Narrative:

This was the first trip I had flown with this captain. On the first leg of day three of the trip; the captain was flying; and I was monitoring. We began an ILS approach in IMC with all briefings and prior-phase checklists complete. The captain had demonstrated a pattern of late transitions to landing configuration and late speed reductions in previous approaches; though they had all met the parameters of stabilized approaches for the given flight environments per the company operating manual. During this approach; there was a quartering 20-30 knot. Tailwind; which I pointed out to the captain. He kept the speed up (approximately 190 KIAS) until about 1500 feet AGL and became distracted with the autopilot's vertical oscillations as it tried to capture the glideslope at the higher-than-normal speed. We hit the 1000 feet window about 30 knots. Above reference speed. The captain omitted his 'stable' call and called for full flaps just after the automated 1000 feet call. I instinctively crosschecked the airspeed and selected the flaps to full. Then; knowing that we were unstable; I said; 'we are unstable; let's go around.' he said; 'no; I'm a little fast; but ok.' I said; 'we aren't supposed to change flap settings below 1000 feet; we need to go around.' he said; 'no; that's not a hard number.' moments later we hit the 500 feet window; 12 or 13 knots; above reference speed; engines unspooled; still IMC. I said; '500; unstable; go around.' the captain said; 'we're 6 knots fast; I'm landing!' at that point; the engines began to spool up and the approach lights came into view. We landed without further incident.after the captain's initial rejections of my go-around prompts (below 1000 feet but prior to the 500 feet window) I had a few seconds to decide whether to assume control of the aircraft; but ultimately determined that it would be safer to monitor the flight path until the 500 feet window than to enter into a possible fight for control. (The captain had shown hostility and irritability throughout the trip.) at the 500 feet window; when I stated; '500; unstable; go around;' I fully expected him to execute a go-around because this is mandatory per our manual. It shocked me that he flatly rejected the command; but this time I didn't have time to assess whether to assume control before the engines began to spool up and the runway environment came into view. At that point; the flight path was stable and landing was the safest option. The captain and I had a brief discussion at the gate; in which I told him the FAA is really looking at unstable approaches now. He made no apology; but all his subsequent approaches during the trip were stable.there has been an intense focus on stabilized approaches in the last couple years; so I do not think this is an area that needs improvement. The captain mentioned above seems to be an outlier who; hopefully; has learned a lesson. However; one deficiency is clear. First officers at my airline train for pilot flying and pilot monitoring scenarios wherein both pilots follow sops; and 'incapacitated crew member' scenarios wherein the captain 'falls asleep' or 'dies;' but we don't practice taking control from a captain who willfully disregards sops during critical phases of flight. What's more; the point at which action should be taken is somewhat ambiguous because one-size-fits-all standards such as the 1000 feet window and 500 feet window; and the parameters associated with them; are conservative by design. Perhaps standards and methods should be established and incorporated into our training so first officers facing such scenarios will know what to do and when to do it; and captains will not be surprised when they do.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A319 First Officer describes an un-stabilized approach flown by the Captain; during which the reporter calls for a go around at 1000 and 500 feet. The Captain continues the approach to landing.

Narrative: This was the first trip I had flown with this captain. On the first leg of day three of the trip; the captain was flying; and I was monitoring. We began an ILS approach in IMC with all briefings and prior-phase checklists complete. The captain had demonstrated a pattern of late transitions to landing configuration and late speed reductions in previous approaches; though they had all met the parameters of stabilized approaches for the given flight environments per the company operating manual. During this approach; there was a quartering 20-30 knot. tailwind; which I pointed out to the captain. He kept the speed up (approximately 190 KIAS) until about 1500 feet AGL and became distracted with the autopilot's vertical oscillations as it tried to capture the glideslope at the higher-than-normal speed. We hit the 1000 feet window about 30 knots. Above reference speed. The captain omitted his 'stable' call and called for full flaps just after the automated 1000 feet call. I instinctively crosschecked the airspeed and selected the flaps to full. Then; knowing that we were unstable; I said; 'We are unstable; let's go around.' He said; 'No; I'm a little fast; but OK.' I said; 'We aren't supposed to change flap settings below 1000 feet; we need to go around.' He said; 'No; that's not a hard number.' Moments later we hit the 500 feet window; 12 or 13 knots; above reference speed; engines unspooled; still IMC. I said; '500; unstable; go around.' The captain said; 'We're 6 knots fast; I'm landing!' At that point; the engines began to spool up and the approach lights came into view. We landed without further incident.After the captain's initial rejections of my go-around prompts (below 1000 feet but prior to the 500 feet window) I had a few seconds to decide whether to assume control of the aircraft; but ultimately determined that it would be safer to monitor the flight path until the 500 feet window than to enter into a possible fight for control. (The captain had shown hostility and irritability throughout the trip.) At the 500 feet window; when I stated; '500; unstable; go around;' I fully expected him to execute a go-around because this is mandatory per our manual. It shocked me that he flatly rejected the command; but this time I didn't have time to assess whether to assume control before the engines began to spool up and the runway environment came into view. At that point; the flight path was stable and landing was the safest option. The captain and I had a brief discussion at the gate; in which I told him the FAA is really looking at unstable approaches now. He made no apology; but all his subsequent approaches during the trip were stable.There has been an intense focus on stabilized approaches in the last couple years; so I do not think this is an area that needs improvement. The captain mentioned above seems to be an outlier who; hopefully; has learned a lesson. However; one deficiency is clear. First officers at my airline train for Pilot Flying and Pilot Monitoring scenarios wherein both pilots follow SOPs; and 'incapacitated crew member' scenarios wherein the captain 'falls asleep' or 'dies;' but we don't practice taking control from a captain who willfully disregards SOPs during critical phases of flight. What's more; the point at which action should be taken is somewhat ambiguous because one-size-fits-all standards such as the 1000 feet window and 500 feet window; and the parameters associated with them; are conservative by design. Perhaps standards and methods should be established and incorporated into our training so first officers facing such scenarios will know what to do and when to do it; and captains will not be surprised when they do.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.