisory frequency. Right after I did that; the controller working next to me inquired as to if runway 18 was still closed. I immediately felt my insides drop and went into 'omg' mode. I immediately asked another pilot to switch to the unicom frequency and broadcast to aircraft X that runway 18 was closed. By this time; aircraft X was on about a 5-7 mile final for 18. Shortly after; I observed aircraft X turning left on what looked to be a downwind for runway 27. The other airliner pilot came back on frequency stating that he had heard no response. I thanked him and advised that I had seen aircraft X turning. During the time; I was also in the process of clearing another aircraft for an approach into mbs. Aircraft X came on frequency while still on downwind to advise that he was cancelling IFR and landed safely on runway 27. I thanked the controller next to me for saying something. I also told him; which I believe still; that I would not have noticed anything wrong at all if he hadn't spoken up. I continued to work the position until I was offered a break.there was an FAA saying and training phrase many years ago called 'break the chain'. This event; in my opinion; had many links in this chain. Myself; being one of them. Weather. Equipment not working at the position. Workload. Pilot stating that he had the NOTAMS when he evidently did not; no mention of the runway outage in the briefing; thankfully [the other controller] 'broke the chain' by speaking up and asking a question. In the end; I am not sure if my efforts to inform aircraft X of the closed runway were successful or not.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZOB Controller reported of clearing an aircraft for an approach to a closed runway and switching the aircraft to the advisory frequency. A controller sitting near the reporter asked him if Runway 18 was still closed. The reporting Controller realized what he had done and attempted to reach the landing aircraft. Eventually the landing aircraft called the reporter and cancelled IFR and went to land on a different runway.

Narrative: I arrived for my shift and went right to work at a high altitude Radar position where aircraft were deviating due to thunderstorms that had impacted the area. Traffic was high enough that I had a D-side to help with coordination. The area had been dealing with weather all evening and everyone was happy that myself and another 'midnighter' had arrived earlier than normal to help. After an 1:36 minutes on position at the high altitude sector; it was determined that traffic had lessened enough to combine sectors into our 'midnight' configuration. I was still not up for break and people were getting close to the end of their shifts. I agreed to move over and work the two high sectors (ECK/GAM) that I had been already working as well as the two low altitude sectors (LAN/FNT) underlying them. This is our normal midnight configuration. I was offered a break shortly thereafter and left position. I returned and took over that same position. During the time that I was on break; the three approach controls that we take over for on the midnight shift had closed. The briefing that I received was 'rushed' due to workload. After the previous controller unplugged and I sat down; we continued to talk; to clear up what approaches were left on at the airports that had closed. I work many midnight shifts and have a certain system that I use to keep track of the ILS's that were left on. I keep track of this information by writing them on my scope in addition to any other pertinent information the approach control gives to me when they go home for the night. He had written the ILS for one airport on a scrap piece of paper and showed it to me when I asked for confirmation. When I took position; I wrote the ILS's on my scope. There was no mention of runway 18/36 being closed. I had seen this runway closed over the last few weeks and in hindsight; of course; wish I would have remembered. This being my first shift back however; I did not. There is and has been NOTAM out stating this closure.Traffic was moderate with complaints on rides and deviations. I received an indication that my first aircraft that I would need to clear for an approach was on its way. Aircraft X. Once again; as a habit; I always pull up the airport of landing on my ERIDS so that I can access the approach plates and any NOTAMS at the touch of a button. When I went to do this; I noticed that my display was not working and called the Ops Manager on duty to ask if they were aware that it was out. I decided to work around the outage by getting up and walking to an unused position to use a different sector's ERIDS display. I commented in a joking manner to the controller next to me that I felt kind of 'naked' without it being at my sector and that it was kind of like a security blanket to have that information right next to me. I asked Aircraft X if they had the current weather and NOTAMS for their destination. They advised that they did have the weather and NOTAMS and then advised that they were requesting the RNAV18 approach. Due to workload; the non-ease of the placement of a working ERIDS; and the comment that the pilot had the NOTAMS; I did not open the current NOTAMS for the airport. I issued Aircraft X an approach clearance and cleared him to advisory frequency. Right after I did that; the controller working next to me inquired as to if runway 18 was still closed. I immediately felt my insides drop and went into 'OMG' mode. I immediately asked another pilot to switch to the Unicom frequency and broadcast to Aircraft X that runway 18 was closed. By this time; Aircraft X was on about a 5-7 mile final for 18. Shortly after; I observed Aircraft X turning left on what looked to be a downwind for runway 27. The other airliner pilot came back on frequency stating that he had heard no response. I thanked him and advised that I had seen Aircraft X turning. During the time; I was also in the process of clearing another aircraft for an approach into MBS. Aircraft X came on frequency while still on downwind to advise that he was cancelling IFR and landed safely on runway 27. I thanked the controller next to me for saying something. I also told him; which I believe still; that I would not have noticed anything wrong at all if he hadn't spoken up. I continued to work the position until I was offered a break.There was an FAA saying and training phrase many years ago called 'Break the Chain'. This event; in my opinion; had many links in this chain. Myself; being one of them. Weather. Equipment not working at the position. Workload. Pilot stating that he had the NOTAMS when he evidently did not; no mention of the runway outage in the briefing; Thankfully [the other controller] 'broke the chain' by speaking up and asking a question. In the end; I am not sure if my efforts to inform Aircraft X of the closed runway were successful or not.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.