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Attributes | |
ACN | 1310361 |
Time | |
Date | 201511 |
Local Time Of Day | 0001-0600 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | ZZZ.Airport |
State Reference | US |
Environment | |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Make Model Name | B737-700 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | Parked |
Flight Plan | None |
Component | |
Aircraft Component | APU Controls |
Person 1 | |
Function | Technician |
Qualification | Maintenance Airframe Maintenance Powerplant |
Events | |
Anomaly | Aircraft Equipment Problem Critical Deviation - Procedural FAR Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy Ground Event / Encounter Other / Unknown |
Narrative:
Last night; [early evening]; I walked up the gate jetway and tried to enter aircraft X; a B737-700. I found a large group (8-12) ground service contract employees [contractor X] in the aisle of the airplane from the forward lav; first class galley; in the aisle to the cabin and in the front of the first class cabin. They were all watching one (most likely two) contract employees that were inside of the first class coat closet. I overheard someone say 'I think you broke the coat hangers'. After the employees had left the aircraft; I checked the closet and didn't find anything damaged or broken. A number of these employees were new hires with temporary badges. This group of [contract] employees included at least one lead; possibly two leads. I'm not certain but it's possible one of the employees might have been a safety or a trainer employee.on a daily basis; [employees of] service contractor X; are making numerous mistakes many of which are very serious errors of our required procedures. Below is a short list of typical problems occurring:1. We often have the aircraft improperly configured after contractor X employees tows the aircraft to the gates. They move switches on items they should never touch. Such as leaving steering bypass switch in the open position; turning off electric hydraulic pumps and leaving the APU running. Turning off the idg's; turning off the engine hydraulic pumps and other switches that are never moved except in emergency.2. I asked two different employees of contractor X (one of which was a lead) why are they shutting off the hydraulic pumps and leaving the APU on after towing the aircraft? They both said that is how they were trained. I asked these same employees who trained them? Was it an employee of our air carrier or a contractor x employee? They both said they couldn't remember.3. A few months ago a contractor X employee started the APU and then left the APU running for about 2.5 hours until I discovered it running. The APU was off and the aircraft was on gate power (using the ground service bus) when I left the aircraft. After discovering the APU running; I back tracked to find out who started the APU and find why it was started. The contractor X supervisor told me one of their employee's started the APU so they could flush the lav's.4. During aircraft tows and repositions; the APU is being started without following normal checklist procedures. The required fire system test is not being accomplished before starting the APU.[contributing factors]:contract employees [working aircraft] without any direct supervision by any of our air carrier employees. Sent info to station manager and filed report.recommendations:this and many other behaviors by employees of contractor X demonstrates that we need our air carrier employees (a lead customer service agent (csa); lead cleaner or lead ramp employee?) directly overseeing the entire everyday activities of contractor X's employees. It's unsafe to have contractor X [employees] towing our aircraft when the persons riding brakes isn't properly trained. We need enough technicians on duty to accomplish the brake riding; towing/repositioning of our aircraft. Routine overnight maintenance. Line aircraft technician. Evening shift. Training inadequate. Fars; policies and procedures noncompliance.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: An Aircraft Maintenance Technician reports about numerous daily mistakes made by employees of a ground service contractor at a line station involving his air carrier's B737-700 aircraft. Multiple aircraft have been found improperly configured with IDGs turned off; electric and engine hydraulic pump switches turned off and APUs left running after ground contract employees have towed airplanes to the gate. No oversight by air carrier employees.
Narrative: Last night; [early evening]; I walked up the Gate Jetway and tried to enter Aircraft X; a B737-700. I found a large group (8-12) ground service Contract employees [Contractor X] in the aisle of the airplane from the Forward lav; First Class galley; in the aisle to the Cabin and in the front of the First Class cabin. They were all watching one (most likely two) Contract employees that were inside of the First Class coat closet. I overheard someone say 'I think you broke the coat hangers'. After the employees had left the aircraft; I checked the closet and didn't find anything damaged or broken. A number of these employees were new hires with temporary badges. This group of [Contract] employees included at least one Lead; possibly two Leads. I'm not certain but it's possible one of the employees might have been a safety or a trainer employee.On a daily basis; [employees of] Service Contractor X; are making numerous mistakes many of which are very serious errors of our required procedures. Below is a short list of typical problems occurring:1. We often have the aircraft improperly configured after Contractor X employees tows the aircraft to the gates. They move switches on items they should never touch. Such as leaving Steering Bypass Switch in the open position; turning off Electric Hydraulic pumps and leaving the APU running. Turning off the IDG's; turning off the Engine Hydraulic pumps and other switches that are never moved except in emergency.2. I asked two different employees of Contractor X (one of which was a Lead) why are they shutting off the hydraulic pumps and leaving the APU on after towing the aircraft? They both said that is how they were trained. I asked these same employees who trained them? Was it an employee of our Air Carrier or a Contractor x employee? They both said they couldn't remember.3. A few months ago a Contractor X employee started the APU and then left the APU running for about 2.5 hours until I discovered it running. The APU was off and the aircraft was on gate power (using the Ground Service Bus) when I left the aircraft. After discovering the APU running; I back tracked to find out who started the APU and find why it was started. The Contractor X Supervisor told me one of their employee's started the APU so they could flush the lav's.4. During aircraft tows and repositions; the APU is being started without following normal checklist procedures. The required Fire System Test is not being accomplished before starting the APU.[Contributing Factors]:Contract employees [working aircraft] without any direct supervision by any of our Air Carrier employees. Sent info to Station Manager and filed report.Recommendations:This and many other behaviors by employees of Contractor X demonstrates that we need our Air Carrier employees (A Lead Customer Service Agent (CSA); Lead Cleaner or Lead Ramp employee?) directly overseeing the entire everyday activities of Contractor X's employees. It's unsafe to have Contractor X [employees] towing our aircraft when the persons riding brakes isn't properly trained. We need enough technicians on duty to accomplish the brake riding; towing/repositioning of our aircraft. Routine Overnight Maintenance. Line Aircraft Technician. Evening shift. Training inadequate. FARs; policies and procedures noncompliance.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.