Narrative:

Captain loaded flight plan into flight management system. Captain included runway 31L with JFK2 departure. After clearance/pre departure clearance was received; the first officer changed the departure from JFK2 to skorr three per the pre departure clearance. First officer failed to include rngrr transition. On climb-out the captain flew the aircraft per the skorr three; but shortly after turning left towards skorr the first officer; with the captain's consent; removed the discontinuity between skorr and gayel. As a result; the FMS commanded the flight directors to turn right towards gayel and the captain flew the aircraft accordingly. Captain asked the first officer to ask ATC for direct routing further down our flight plan and once queried by the first officer; ATC instructed an immediate left turn to a heading of 210 deg. We received radar vectors from that point to join our original flight plan.the international relief officer noticed that a deviation was occurring as soon as the first officer removed the discontinuity between skorr and gayel from the flight plan. The relief officer advised the captain that he needed to fly over skorr; but the right turn was already underway and continued for a few seconds. ATC thereafter requested a left turn to a heading of 210 deg. This instruction was immediately complied with by the flying pilot; whereupon ATC then issued a contact phone number regarding said deviation. Captain loaded FMS prior to receiving pre departure clearance. Once the pre departure clearance was received the first officer made the changes as referenced above to the skorr three. The first officer was confused as to whether the SID included a transition and queried the captain and relief officer. At the time; there were numerous distractions on the flight deck including maintenance personnel; a jump seater; and lead gate agent. As a result of these distractions the transition was ultimately not loaded into the FMS. While the first officer conducted his own route legs verification; neither the captain nor the relief officer participated resulting in the omission of the rngrr transition.this deviation was the result of a breakdown in CRM amongst the flight crew. The multiple distractions mentioned above combined with the crew's general concern regarding the captain's wellbeing and led to an environment where standard operating procedures were overlooked. This deviation began prior to push and was the result of multiple nonessential events that distracted the flight crew during important preflight operations. The deviation and CRM breakdown would not have occurred had all questions regarding the captain's wellbeing been resolved prior to his boarding of the aircraft.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A330 Flight Crew reported a track deviation during SKORR3 RNAV departure from JFK. Distractions in the cockpit resulted in the SKORR3 being entered in the FMC without the RNGRR transition and was not detected until airborne. When the route discontinuity was cleared a turn direct to GAYEL was commenced before correcting back to SKORR.

Narrative: Captain loaded flight plan into flight management system. Captain included Runway 31L with JFK2 departure. After clearance/PDC was received; the first officer changed the departure from JFK2 to SKORR THREE per the pre departure clearance. First officer failed to include RNGRR transition. On climb-out the captain flew the aircraft per the SKORR THREE; but shortly after turning left towards SKORR the first officer; with the captain's consent; removed the discontinuity between SKORR and GAYEL. As a result; the FMS commanded the flight directors to turn right towards GAYEL and the captain flew the aircraft accordingly. Captain asked the first officer to ask ATC for direct routing further down our flight plan and once queried by the first officer; ATC instructed an immediate left turn to a heading of 210 deg. We received radar vectors from that point to join our original flight plan.The international relief officer noticed that a deviation was occurring as soon as the first officer removed the discontinuity between SKORR and GAYEL from the flight plan. The relief officer advised the captain that he needed to fly over SKORR; but the right turn was already underway and continued for a few seconds. ATC thereafter requested a left turn to a heading of 210 deg. This instruction was immediately complied with by the flying pilot; whereupon ATC then issued a contact phone number regarding said deviation. Captain loaded FMS prior to receiving PDC. Once the PDC was received the first officer made the changes as referenced above to the SKORR THREE. The first officer was confused as to whether the SID included a transition and queried the captain and relief officer. At the time; there were numerous distractions on the flight deck including maintenance personnel; a jump seater; and lead gate agent. As a result of these distractions the transition was ultimately not loaded into the FMS. While the first officer conducted his own route legs verification; neither the captain nor the relief officer participated resulting in the omission of the RNGRR transition.This deviation was the result of a breakdown in CRM amongst the flight crew. The multiple distractions mentioned above combined with the crew's general concern regarding the captain's wellbeing and led to an environment where standard operating procedures were overlooked. This deviation began prior to push and was the result of multiple nonessential events that distracted the flight crew during important preflight operations. The deviation and CRM breakdown would not have occurred had all questions regarding the captain's wellbeing been resolved prior to his boarding of the aircraft.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.