Narrative:

The 'MDA' was set in the altitude preselect instead of the 'stepdown altitude'. We were flying to jfk as co-captains. My role was PIC and the other pilot role was sic. On this leg; I was the nonflying pilot and the sic was the flying pilot. The weather at jfk was marginal VFR. ATC was using the ILS 4R and the RNAV GPS Y 4L approach. We were assigned the RNAV GPS Y 4L approach. Throughout our flight; I was privately admiring the proficiency; professionalism and airmanship of my co-captain. He was doing an excellent job in the performance of his duties and his conduct of CRM. We conducted the [memory jogging] procedure. As we approached the repre stepdown fix; the sic called for the MDA altitude instead of the stepdown altitude. Since we were in VMC conditions; I set the MDA in the altitude preselect without verbal question. I do remember thinking; for just a flash of a second; 'oh; he's having me set MDA; and he's going to mentally adjust the descent rate for krstl (the final approach fix).' I then proceeded to observe the VMC conditions outside the airplane; especially noting the surface winds and the whitecaps on the ocean surface; and updated the sic of my observations.during our descent; we received the 1000 foot call out from the radar altimeter and then the gear warning horn. We noted that as being out of the ordinary and lowered the gear. Shortly thereafter; we received the low altitude alert from jfk tower. I advised the sic that we were too low; at MDA and just approaching krstl (the final approach fix). About the same time; there was an autopilot trim caution message which the sic corrected by disengaging the autopilot and retrimming the airplane. Being in VMC we remained at that altitude and continued for an otherwise uneventful landing. Evan though both pilots were completely engaged in the approach and procedure; the assumption was; by both pilots; that the descent would be adjusted for the proper altitude at krstl (the final approach fix). Both pilots missed it. If the flying pilot would have called for the stepdown altitude instead of the MDA; 'and'; if the monitoring pilot would have insisted on; or corrected; the altitude selection for the stepdown altitude; the whole altitude deviation situation would have been avoided.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: CRJ-900 flight crew reported receiving a low altitude alert from ATC when they descended below charted altitude on approach to JFK.

Narrative: The 'MDA' was set in the altitude preselect instead of the 'stepdown altitude'. We were flying to JFK as Co-Captains. My role was PIC and the other pilot role was SIC. On this leg; I was the nonflying pilot and the SIC was the flying pilot. The weather at JFK was marginal VFR. ATC was using the ILS 4R and the RNAV GPS Y 4L approach. We were assigned the RNAV GPS Y 4L approach. Throughout our flight; I was privately admiring the proficiency; professionalism and airmanship of my Co-captain. He was doing an excellent job in the performance of his duties and his conduct of CRM. We conducted the [memory jogging] procedure. As we approached the REPRE stepdown fix; the SIC called for the MDA altitude instead of the stepdown altitude. Since we were in VMC conditions; I set the MDA in the altitude preselect without verbal question. I do remember thinking; for just a flash of a second; 'Oh; he's having me set MDA; and he's going to mentally adjust the descent rate for KRSTL (the final approach fix).' I then proceeded to observe the VMC conditions outside the airplane; especially noting the surface winds and the whitecaps on the ocean surface; and updated the SIC of my observations.During our descent; we received the 1000 foot call out from the radar altimeter and then the gear warning horn. We noted that as being out of the ordinary and lowered the gear. Shortly thereafter; we received the low altitude alert from JFK tower. I advised the SIC that we were too low; at MDA and just approaching KRSTL (the final approach fix). About the same time; there was an autopilot trim caution message which the SIC corrected by disengaging the autopilot and retrimming the airplane. Being in VMC we remained at that altitude and continued for an otherwise uneventful landing. Evan though both pilots were completely engaged in the approach and procedure; the assumption was; by both pilots; that the descent would be adjusted for the proper altitude at KRSTL (the final approach fix). Both pilots missed it. If the flying pilot would have called for the stepdown altitude instead of the MDA; 'AND'; if the monitoring pilot would have insisted on; or corrected; the altitude selection for the stepdown altitude; the whole altitude deviation situation would have been avoided.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.