Narrative:

I have noticed a significant increase in operational concerns with our load planning and ramp handling lately. I have had incorrect load planning forms; ramp pushing back contrary to instructions; late bags loaded after beginning pushback and overall poor communication with agents; which I have not experienced previously in such a high number of cases. It appears that ground operations is in such a hurry lately that they will not complete their requirements per SOP and require the flight crews to intervene on a regular basis.examples:1. We waited for over 30 minutes for bags which never showed up. There was no communication from the agent when they decided not to have us wait any longer; the gate just pulled away and we had to query ramp agents as to the status and location of the phantom bags that never arrived so that we could amend the loadsheet and re-compute our takeoff data.2. Ramp was told to wait for an adjacent aircraft to taxi in before pushing back. The tug driver began pushback anyway. When we stopped them and instructed them to wait; the agent said that he was going to push us out of the way before they arrived so it was ok. They do not seem to understand that we must comply with ground/ramp control instructions. Late bags were subsequently loaded after beginning the pushback.3. Load sheets have had ridiculous fuel errors (mains with 1;000 lbs. And center fuel with 17;000 lbs.) or wrong captain names.4. Ramp and agents were not familiar with restrictions on the new airport information charts (10-7 chart replacements) and incorrectly indicated that our charts are incorrect or out of date.5. We waited for an aircraft to complete pushback from an adjacent gate per the airport information page. The aircraft in question had not called ground control for a clearance and airport operations was not aware of their status. After a 20 minute series of tower disconnects/reconnects and various pushback/pull forward movements of the aircraft; the aircraft was finally repositioned to an adjacent remote ramp.6. Marshaling agents often signal turns in the wrong direction during marshaling. At this point; I (and other captains that I have discussed the issue with) ignore their turn instructions and line myself up on the j-line and just follow their instructions for braking guidance.it appears that most of these issues are due to rushing and poor training. The ramp; in particular; seems not to realize that we must operate in accordance with a larger system of rules/regulations/clearances outside of their local scope. While most of these errors are trapped by the flight crews; they should not get to the point of required crew intervention as often as they do.ground operations must adequately train agents to include the potential effects of incorrect data on the greater system. Agents should also be familiar how their actions are integrated in the whole of the operation; it seems that they are trained to follow their guidance but that guidance exists in a vacuum rather than a portion of a greater system. Exposure to aircraft operations from the crew point of view would be helpful as well.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B737 Captain reported a significant increase in operational concerns with load planning and Ramp handling lately; and offers several examples. Training was thought to be a primary factor.

Narrative: I have noticed a significant increase in operational concerns with our load planning and Ramp handling lately. I have had incorrect load planning forms; Ramp pushing back contrary to instructions; late bags loaded after beginning pushback and overall poor communication with Agents; which I have not experienced previously in such a high number of cases. It appears that Ground Operations is in such a hurry lately that they will not complete their requirements per SOP and require the Flight Crews to intervene on a regular basis.Examples:1. We waited for over 30 minutes for bags which never showed up. There was no communication from the Agent when they decided not to have us wait any longer; the gate just pulled away and we had to query Ramp Agents as to the status and location of the phantom bags that never arrived so that we could amend the loadsheet and re-compute our takeoff data.2. Ramp was told to wait for an adjacent aircraft to taxi in before pushing back. The Tug Driver began pushback anyway. When we stopped them and instructed them to wait; the Agent said that he was going to push us out of the way before they arrived so it was OK. They do not seem to understand that we must comply with Ground/Ramp Control instructions. Late bags were subsequently loaded after beginning the pushback.3. Load sheets have had ridiculous fuel errors (mains with 1;000 lbs. and center fuel with 17;000 lbs.) or wrong Captain Names.4. Ramp and Agents were not familiar with restrictions on the new airport information charts (10-7 chart replacements) and incorrectly indicated that our charts are incorrect or out of date.5. We waited for an aircraft to complete pushback from an adjacent gate per the airport information page. The aircraft in question had not called Ground Control for a clearance and airport operations was not aware of their status. After a 20 minute series of Tower disconnects/reconnects and various pushback/pull forward movements of the aircraft; the aircraft was finally repositioned to an adjacent remote ramp.6. Marshaling Agents often signal turns in the wrong direction during marshaling. At this point; I (and other Captains that I have discussed the issue with) ignore their turn instructions and line myself up on the J-line and just follow their instructions for braking guidance.It appears that most of these issues are due to rushing and poor training. The Ramp; in particular; seems not to realize that we must operate in accordance with a larger system of rules/regulations/clearances outside of their local scope. While most of these errors are trapped by the Flight Crews; they should not get to the point of required Crew intervention as often as they do.Ground Operations must adequately train Agents to include the potential effects of incorrect data on the greater system. Agents should also be familiar how their actions are integrated in the whole of the operation; it seems that they are trained to follow their guidance but that guidance exists in a vacuum rather than a portion of a greater system. Exposure to aircraft operations from the Crew point of view would be helpful as well.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.