Narrative:

At some point just prior to ATC handoff from center to approach control we received a 'master warning' of right engine oil pressure. As we proceeded to evaluate the situation and run the emergency checklist we continued on course and our descent to planned destination. During this time period the engine showed no other anomalies and continued to produce thrust. The checklist instructed us to bring the engine to idle thrust and we did. The next item was to shut down the engine. We decided as a crew to instead leave the right engine at idle thrust and closely monitor its performance. This decision was made because our APU was deferred and we felt it was better to not reduce ourselves to one generator operations at night. We continued inbound and advised ATC we had an oil pressure problem and they coordinated the most favorable runway for a straight in approach. No emergency was declared. During the sequence of events the right engine ran and was secured off immediately after landing. The right engine was subsequently restarted several times by maintenance that night. I and my first officer were now under the impression that the master warning was a sensor problem and not an actual loss of oil pressure. We feel that we took the safest course of action by not securing the right engine in-flight; thus maintaining a source of electric and hydraulic power as well as thrust available. With the APU deferred inoperative continuing on course and descent also expedited our arrival and decreased our exposure to this event.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CL65 Captain reported a low oil pressure warning as the aircraft began its descent for landing. The QRH was completed up to the point of securing the engine which was left running because the APU was inoperative and single engine operations would limit electrical and hydraulic power during a night time approach.

Narrative: At some point just prior to ATC handoff from Center to Approach Control we received a 'Master Warning' of right engine oil pressure. AS we proceeded to evaluate the situation and run the emergency checklist we continued on course and our descent to planned destination. During this time period the engine showed no other anomalies and continued to produce thrust. The checklist instructed us to bring the engine to idle thrust and we did. The next item was to shut down the engine. We decided as a crew to instead leave the right engine at idle thrust and closely monitor its performance. This decision was made because our APU was deferred and we felt it was better to not reduce ourselves to one generator operations at night. We continued inbound and advised ATC we had an oil pressure problem and they coordinated the most favorable Runway for a straight in approach. No emergency was declared. During the sequence of events the right engine ran and was secured off immediately after landing. The right engine was subsequently restarted several times by Maintenance that night. I and my First Officer were now under the impression that the Master Warning was a sensor problem and not an actual loss of oil pressure. We feel that we took the safest course of action by not securing the right engine in-flight; thus maintaining a source of electric and hydraulic power as well as thrust available. With the APU deferred inoperative continuing on course and descent also expedited our arrival and decreased our exposure to this event.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.