Narrative:

I observed what I believe to have been a near mid-air collision while working the radar east (re) position today. A front line manager (flm) was providing a certification; training; or skills check at the arrival/flight data position in the TRACON. This is in violation to local written directives. Previous issues at aus have been identified by aov; safety; and others; these issues have related to the flm not paying attention to what is happening on the sectors while he/she is/was performing other duties. Radar west (rw) was very busy. My position (re) was moderately busy. I overheard the trainee ask for a release from the rw controller. I can't explain why but I had the impression that the release request was for an aircraft off of gtu. This airport is on a common boundary between rw and re; so ad/FD must coordinate with both rw and re before releasing any aircraft off of gtu. I waited a few moments for the trainee to coordinate with my sector; and when this did not happen; I questioned the trainee: 'hey; did you release a guy off of gtu without coordinating with me?' the trainee mumbled something and turned away from me. There were several people around the ad/FD position; including the flm; so I was waiting for someone to say something. I continued to work my traffic and then turned to the trainee once again and told him: 'you need to coordinate with radar east before you release anyone off of gtu.' once again; the trainee turned his back and walked away. I made an assumption that this had been taken care of; or that there were other factors in play that I simply was not aware of at the time. Moments later I saw aircraft X depart runway 18 at gtu. I was upset because coordination had not been accomplished with me; and then I noticed that aircraft Y was approximately 5 miles southwest of gtu. I yelled-out to rw: 'hey; are you okay with those two gtu aircraft?' the rw controller said that he/she was not talking to aircraft Y. I then saw aircraft X turn northwest towards aircraft Y; and then aircraft Y started to descend. The ca/ca went off as aircraft X passed nearly overhead aircraft Y. I estimate the vertical separation to be 400 ft. This type of situation has been discussed in the past. Cpc's and trainees have been known to request a release of hyi and gtu; and have occasionally used the wrong airport name when making the release request. Due to the close proximity of hyi to sat TRACON airspace; and the close proximity of gtu to grk approach control airspace; this type of confusion often results in an airspace deviation. I have made previous suggestions to alter our airspace so that gtu resides within the lateral confines of re airspace; and retain hyi in the lateral confines of rw airspace. Our local procedures mandate that ad/FD issue clearances for hyi; and to then coordinate with rw and re as necessary for the IFR release. I have suggested that rw utilize the remote communications outlet (rco) frequency to coordinate clearances and releases off of hyi. This would cut ad/FD and re out of the loop; and rw would serve as the sole authority for releasing aircraft off of hyi. This suggestion has been rejected by everyone at my facility. Our local procedures mandate that ad/FD issue gtu clearances to gtu tower when the tower is open; or directly to the pilot when gtu is closed. Gtu tower or the pilot then calls ad/FD for a release; and then the ad/FD controller coordinates with rw and re; and then issues the release to gtu tower or the pilot. As you can see; there are multiple people involved in releases off of gtu and hyi; and all of this could be prevented if rw was solely responsible for releases off of hyi; and re solely responsible for releases off of gtu. Additionally; none of the coordination between ad/FD and rw/re is recorded on the land line. An investigation of the event described in this incident report will reveal that ad/FD said one thing; and the rw controller said/thought something different. Our facility mandates thatground control (ground control) perform all runway crossings with local control (local control) on the land line; yet the coordination for an IFR release off of gtu and hyi is not required to be recorded. Another problem relates to gtu tower pressuring controllers to allow them to provide visual separation between arriving and departing aircraft. The 7110.65 requires specific phraseology for this type of action; and this is never followed. Gtu tower often reports 'landing assured' or that an arriving aircraft is 'on the ground'; when it is clear that the arriving aircraft is 3+ miles from the airport. Gtu's intent is to remove the arrival aircraft from the equation so that they may obtain another IFR release. Today was a classic example of coordination gone awry? We could fix this with ease

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Several AUS Controllers provided differing perspectives on a conflict event; two identifying facility coordination procedures as the primary causal factor.

Narrative: I observed what I believe to have been a Near Mid-Air Collision while working the RADAR East (RE) Position today. A Front Line Manager (FLM) was providing a Certification; Training; or Skills Check at the Arrival/Flight Data Position in the TRACON. This is in violation to local written directives. Previous issues at AUS have been identified by AOV; Safety; and others; these issues have related to the FLM not paying attention to what is happening on the sectors while he/she is/was performing other duties. RADAR West (RW) was very busy. My Position (RE) was moderately busy. I overheard the Trainee ask for a release from the RW Controller. I can't explain why but I had the impression that the release request was for an aircraft off of GTU. This airport is on a common boundary between RW and RE; so AD/FD must coordinate with both RW and RE before releasing any aircraft off of GTU. I waited a few moments for the Trainee to coordinate with my sector; and when this did not happen; I questioned the Trainee: 'Hey; did you release a guy off of GTU without coordinating with me?' The Trainee mumbled something and turned away from me. There were several people around the AD/FD position; including the FLM; so I was waiting for someone to say something. I continued to work my traffic and then turned to the trainee once again and told him: 'You need to coordinate with RADAR east before you release anyone off of GTU.' Once again; the trainee turned his back and walked away. I made an assumption that this had been taken care of; or that there were other factors in play that I simply was not aware of at the time. Moments later I saw Aircraft X depart Runway 18 at GTU. I was upset because coordination had not been accomplished with me; and then I noticed that Aircraft Y was approximately 5 miles SW of GTU. I yelled-out to RW: 'Hey; are you okay with those two GTU aircraft?' The RW Controller said that he/she was not talking to Aircraft Y. I then saw Aircraft X turn NW towards Aircraft Y; and then Aircraft Y started to descend. The CA/CA went off as Aircraft X passed nearly overhead Aircraft Y. I estimate the vertical separation to be 400 FT. This type of situation has been discussed in the past. CPC's and Trainees have been known to request a release of HYI and GTU; and have occasionally used the wrong airport name when making the release request. Due to the close proximity of HYI to SAT TRACON airspace; and the close proximity of GTU to GRK Approach Control airspace; this type of confusion often results in an airspace deviation. I have made previous suggestions to alter our airspace so that GTU resides within the lateral confines of RE airspace; and retain HYI in the lateral confines of RW airspace. Our local procedures mandate that AD/FD issue clearances for HYI; and to then coordinate with RW and RE as necessary for the IFR release. I have suggested that RW utilize the Remote Communications Outlet (RCO) frequency to coordinate clearances and releases off of HYI. This would cut AD/FD and RE out of the loop; and RW would serve as the sole authority for releasing aircraft off of HYI. This suggestion has been rejected by everyone at my facility. Our local procedures mandate that AD/FD issue GTU clearances to GTU Tower when the Tower is open; or directly to the pilot when GTU is closed. GTU Tower or the pilot then calls AD/FD for a release; and then the AD/FD Controller coordinates with RW and RE; and then issues the release to GTU Tower or the pilot. As you can see; there are multiple people involved in releases off of GTU and HYI; and all of this could be prevented if RW was solely responsible for releases off of HYI; and RE solely responsible for releases off of GTU. Additionally; none of the coordination between AD/FD and RW/RE is recorded on the land line. An investigation of the event described in this incident report will reveal that AD/FD said one thing; and the RW Controller said/thought something different. Our facility mandates thatGround Control (GC) perform all runway crossings with Local Control (LC) on the land line; yet the coordination for an IFR release off of GTU and HYI is not required to be recorded. Another problem relates to GTU Tower pressuring Controllers to allow them to provide Visual Separation between arriving and departing aircraft. The 7110.65 requires specific phraseology for this type of action; and this is never followed. GTU Tower often reports 'landing assured' or that an arriving aircraft is 'on the ground'; when it is clear that the arriving aircraft is 3+ miles from the airport. GTU's intent is to remove the arrival aircraft from the equation so that they may obtain another IFR release. Today was a classic example of coordination gone awry? We could fix this with ease

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.