Narrative:

Received lga ATIS, which specified runway 13 departure. Clearance delivery gave us 'right turn heading 340 dgs, maspeth climb.' briefed crew for lga 3 departure, maspeth climb, which called for right turn 175 degrees after takeoff from runway 13, climb to 3000', then right turn 340 degree heading to 5000'. Clearance from clearance delivery to turn right 340 degrees 'seemed' to agree with published departure. After engine start, flight crew requested clearance to taxi from ground controller. Controller cleared us to 'taxi runway 13 via inner--information current.' aircraft was then taxied toward runway 13 via the inner and taxiway gulf, past control tower and across runway 4/22. Shortly after crossing runway 4/22, controller advised crew that 'clearance was to runway 31 (not 13!), make left turn on alpha, left on echo, hold short 22.' due to late hour, there was no other aircraft in operation on airport surface, one other air carrier aircraft was landing on runway 31 (after our aircraft was heading back toward 31 after crossing 4/22). I'm not sure if 4/22 was active when originating. Crossed when headed mistakenly for runway 13. (After u-turn, aircraft was rolling out on 31.) I'm not sure if ground controller actually cleared us to runway 31. Crew had runway 13 in mind after hearing ATIS, getting clearance, briefing runway 13, departure with maspeth climb and seeing 'departure 13' written on paper second officer gave us. Perhaps controller said runway 31 and we 'heard' 13. Perhaps controller said '13,' as it was near the end of his shift. He sounded tired, and he had been clearing aircraft to runway 13 all night. In either case, more vigilance on part of flight crew, ground controller and local controller would have avoided situation. Actually thought about asking controller to confirm 'cleared across 4/22,' but decided against this as a clearance to a runway is a clearance across all runways, unless otherwise instructed. In future, prior to crossing any runway I am going to request confirmation to cross. Obviously, this situation would have been avoided if I had done this. In addition, due to light traffic, I would have expected that controller would have brought it to our attention that we were taxiing toward the wrong runway prior to our taxiing the length of the airport and right past control tower. After incident I apologized to controller who told us 'no problem.' he was extremely polite and professional during the entire incident. In addition, I plan to pay the strictest of attention to runway assignments in the future, and confirm again and again, if I have the slightest doubt, or trace of doubt.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ACR CROSSED RWY WITHOUT CLRNC WHILE APPARENTLY TAXIING TO WRONG RWY AT LGA.

Narrative: RECEIVED LGA ATIS, WHICH SPECIFIED RWY 13 DEP. CLRNC DELIVERY GAVE US 'RIGHT TURN HDG 340 DGS, MASPETH CLB.' BRIEFED CREW FOR LGA 3 DEP, MASPETH CLB, WHICH CALLED FOR RIGHT TURN 175 DEGS AFTER TKOF FROM RWY 13, CLB TO 3000', THEN RIGHT TURN 340 DEG HDG TO 5000'. CLRNC FROM CLRNC DELIVERY TO TURN RIGHT 340 DEGS 'SEEMED' TO AGREE WITH PUBLISHED DEP. AFTER ENG START, FLT CREW REQUESTED CLRNC TO TAXI FROM GND CTLR. CTLR CLRED US TO 'TAXI RWY 13 VIA INNER--INFO CURRENT.' ACFT WAS THEN TAXIED TOWARD RWY 13 VIA THE INNER AND TXWY GULF, PAST CTL TWR AND ACROSS RWY 4/22. SHORTLY AFTER XING RWY 4/22, CTLR ADVISED CREW THAT 'CLRNC WAS TO RWY 31 (NOT 13!), MAKE LEFT TURN ON ALPHA, LEFT ON ECHO, HOLD SHORT 22.' DUE TO LATE HOUR, THERE WAS NO OTHER ACFT IN OPERATION ON ARPT SURFACE, ONE OTHER ACR ACFT WAS LNDG ON RWY 31 (AFTER OUR ACFT WAS HEADING BACK TOWARD 31 AFTER XING 4/22). I'M NOT SURE IF 4/22 WAS ACTIVE WHEN ORIGINATING. CROSSED WHEN HEADED MISTAKENLY FOR RWY 13. (AFTER U-TURN, ACFT WAS ROLLING OUT ON 31.) I'M NOT SURE IF GND CTLR ACTUALLY CLRED US TO RWY 31. CREW HAD RWY 13 IN MIND AFTER HEARING ATIS, GETTING CLRNC, BRIEFING RWY 13, DEP WITH MASPETH CLB AND SEEING 'DEP 13' WRITTEN ON PAPER S/O GAVE US. PERHAPS CTLR SAID RWY 31 AND WE 'HEARD' 13. PERHAPS CTLR SAID '13,' AS IT WAS NEAR THE END OF HIS SHIFT. HE SOUNDED TIRED, AND HE HAD BEEN CLRING ACFT TO RWY 13 ALL NIGHT. IN EITHER CASE, MORE VIGILANCE ON PART OF FLT CREW, GND CTLR AND LCL CTLR WOULD HAVE AVOIDED SITUATION. ACTUALLY THOUGHT ABOUT ASKING CTLR TO CONFIRM 'CLRED ACROSS 4/22,' BUT DECIDED AGAINST THIS AS A CLRNC TO A RWY IS A CLRNC ACROSS ALL RWYS, UNLESS OTHERWISE INSTRUCTED. IN FUTURE, PRIOR TO XING ANY RWY I AM GOING TO REQUEST CONFIRMATION TO CROSS. OBVIOUSLY, THIS SITUATION WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF I HAD DONE THIS. IN ADDITION, DUE TO LIGHT TFC, I WOULD HAVE EXPECTED THAT CTLR WOULD HAVE BROUGHT IT TO OUR ATTN THAT WE WERE TAXIING TOWARD THE WRONG RWY PRIOR TO OUR TAXIING THE LENGTH OF THE ARPT AND RIGHT PAST CTL TWR. AFTER INCIDENT I APOLOGIZED TO CTLR WHO TOLD US 'NO PROB.' HE WAS EXTREMELY POLITE AND PROFESSIONAL DURING THE ENTIRE INCIDENT. IN ADDITION, I PLAN TO PAY THE STRICTEST OF ATTN TO RWY ASSIGNMENTS IN THE FUTURE, AND CONFIRM AGAIN AND AGAIN, IF I HAVE THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT, OR TRACE OF DOUBT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.