Narrative:

During our landing roll-out on runway 36 at dca, as we approached the intersection of 36 and runway 33, the controller instructed us to 'hold short of runway 33, landing traffic.' we stopped just short of 33 and watched an small transport Y roll out on runway 33 right in front of us. We then advised the controller that he had cleared 'us to turn left on 33 and contact ground 121.7.' his response was that he had instructed us to hold short of runway 33, at which point he cleared us to turn left on 33 and handed us off to ground control. The captain, on his own initiative, called the tower and was told to call back later, that they were checking the tapes. Later on the captain called the tower and they told him there was no operational problem nor conflict, and that what was actually said to us during our landing rollout was 'any left short of runway 33 and contact ground 121.7,'--and according to the controller, our response was 'roger.' I think a # of factors contributed to this situation. At no time in our approach or landing roll were we told to, or asked if, we could hold short of runway 33. During our rollout with the engines at normal reverse thrust EPR (1-6), we were given a non-standard and vague clearance--and due to habit patterns, we in our minds heard the controller say 'left on runway 33 and contact ground 121.7.' thanks to a heads-up controller, a conflict was averted; however, if the controller had been a little clearer in his instructions and phraseology, it never would have been a conflict. Our mistake was in not reading back the controller's instructions on the runway. In order to avert this type of potential for conflict, a controller should issue instructions of such a critical nature early enough that they can be clearly understood and acted upon, or so the controller can be advised if the crew cannot comply. Also, during the landing rollout on a relatively short and critical runway, the tower should not count on the pilots to hold short if they didn't have advance notice to plan ahead.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AMENDED CLRNC BY LCL TWR CTLR STOPS LNDG ACFT FROM HITTING ANOTHER LNDG ACFT CROSSING HIS ACTIVE RWY. REPORTER CITES CTLR PHRASEOLOGY AS MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN INCIDENT. HAD NOT BEEN TOLD TO HOLD SHORT OF CROSSING RWY UNTIL IN ROLLOUT PHASE.

Narrative: DURING OUR LNDG ROLL-OUT ON RWY 36 AT DCA, AS WE APCHED THE INTXN OF 36 AND RWY 33, THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO 'HOLD SHORT OF RWY 33, LNDG TFC.' WE STOPPED JUST SHORT OF 33 AND WATCHED AN SMT Y ROLL OUT ON RWY 33 RIGHT IN FRONT OF US. WE THEN ADVISED THE CTLR THAT HE HAD CLRED 'US TO TURN LEFT ON 33 AND CONTACT GND 121.7.' HIS RESPONSE WAS THAT HE HAD INSTRUCTED US TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 33, AT WHICH POINT HE CLRED US TO TURN LEFT ON 33 AND HANDED US OFF TO GND CTL. THE CAPT, ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE, CALLED THE TWR AND WAS TOLD TO CALL BACK LATER, THAT THEY WERE CHKING THE TAPES. LATER ON THE CAPT CALLED THE TWR AND THEY TOLD HIM THERE WAS NO OPERATIONAL PROB NOR CONFLICT, AND THAT WHAT WAS ACTUALLY SAID TO US DURING OUR LNDG ROLLOUT WAS 'ANY LEFT SHORT OF RWY 33 AND CONTACT GND 121.7,'--AND ACCORDING TO THE CTLR, OUR RESPONSE WAS 'ROGER.' I THINK A # OF FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SITUATION. AT NO TIME IN OUR APCH OR LNDG ROLL WERE WE TOLD TO, OR ASKED IF, WE COULD HOLD SHORT OF RWY 33. DURING OUR ROLLOUT WITH THE ENGS AT NORMAL REVERSE THRUST EPR (1-6), WE WERE GIVEN A NON-STANDARD AND VAGUE CLRNC--AND DUE TO HABIT PATTERNS, WE IN OUR MINDS HEARD THE CTLR SAY 'LEFT ON RWY 33 AND CONTACT GND 121.7.' THANKS TO A HEADS-UP CTLR, A CONFLICT WAS AVERTED; HOWEVER, IF THE CTLR HAD BEEN A LITTLE CLEARER IN HIS INSTRUCTIONS AND PHRASEOLOGY, IT NEVER WOULD HAVE BEEN A CONFLICT. OUR MISTAKE WAS IN NOT READING BACK THE CTLR'S INSTRUCTIONS ON THE RWY. IN ORDER TO AVERT THIS TYPE OF POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT, A CTLR SHOULD ISSUE INSTRUCTIONS OF SUCH A CRITICAL NATURE EARLY ENOUGH THAT THEY CAN BE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD AND ACTED UPON, OR SO THE CTLR CAN BE ADVISED IF THE CREW CANNOT COMPLY. ALSO, DURING THE LNDG ROLLOUT ON A RELATIVELY SHORT AND CRITICAL RWY, THE TWR SHOULD NOT COUNT ON THE PLTS TO HOLD SHORT IF THEY DIDN'T HAVE ADVANCE NOTICE TO PLAN AHEAD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of August 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.