Narrative:

While at cruise FL410 at mach .85; the right forward outer pane windshield shattered the right main forward windshield heat push button illuminated. Cockpit O2 masks were deployed and the aircraft was quickly determined to be in a stable state of flight. The pilot monitoring accomplished portions of the right window heat off checklist but omitted the step to re-establish power to the windscreen. This omission was because the crew determined it would be unsafe to reset electrical power to the damaged windscreen. The interior pane of the windshield was not damaged and maintained its structural integrity. There was no indication of a loss of pressurization or other damage to the aircraft. The pilot flying (PF) requested a descent to FL330 and reduced airspeed to .80 mach. Because the aircraft had no indications of further damage; the crew elected to continue the flight to its destination at the reduced speed and lower altitude. [Maintenance] was contacted through ACARS and an entry was made into the logbook of the damaged outer pane on the right windshield. The first officer who initially was the PF transferred control to the captain due to the impaired vision the shattered windscreen presented. The flight was completed and landing made without further incident.upon returning to his domicile; the first officer determined that there was a supplementary checklist that specifically dealt with the problem of the shattered windscreen. Upon review of the checklist it was determined that all the appropriate steps of the supplemental checklist were completed; however information on that checklist was not available to the crew. Although the safety of flight was never in doubt; and the steps and precautions the crew made were identical to the procedure required by the supplementary checklist; the fact that the checklist was never run shows a lack of familiarity by the crew with the supplementary procedures. This unfamiliarity was in part due to the low [type] experience level of the first officer; and the relatively low experience of the captain on the [type of aircraft]. Constant review of supplementary; normal; and non-normal procedures is not an option when operating [this aircraft type]. Attention to detail and the understanding that dealing with any non-normal on the aircraft requires a checklist; be it annunciated; unannunciated; or supplemental.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A First Officer reported the flight crew failed to complete all checklists following failure of the outer pane of forward right windshield.

Narrative: While at cruise FL410 at Mach .85; the right forward outer pane windshield shattered the right main forward windshield heat push button illuminated. Cockpit O2 masks were deployed and the aircraft was quickly determined to be in a stable state of flight. The Pilot Monitoring accomplished portions of the Right Window Heat Off checklist but omitted the step to re-establish power to the windscreen. This omission was because the crew determined it would be unsafe to reset electrical power to the damaged windscreen. The interior pane of the windshield was not damaged and maintained its structural integrity. There was no indication of a loss of pressurization or other damage to the aircraft. The Pilot Flying (PF) requested a descent to FL330 and reduced airspeed to .80 Mach. Because the aircraft had no indications of further damage; the crew elected to continue the flight to its destination at the reduced speed and lower altitude. [Maintenance] was contacted through ACARS and an entry was made into the logbook of the damaged outer pane on the right windshield. The First Officer who initially was the PF transferred control to the Captain due to the impaired vision the shattered windscreen presented. The flight was completed and landing made without further incident.Upon returning to his domicile; the First Officer determined that there was a supplementary checklist that specifically dealt with the problem of the shattered windscreen. Upon review of the checklist it was determined that all the appropriate steps of the supplemental checklist were completed; however information on that checklist was not available to the crew. Although the safety of flight was never in doubt; and the steps and precautions the crew made were identical to the procedure required by the supplementary checklist; the fact that the checklist was never run shows a lack of familiarity by the crew with the supplementary procedures. This unfamiliarity was in part due to the low [type] experience level of the First Officer; and the relatively low experience of the Captain on the [type of aircraft]. Constant review of supplementary; normal; and non-normal procedures is not an option when operating [this aircraft type]. Attention to detail and the understanding that dealing with any non-normal on the aircraft requires a checklist; be it annunciated; unannunciated; or supplemental.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.