Commuter mdt climbed to 13000' with gear extended.

Attributes
ACN	129299
Time
Date	198911
Day	Sat
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	airport : clt
State Reference	NC
Altitude	msl bound lower : 400 msl bound upper : 13000
Environment
Flight Conditions	Mixed
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : clt
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Medium Transport, High Wing, 2 Turboprop Eng
Flight Phase	climbout : initial climbout : intermediate altitude
Route In Use	enroute : on vectors
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 200 flight time total : 6000 flight time type : 1500
ASRS Report	129299
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : instrument pilot : commercial
Events
Anomaly	non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other
Independent Detector	other flight crewa
Resolutory Action	other
Consequence	Other
Supplementary
Primary Problem	Flight Crew Human Performance
Air Traffic Incident	Pilot Deviation

Narrative:

Prepared for immediate takeoff with a left turnout as soon as possible, 90 degree turn. I was flying at 400' AGL. Made turnout at 'positive rate' call from first officer. Prior to the turn called, 'gear up.' after turnout and 400' AGL, called for flaps up, bleeps on, and climb power, when the flaps are fully retracted, which is the company profile. Out of 1500' the first officer is to do the after-takeoff checklist silently and call complete, which he did. The airplane did not climb as well as usual, but we were only 150-200# below maximum gross weight. After leveling off at 13000', I noticed the landing gear selector still down and selected it to the up position. The lights were hard to see with the sunglasses on. The first officer's response was, 'did I forget that?' we discussed the fact that he did not actually read the after-takeoff checklist, but performed it by memory. We were busy after takeoff with the turn and traffic, but this is no excuse for not reading the after takeoff checks. I will insist that first officer's read the checklists, not memorize them. I try to fight the urge to not read them because we do them so many times each day, but we must all have the discipline to read and actually check the items.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: COMMUTER MDT CLIMBED TO 13000' WITH GEAR EXTENDED.

Narrative: PREPARED FOR IMMEDIATE TKOF WITH A LEFT TURNOUT ASAP, 90 DEG TURN. I WAS FLYING AT 400' AGL. MADE TURNOUT AT 'POSITIVE RATE' CALL FROM F/O. PRIOR TO THE TURN CALLED, 'GEAR UP.' AFTER TURNOUT AND 400' AGL, CALLED FOR FLAPS UP, BLEEPS ON, AND CLB PWR, WHEN THE FLAPS ARE FULLY RETRACTED, WHICH IS THE COMPANY PROFILE. OUT OF 1500' THE F/O IS TO DO THE AFTER-TKOF CHKLIST SILENTLY AND CALL COMPLETE, WHICH HE DID. THE AIRPLANE DID NOT CLB AS WELL AS USUAL, BUT WE WERE ONLY 150-200# BELOW MAX GROSS WT. AFTER LEVELING OFF AT 13000', I NOTICED THE LNDG GEAR SELECTOR STILL DOWN AND SELECTED IT TO THE UP POS. THE LIGHTS WERE HARD TO SEE WITH THE SUNGLASSES ON. THE F/O'S RESPONSE WAS, 'DID I FORGET THAT?' WE DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT HE DID NOT ACTUALLY READ THE AFTER-TKOF CHKLIST, BUT PERFORMED IT BY MEMORY. WE WERE BUSY AFTER TKOF WITH THE TURN AND TFC, BUT THIS IS NO EXCUSE FOR NOT READING THE AFTER TKOF CHKS. I WILL INSIST THAT F/O'S READ THE CHKLISTS, NOT MEMORIZE THEM. I TRY TO FIGHT THE URGE TO NOT READ THEM BECAUSE WE DO THEM SO MANY TIMES EACH DAY, BUT WE MUST ALL HAVE THE DISCIPLINE TO READ AND ACTUALLY CHK THE ITEMS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.