Narrative:

Departing hnl using runway 8R MKK4 departure. First officer was the PF I was the pm. At 400 feet the PF called for LNAV as it showed the right turn to heading 140. At 500 feet I began to notice the airspeed tape accelerating at a rapid pace to the bottom of flap overspeed (red dots) and then decreasing at a rapid pace to the top of the underspeed (yellow bar); this oscillation continued repeatedly. I looked at the vsi and climb was showing 1;600 FPM climb and the PF was not over controlling; so this lead me to believe we were going through a shear. Since I had been distracted looking inside at the speed tape and vsi I did not notice the turn had stopped. When I again looked out the window I noticed that we were not facing the direction I was expecting to see. I immediately stated that we should be on a 140 degree heading (we were on a 110 degree heading) the PF immediately corrected the situation and rolled into a turn to the right as he was hand flying at this point of the flight. As we were in the turn the controller called for a turn to 140 degrees.the PF and I talked about the situation and he said that he was following the FD which had stopped showing the turn and the magenta line was showing straight. Given my distraction with the speed tape I did not notice the change in the [heading indicator] and given that our briefing was for the PF to keep flying the aircraft unless I stated otherwise and I and the relief officer (ro) would handle the check lists and radios; I did not notice that we had stopped the turn. We were quickly on the correct heading and the controller switched us to departure frequency and no further issue came up.I have noticed that pilots (especially younger pilots) are becoming too dependent on the automation ability of the aircraft; but they are not backing up the automation with good old fashion flying ability and situational awareness. I would recommend that anytime there is a departure dealing with a heading; that heading select be used initially until it is ascertained that the LNAV is following the desired course. I have had 8 situations where the data in the FMC dumped and in those cases where the first officer was the PF; when the magenta line disappeared; the first officer was lost on what to do. Because of the past situations I use and I have the first officer use the technique of selecting LNAV at the appropriate point in the departure phase of the flight and not on the ground before departure.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767 Captain reported a track deviation departing HNL when the FO lost situational awareness and blindly followed the flight director that was giving incorrect track information.

Narrative: Departing HNL using Runway 8R MKK4 departure. FO was the PF I was the PM. At 400 feet the PF called for LNAV as it showed the right turn to heading 140. At 500 feet I began to notice the airspeed tape accelerating at a rapid pace to the bottom of flap overspeed (red dots) and then decreasing at a rapid pace to the top of the underspeed (yellow bar); this oscillation continued repeatedly. I looked at the VSI and climb was showing 1;600 FPM climb and the PF was not over controlling; so this lead me to believe we were going through a shear. Since I had been distracted looking inside at the speed tape and VSI I did not notice the turn had stopped. When I again looked out the window I noticed that we were not facing the direction I was expecting to see. I immediately stated that we should be on a 140 degree heading (we were on a 110 degree heading) the PF immediately corrected the situation and rolled into a turn to the right as he was hand flying at this point of the flight. As we were in the turn the controller called for a turn to 140 degrees.The PF and I talked about the situation and he said that he was following the FD which had stopped showing the turn and the magenta line was showing straight. Given my distraction with the speed tape I did not notice the change in the [heading indicator] and given that our briefing was for the PF to keep flying the aircraft unless I stated otherwise and I and the Relief Officer (RO) would handle the check lists and radios; I did not notice that we had stopped the turn. We were quickly on the correct heading and the controller switched us to departure frequency and no further issue came up.I have noticed that pilots (especially younger pilots) are becoming too dependent on the automation ability of the aircraft; but they are not backing up the automation with good old fashion flying ability and situational awareness. I would recommend that anytime there is a departure dealing with a heading; that heading select be used initially until it is ascertained that the LNAV is following the desired course. I have had 8 situations where the data in the FMC dumped and in those cases where the FO was the PF; when the magenta line disappeared; the FO was lost on what to do. Because of the past situations I use and I have the FO use the technique of selecting LNAV at the appropriate point in the departure phase of the flight and not on the ground before departure.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.