B737-700 captain failed to notice that the relatively inexperienced first officer had improperly set...

Narrative:

We were not rushing and the entire crew was content with what was happening timewise. Everything seemed normal as we started and taxied for takeoff. All checklist were completed in a timely manner; but when the before takeoff checklist was performed; I missed that the first officer had placed both engine bleed switches off and the APU bleed on. When I looked to verify; I saw two switches one direction and the APU switch in the opposite direction and my brain just did not register that all three were wrong.I have absolutely no idea why the first officer would reverse all three switches; but he did. A key factor in this is that the first officer's employee number would imply that he has been with the company for over nine years; yet he has only been here from another carrier for about half a year and is new to the 737. So; there is an implied level of trust based on employee number and there is no requirement for him to tell me he is inexperienced. I was not watching him like he was a new guy; but I should have been. I noticed a problem with the air conditioning system not putting out much air as we were climbing and then at the 10;000 foot checklist I noticed the pressurization problem. I leveled the aircraft; examined the AC system and found the switches reversed. Resolved problem according to checklist; repressurized the aircraft and continued.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-700 Captain failed to notice that the relatively inexperienced First Officer had improperly set the engine bleed and APU control switches on prefight. The error was caught and corrected when performing the 10;000 foot checklist.

Narrative: We were not rushing and the entire crew was content with what was happening timewise. Everything seemed normal as we started and taxied for takeoff. All checklist were completed in a timely manner; but when the before takeoff checklist was performed; I missed that the FO had placed both engine bleed switches off and the APU bleed on. When I looked to verify; I saw two switches one direction and the APU switch in the opposite direction and my brain just did not register that all three were wrong.I have absolutely no idea why the FO would reverse all three switches; but he did. A key factor in this is that the FO's employee number would imply that he has been with the Company for over nine years; yet he has only been here from another carrier for about half a year and is new to the 737. So; there is an implied level of trust based on employee number and there is no requirement for him to tell me he is inexperienced. I was not watching him like he was a new guy; but I should have been. I noticed a problem with the air conditioning system not putting out much air as we were climbing and then at the 10;000 foot checklist I noticed the pressurization problem. I leveled the aircraft; examined the AC system and found the switches reversed. Resolved problem according to checklist; repressurized the aircraft and continued.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

Attributes
ACN	1296866
Time
Date	201509
Local Time Of Day	1801-2400
Place
Locale Reference	ZZZ.Airport
State Reference	US
Environment
Flight Conditions	Mixed
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Make Model Name	B737-700
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Phase	Taxi
Flight Plan	IFR
Component
Aircraft Component	Pneumatic Control Valves
Person 1
Function	Pilot Flying Captain
Qualification	Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP)
Experience	Flight Crew Last 90 Days 188 Flight Crew Type 11000
Events
Anomaly	Aircraft Equipment Problem Less Severe Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy

B737-700 captain failed to notice that the relatively inexperienced first officer had improperly set the engine bleed and APU control switches on prefight. The error was caught and corrected when performing the 10;000 foot checklist.