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B737 flight crew reported taking off with the wrong flap setting because of distractions.
| Attributes | |
| ACN | 1312929 |
| Time | |
| Date | 201511 |
| Place | |
| Locale Reference | MAF.Airport |
| State Reference | TX |
| Aircraft 1 | |
| Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
| Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
| Flight Phase | Taxi |
| Flight Plan | IFR |
| Person 1 | |
| Function | Captain |
| Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
| Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 140 |
| Person 2 | |
| Function | First Officer |
| Qualification | Flight Crew Air Transport Pilot (ATP) |
| Experience | Flight Crew Last 90 Days 196 |
| Events | |
| Anomaly | Deviation - Procedural Published Material / Policy |
Narrative:
Aircraft was programmed for a flaps 1 takeoff on runway 16R. Before taxi checklist was done and we were cleared to taxi to runway 16R to hold short at taxiway mike for landing traffic. While holding short of 16R at taxiway mike; we ran the numbers for an intersection takeoff from taxiway mike. The first officer populated the CDU for a flaps 5 takeoff and new v-speeds. At that time we were interrupted by ATC as we were cleared to back taxi the runway. We requested to takeoff from taxiway mike.we did the departure plan checklist. I verbalized and visually checked the new flap 5 setting in the CDU and also verbalized the flap indicator setting but did not visually check the flap setting and flap handle position was at the new flaps 5 setting. I didn't take possession of the [computer] from the first officer as per standard procedure when reviewing the departure plan which probably would have trapped the error. The captain must always have possession of the [computer] when reviewing any change in takeoff performance. We were both aware of the change in flap setting but for some reason assumed the flaps were repositioned. Every change must be visually checked and verified.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: B737 flight crew reported taking off with the wrong flap setting because of distractions.
Narrative: Aircraft was programmed for a flaps 1 takeoff on Runway 16R. Before Taxi Checklist was done and we were cleared to taxi to Runway 16R to hold short at Taxiway Mike for landing traffic. While holding short of 16R at Taxiway Mike; we ran the numbers for an intersection takeoff from Taxiway Mike. The First Officer populated the CDU for a flaps 5 takeoff and new V-Speeds. At that time we were interrupted by ATC as we were cleared to back taxi the runway. We requested to takeoff from Taxiway Mike.We did the Departure Plan Checklist. I verbalized and visually checked the new flap 5 setting in the CDU and also verbalized the flap indicator setting but did not visually check the flap setting and flap handle position was at the new flaps 5 setting. I didn't take possession of the [computer] from the First Officer as per standard procedure when reviewing the departure plan which probably would have trapped the error. The Captain must always have possession of the [computer] when reviewing any change in takeoff performance. We were both aware of the change in flap setting but for some reason assumed the flaps were repositioned. Every change must be visually checked and verified.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.