Narrative:

I was on south feeder final to mia; south. Low ceilings; limited visibility; rain at the airport. Low staffing in the facility due to recurrent training; training on various other positions; and e-learning management system (elms) assigned by management. Staggered approaches were being run at miami with very strong winds out of the east and high volume from my 3 fixes. We had just combined up the final to me at the command of the front line manager (flm); I believed the volume still warranted it for another 10 minutes because of the precision needed to keep the finals separated; and the volume was still high. Due to low staffing; the flm thought it was best to close it to have a body on break. I had been vectoring my two west arrival gates south of my final into a double downwind because of too many airplanes and to buy myself time with all the frequency congestion. Aircraft Y was on the GPS runway 9 final approx. 12w mia indicating 170kts and aircraft Z heavy was 6 mi in trail on the GPS runway 9 final indicating 170kts. Both aircraft were level at 030 per our LOA for staggered approaches to mia. Aircraft X was approx. 15sw mia heading 360 to join the downwind level at 030 assigned airspeed 190kts. There was no convective activity depicted within 20 mi of aircraft X. I assigned aircraft X a left turn heading 265 to join the downwind and to compensate for winds aloft; aircraft X read it back. After several other transmissions to numerous other aircraft on frequency; and a talk with an operations manager who had been taking handoffs for me without my permission; I noticed aircraft X still northwesterly encroaching on my final and indicating 230kts. I immediately instruct aircraft X to increase rate of turn and continue left to heading 220 to cross out with the aircraft Z next on the final. I also asked aircraft X what his speed was; he responded 210kts. High volume initially caused me to miss the very slow; and non-standard rate of turn; but the following aircraft joining the downwind upon the instruction of heading 265 asked to deviate north west on a heading of 290 for ''buildups'' into the final. I advised unable; no convective activity was observed; and they needed to deviate left of a heading 265 if needed. Considering the location; I believe the aircraft X pilot may have commenced a non-standard turn to go north of the ''buildup'' he saw and taking him too close to the runway 9 final opposite direction. Pireps were obtained on frequency and no pilots reported turbulence anywhere in my airspace at any altitude which could be heard by all pilots.I should not have allowed the operations manager to have a conversation with me about his taking of my handoffs without my permission while on position with so many airplanes and such high level of complexity with staggered approaches; and I should have advised the supervisor to keep the final a little longer until the airplanes decreased to a reasonable volume for a single frequency. Also; training should have been suspended in all aspects to promote a safe operation; more positions being opened would have helped avoid controllers being oversaturated with airplanes and provided a safer environment; especially with weather and low ceilings.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A MIA TRACON Controller reported of being short staffed and working a combined position. The Controller issued a turn to an aircraft that he noticed later did not take the turn. The Controller issued the turn again and the aircraft replied they wanted to deviate around a buildup. Then the Controller told them unable and issued a heading to turn to if needed. The Controller reported of distractions in the area and that the position should not have been combined.

Narrative: I was on south feeder final to MIA; S. Low ceilings; limited visibility; rain at the airport. Low staffing in the facility due to recurrent training; training on various other positions; and E-learning Management System (ELMS) assigned by management. Staggered approaches were being run at Miami with very strong winds out of the east and high volume from my 3 fixes. We had just combined up the final to me at the command of the Front Line Manager (FLM); I believed the volume still warranted it for another 10 minutes because of the precision needed to keep the finals separated; and the volume was still high. Due to low staffing; the FLM thought it was best to close it to have a body on break. I had been vectoring my two west arrival gates south of my final into a double downwind because of too many airplanes and to buy myself time with all the frequency congestion. Aircraft Y was on the GPS runway 9 final approx. 12w MIA indicating 170kts and Aircraft Z heavy was 6 mi in trail on the GPS runway 9 final indicating 170kts. Both aircraft were level at 030 per our LOA for staggered approaches to MIA. Aircraft X was approx. 15sw MIA heading 360 to join the downwind level at 030 assigned airspeed 190kts. There was no convective activity depicted within 20 mi of Aircraft X. I assigned Aircraft X a left turn heading 265 to join the downwind and to compensate for winds aloft; Aircraft X read it back. After several other transmissions to numerous other aircraft on frequency; and a talk with an operations manager who had been taking handoffs for me without my permission; I noticed Aircraft X still northwesterly encroaching on my final and indicating 230kts. I immediately instruct Aircraft X to increase rate of turn and continue left to heading 220 to cross out with the Aircraft Z next on the final. I also asked Aircraft X what his speed was; he responded 210kts. High volume initially caused me to miss the very slow; and non-standard rate of turn; but the following aircraft joining the downwind upon the instruction of heading 265 asked to deviate north west on a heading of 290 for ''buildups'' into the final. I advised unable; no convective activity was observed; and they needed to deviate left of a heading 265 if needed. Considering the location; I believe the Aircraft X pilot may have commenced a non-standard turn to go north of the ''buildup'' he saw and taking him too close to the runway 9 final opposite direction. PIREPs were obtained on frequency and no pilots reported turbulence anywhere in my airspace at any altitude which could be heard by all pilots.I should not have allowed the operations manager to have a conversation with me about his taking of my handoffs without my permission while on position with so many airplanes and such high level of complexity with staggered approaches; and I should have advised the supervisor to keep the final a little longer until the airplanes decreased to a reasonable volume for a single frequency. Also; training should have been suspended in all aspects to promote a safe operation; more positions being opened would have helped avoid controllers being oversaturated with airplanes and provided a safer environment; especially with weather and low ceilings.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.