Narrative:

I was working [aircraft X] climbing westbound. The aircraft had been shortcut direct to his destination so he was climbing on the boundary of 3 different airspaces. [Aircraft X] had climbed to FL280. I verbally coordinated with sector 36 control to continue climbing [aircraft X]. In the meantime; I had accepted radar contact from sector 36 on [aircraft Y] descending northbound to fl 290. As I was working at the radar scope adjacent to sector 36; I verbally asked the controller still working the [aircraft Y] to stop him at FL310. I then climbed the [aircraft X] to FL300. In hindsight; the reply and approval from sector 36 was an additional acknowledgment of his permission for me to climb [aircraft X]. Not an acknowledgment to stop [aircraft Y]. The controller at sector 36 stated later that he though I was already talking to the [aircraft Y]. When I realized that [aircraft Y] had not been stopped at FL310; I instructed [aircraft X] to stop his climb and descend to FL290. At that time [aircraft X] responded and stated that he was also responding to a TCAS resolution advisory. I told the [aircraft X] about the traffic and the controller at sector 36 climbed the [aircraft Y]. I believe there was no loss of separation.better communication between the 2 controllers would have prevented the event. The vagueness of the requests and replies made it hard to determine exactly what was being requested and what was approved.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Two ARTCC Controllers and four air carrier pilots report their perspectives after two ATC Controllers' confusion required one air carrier climbing to take evasive action while a descending air carrier took opposite direction evasive action. TCAS RA alerts were factors.

Narrative: I was working [Aircraft X] climbing westbound. The aircraft had been shortcut direct to his destination so he was climbing on the boundary of 3 different airspaces. [Aircraft X] had climbed to FL280. I verbally coordinated with Sector 36 control to continue climbing [Aircraft X]. In the meantime; I had accepted radar contact from sector 36 on [Aircraft Y] descending northbound to FL 290. As I was working at the radar scope adjacent to sector 36; I verbally asked the controller still working the [Aircraft Y] to stop him at FL310. I then climbed the [Aircraft X] to FL300. In hindsight; the reply and approval from sector 36 was an additional acknowledgment of his permission for me to climb [Aircraft X]. Not an acknowledgment to stop [Aircraft Y]. The controller at sector 36 stated later that he though I was already talking to the [Aircraft Y]. When I realized that [Aircraft Y] had not been stopped at FL310; I instructed [Aircraft X] to stop his climb and descend to FL290. At that time [Aircraft X] responded and stated that he was also responding to a TCAS resolution advisory. I told the [Aircraft X] about the traffic and the controller at sector 36 climbed the [Aircraft Y]. I believe there was no loss of separation.Better communication between the 2 controllers would have prevented the event. The vagueness of the requests and replies made it hard to determine exactly what was being requested and what was approved.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.