Narrative:

While enroute to dca; we noted that we were running behind on fuel; 1;100 lbs at ilm. Some of this we attributed to leveling at FL370 instead of FL390 and a slightly higher than planned takeoff weight. It was apparent that fuel would be tighter than expected on landing; but not critical given it was a clear night. Later; we were given delaying vectors and an early descent; well before what was required to meet the capss arrival. Just outside of potomac approach's airspace; we were assigned a 110 degree turn to the left and slowed to 250 kts. Throughout we were keenly aware of our fuel situation as we were turned back onto the arrival and crossed the waves intersection with 5;000 lbs; about 2;300 lbs less than planned. First officer (first officer) suggested that we declare minimum fuel but I felt that we were going to land well above reserve fuel (3;700 lbs) and did not think it necessary. As we entered the downwind segment of the arrival; we asked the controller how long our final would be. He stated that we should expect a base turn in about 15 miles; which I felt was within our minimums. We were turned in and cleared for the river visual to 19 which I backed up with the RNAV (rnp). Approach was normal as we switched to tower and heard the tower controller clear one aircraft for takeoff and another into position. As we continued the approach; the tower controller cleared us to land and asked us to 'square the turn to final' as he cleared the next aircraft for takeoff. At this point; with fuel at about 4;200 lbs; the aircraft on the runway apparently did not initiate his takeoff roll quickly enough and tower instructed us to go around. I believed that; while we could go around and get back to dca with expedited handling; that it was safer for us to land provided that the aircraft ahead had cleared the runway. We had the departing aircraft in sight throughout and noted he was well into his takeoff roll. I instructed first officer to tell the tower that we were 'unable' and declare minimum fuel-which he did. The controller cleared us to land once again. We watched the departing aircraft lift off and climb and we touched down normally several seconds later. At no time were we in a position where we could not have gone around if the aircraft had not cleared the runway. Fuel on landing was 4;000 lbs.my most significant error in this event was not declaring minimum fuel with the approach controller. At the very least; we would have received expedited handling and; with the tower in the loop; the departure of the next aircraft might have been delayed to prevent any conflict. My judgment regarding the fuel level appropriate to make that declaration did not include any contingencies for unexpected events. Either with or without the minimum fuel call; I should have declared an emergency to the tower controller. This would have been entirely appropriate since I was exercising my PIC (pilot in command) authority to deviate from a clearance to insure a safe outcome.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 flight crew arriving DCA noted excess fuel consumption enroute but still expected to land with 4;600 pounds on a clear night and TRACON is not advised. The Tower cleared another aircraft to takeoff with the B737 crew inside three miles; then issues a go around when the spacing appeared too tight. The B737 Captain declined; stating minimum fuel and the Tower reissued a landing clearance.

Narrative: While enroute to DCA; we noted that we were running behind on fuel; 1;100 lbs at ILM. Some of this we attributed to leveling at FL370 instead of FL390 and a slightly higher than planned takeoff weight. It was apparent that fuel would be tighter than expected on landing; but not critical given it was a clear night. Later; we were given delaying vectors and an early descent; well before what was required to meet the CAPSS arrival. Just outside of Potomac Approach's airspace; we were assigned a 110 degree turn to the left and slowed to 250 kts. Throughout we were keenly aware of our fuel situation as we were turned back onto the arrival and crossed the WAVES Intersection with 5;000 lbs; about 2;300 lbs less than planned. FO (First Officer) suggested that we declare minimum fuel but I felt that we were going to land well above reserve fuel (3;700 lbs) and did not think it necessary. As we entered the downwind segment of the arrival; we asked the controller how long our final would be. He stated that we should expect a base turn in about 15 miles; which I felt was within our minimums. We were turned in and cleared for the River Visual to 19 which I backed up with the RNAV (RNP). Approach was normal as we switched to tower and heard the tower controller clear one aircraft for takeoff and another into position. As we continued the approach; the tower controller cleared us to land and asked us to 'square the turn to final' as he cleared the next aircraft for takeoff. At this point; with fuel at about 4;200 lbs; the aircraft on the runway apparently did not initiate his takeoff roll quickly enough and Tower instructed us to go around. I believed that; while we could go around and get back to DCA with expedited handling; that it was safer for us to land provided that the aircraft ahead had cleared the runway. We had the departing aircraft in sight throughout and noted he was well into his takeoff roll. I instructed FO to tell the tower that we were 'Unable' and declare minimum fuel-which he did. The controller cleared us to land once again. We watched the departing aircraft lift off and climb and we touched down normally several seconds later. At no time were we in a position where we could not have gone around if the aircraft had not cleared the runway. Fuel on landing was 4;000 lbs.My most significant error in this event was not declaring minimum fuel with the approach controller. At the very least; we would have received expedited handling and; with the tower in the loop; the departure of the next aircraft might have been delayed to prevent any conflict. My judgment regarding the fuel level appropriate to make that declaration did not include any contingencies for unexpected events. Either with or without the minimum fuel call; I should have declared an emergency to the tower controller. This would have been entirely appropriate since I was exercising my PIC (Pilot in Command) authority to deviate from a clearance to insure a safe outcome.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.