Narrative:

This was a runway incursion that occurred while taxiing out to the active runway; no part of the aircraft was beyond the holdbar; but the holdbar used was the incorrect one; designed not for the runway in use but for landing aircraft on adjacent runway. The actual area is designated a 'hot spot' and was briefed by the captain at the gate but not obvious to my captain while taxiing out. I was 'inside' (not looking out) while carrying out my first officer (first officer) duties and was not able to assist my captain at that point during taxi. The ground controller was very graceful and pointed out our mistake for 'future reference.' no immediate safety consequences apply. I would like to add that my captain and I initially felt there was no need for an as soon as possible report; but I decided to file the report because I'm finding safety issues; hazards and threats starting to spring up while flying the line with even with experienced captains; that if left uncheck will cause aircraft damage; injury; or death. I am no spring chicken: have been with this company for nearly 13 years and have previous experiences at other major airlines that ended due to career advancement or furlough. I hope you take my report seriously and for those that have not been in the right seat for a while; to listen carefully and remember that we have many inexperienced new-hires; and very junior captains. I would like to include the training department and the architects of sops that have set up conflicting first officer responsibilities to be nearly impossible to comply with in the real world; with the possibility of rendering the first officer with an always at fault/lose-lose situation. This airport's hot spot (hs) 5 is depicted for a good reason. It was briefed and not obvious to the captain. I believe that if my task responsibilities were lighter or less completed I would have been able to follow along with the captain during his taxi. There was never a moment of doubt or curiosity that would have triggered my attention. I believe this particular hot spot will keep on bringing more and more incursions; especially with those unfamiliar with the airport. I've flown to military and civilian airports where controllers issue taxi instructions with hold short remarks such as 'hold short of taxiway xyz by (a particular landmark; chart depiction (i.e. 'The box') or stationary object)' as emphasis of a particular location. The most obvious characteristic about hs 5 is it's triangular shape. Designating and depicting hs 5 as 'the triangle' at this airport on charts; and ATC asking pilots to 'hold short of the triangle' would bring 'heads up' to pilots unfamiliar with the airport to pay attention and force them to figure where this 'triangle' is; to make sure they hold short where they are supposed to. I really believe this is the easiest and best solution for this airport. The following applies to this particular experience and others as well. First; feel free to ask any of our check airmen how many tasks and items are taken care of by the first officer from the time the airplane pushes back until takeoff. The workload is intense; and is no secret; as some of our check airmen will proudly tell you to the exact number of how many there are. This of course; comes with great conflict while trying to help a captain find his way around. Either checklists/procedures will be done in error/skipped; or taxiway/runway incursions are going to occur. Where the sops are not helping: now combine the previous threat with (especially the latest one) 'no heads down while in a turn;' that brings another checklist implications per SOP on checklists: 'if a checklist is interrupted and any uncertainty exists regarding the last item performed; it must be re-accomplish 'uncertainty' is stated here in a very liberal way; since the captain and first officer are leaving it to their short term memory if the task or item had been 'really' performed -truly a russian roulette. There are also 'flows' where attention and concentration is critical; andthe likeliness of a captain holding short of a turn for an first officer to finish up is not only impractical but could impact airport traffic flow and perhaps a reprimand from ground controllers; try that at [another busy airport] right? The system in place will always find a way to blame the pilots if they were to fail; especially the first officer. I flew with an experienced captain not long ago that had complete disregard to my workload. We were in atl and had a runway change and new ATIS coming up; and we now had an intersection departure assigned and we were #2 for takeoff; with the #1 already lining up on the runway. We had ample time to accomplish everything; but this captain elected to speed through the taxiways. I even asked him; 'hey; slow down a little;' his answer; 'I'm doing the best I can.' right; at 30 kts down the taxiway; and he left it unchanged; unbelievable! I verbalized how uncomfortable I was while doing things in extreme pressure while lining up on the runway. I later thought and wondered if we ever did the before-takeoff brief. I was extremely furious. I didn't say anything and waited until cruise altitude to see if he would say anything; but he never did. On a later flight on this same pairing and same captain we are taxiing very early in the morning out of [another airport]; I copied the taxiing instruction clearly; understood it; and he had no questions. So I'm going about my flows (inside) and a moment later ground control is yelling at us because we missed a turn on a taxiway. He was speeding along in his taxiing and not paying attention. He didn't say anything! Maybe this is all 'normal' to him! I'm sure you are asking yourselves: so why didn't you bring this up? Short answer: (and be ready; I'm going to spill the beans here.) because I'm done with the careless tribal culture of a few of our captains. I am the one that through the years have spent numerous amount of hours with professional standards 'baby-sitting' some of our most unprofessional captains. I have even written up a problem captain; a captain that professional standards have asked me to write up because they; are done with him. [Chief pilot] contacts me to tell me that 'the truth lies somewhere between what I said and what he said; and that they will not do anything about it.' as you can see; I'm done with the captain baby-sitting. On a more personal note; the training department failed me on my initial attempt to upgrade; not because what I didn't know; but because of their own internal issues. My instructor was clueless on what the checkairmen where requiring on certain maneuvers. On my subsequent second attempt the checkairman failed me on a maneuver that was 'passed' on the previous original checkride; while I was doing exactly the same procedures. This lack of standardization and leadership is affecting and/or will affect operations. It will trickle down. I have been a victim of this poor system in many facets; I'm trying to do my best to then be shot down. Very demoralizing frankly. You have to figure how all this fits in the big picture and also figure out what level of safety you want this airline to operate. I'm not holding my breath; and you can see why.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 First Officer reports a runway incursion during taxi out to Runway 8R at MIA. The area is designated as hotspot 5 and has its own inset box to explain the confusing hold short lines.

Narrative: This was a runway incursion that occurred while taxiing out to the active runway; no part of the aircraft was beyond the holdbar; but the holdbar used was the incorrect one; designed not for the runway in use but for landing aircraft on adjacent runway. The actual area is designated a 'Hot Spot' and was briefed by the captain at the gate but not obvious to my captain while taxiing out. I was 'inside' (not looking out) while carrying out my First Officer (FO) duties and was not able to assist my captain at that point during taxi. The ground controller was very graceful and pointed out our mistake for 'future reference.' No immediate safety consequences apply. I would like to add that my Captain and I initially felt there was no need for an ASAP report; but I decided to file the report because I'm finding safety issues; hazards and threats starting to spring up while flying the line with even with experienced captains; that if left uncheck will cause aircraft damage; injury; or death. I am no spring chicken: have been with this company for nearly 13 years and have previous experiences at other major airlines that ended due to career advancement or furlough. I hope you take my report seriously and for those that have not been in the right seat for a while; to listen carefully and remember that we have many inexperienced new-hires; and very junior captains. I would like to include the training department and the architects of SOPs that have set up conflicting FO responsibilities to be nearly impossible to comply with in the real world; with the possibility of rendering the FO with an always at fault/lose-lose situation. This airport's Hot Spot (HS) 5 is depicted for a good reason. It was briefed and not obvious to the captain. I believe that if my task responsibilities were lighter or less completed I would have been able to follow along with the captain during his taxi. There was never a moment of doubt or curiosity that would have triggered my attention. I believe this particular hot spot will keep on bringing more and more incursions; especially with those unfamiliar with the airport. I've flown to military and civilian airports where controllers issue taxi instructions with hold short remarks such as 'hold short of taxiway XYZ by (a particular landmark; chart depiction (i.e. 'the box') or stationary object)' as emphasis of a particular location. The most obvious characteristic about HS 5 is it's triangular shape. Designating and depicting HS 5 as 'the triangle' at this airport on charts; and ATC asking pilots to 'hold short of the triangle' would bring 'heads up' to pilots unfamiliar with the airport to pay attention and force them to figure where this 'triangle' is; to make sure they hold short where they are supposed to. I really believe this is the easiest and best solution for this airport. The following applies to this particular experience and others as well. First; feel free to ask any of our check airmen how many tasks and items are taken care of by the FO from the time the airplane pushes back until takeoff. The workload is intense; and is no secret; as some of our check airmen will proudly tell you to the exact number of how many there are. This of course; comes with great conflict while trying to help a captain find his way around. Either checklists/procedures will be done in error/skipped; or taxiway/runway incursions are going to occur. Where the SOPs are not helping: now combine the previous threat with (especially the latest one) 'no heads down while in a turn;' that brings another checklist implications per SOP on checklists: 'If a checklist is interrupted and any uncertainty exists regarding the last item performed; it must be re-accomplish 'Uncertainty' is stated here in a very liberal way; since the captain and FO are leaving it to their short term memory if the task or item had been 'really' performed -truly a Russian roulette. There are also 'flows' where attention and concentration is critical; andthe likeliness of a captain holding short of a turn for an FO to finish up is not only impractical but could impact airport traffic flow and perhaps a reprimand from ground controllers; try that at [another busy airport] right? The system in place will always find a way to blame the pilots if they were to fail; especially the FO. I flew with an experienced captain not long ago that had complete disregard to my workload. We were in ATL and had a runway change and new ATIS coming up; and we now had an intersection departure assigned and we were #2 for takeoff; with the #1 already lining up on the runway. We had ample time to accomplish everything; but this captain elected to speed through the taxiways. I even asked him; 'Hey; slow down a little;' his answer; 'I'm doing the best I can.' Right; at 30 kts down the taxiway; and he left it unchanged; unbelievable! I verbalized how uncomfortable I was while doing things in extreme pressure while lining up on the runway. I later thought and wondered if we ever did the before-takeoff brief. I was extremely furious. I didn't say anything and waited until cruise altitude to see if he would say anything; but he never did. On a later flight on this same pairing and same captain we are taxiing very early in the morning out of [another airport]; I copied the taxiing instruction clearly; understood it; and he had no questions. So I'm going about my flows (inside) and a moment later ground control is yelling at us because we missed a turn on a taxiway. He was speeding along in his taxiing and not paying attention. He didn't say anything! Maybe this is all 'normal' to him! I'm sure you are asking yourselves: so why didn't you bring this up? Short answer: (And be ready; I'm going to spill the beans here.) Because I'm done with the careless tribal culture of a few of our captains. I am the one that through the years have spent numerous amount of hours with professional standards 'baby-sitting' some of our most unprofessional captains. I have even written up a problem captain; a captain that professional standards have asked me to write up because they; are done with him. [Chief Pilot] contacts me to tell me that 'the truth lies somewhere between what I said and what he said; and that they will not do anything about it.' As you can see; I'm done with the captain baby-sitting. On a more personal note; the training department failed me on my initial attempt to upgrade; not because what I didn't know; but because of their own internal issues. My instructor was clueless on what the checkairmen where requiring on certain maneuvers. On my subsequent second attempt the checkairman failed me on a maneuver that was 'passed' on the previous original checkride; while I was doing exactly the same procedures. This lack of standardization and leadership IS affecting and/or WILL affect operations. It will trickle down. I have been a victim of this poor system in many facets; I'm trying to do my best to then be shot down. Very demoralizing frankly. You have to figure how all this fits in the big picture and also figure out what level of safety you want this airline to operate. I'm not holding my breath; and you can see why.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.