Narrative:

Prior to this flight I had not been to san diego. Briefed approach and arrival 3 times during the flight and descent. We entered descent winds and checked all altitudes and talked about terrain. Started the checklist at FL180. While over the mountains ATC gave us a direct to okain; a 12 mile final. Now that we were off the arrival and the altitudes I became concerned with terrain. ATC stepped us down to 7000 then 5000 the 4000. They also instructed us to maintain 230 kts till cijhi. At 8 thousand feet I looked down at the checklist and noticed the first officer (first officer) was behind and I had not made the 'prepare for landing' call which I made at this time. As we approached vydda we were coming down on the glide slope and everything seemed to be coming together. I lowered the flaps to 5 at vydda and as we slowed between vydda and okain we decelerated and lost the glide slope. I disconnected the auto pilot and went primarily visual for the approach. I extended the speed brake and extended the landing gear. About this time; although I did not realize it; I began to loose situational awareness and we entered the 'yellow'. I knew I was high and a bit fast but I was unsure how high we were above the 3.5 degree glide slope. I extended the flaps and at the first buffet I realized I had left the speed brake extended. I began to mentally chastise myself for this error and I should have asked for a go around at this time but I felt we were coming down on the glide slope. As we got closer to the runway it seemed the glide slope was coming in. At 1;000 feet I had final flaps and gear extended we were about 10 kts fast and decelerating I was thinking go around when I noticed the PAPI went one red and three white. I latched onto this visual cue thinking I was finally coming down on the glide slope and unfortunately decided not to go around. I knew I was high visually but the surrounding high terrain and the knowledge of a non-standard 3.5 degree glide slope deluded me that I was stabilizing. I never heard a 500 foot call I don't think he made one. At this point I desperately needed a 'go around' call to snap me out of the tunnel but I think the first officer was as far behind as I was and I don't think he made one. Coming up on the threshold I lowered the nose I knew I was going to touchdown long but as I saw the 5000 foot remaining marker and mistakenly thought I was ok with runway remaining and landed. Of course now I had gained airspeed from lowering the nose and I floated and landed just beyond the 5000 foot remaining markers. I deploy the thrust reversers and used manual braking. I could have turned off at taxiway [intersection X] but saw the terminal to the left and let off the brakes and turned off at [intersection Y]. I should have broken off this approach at okain; the 12 mile mark. I knew I was fast; 230 assigned; and high but I thought it was correctable. What I did not take into consideration was that the 3.5 degree glide slope was already close to the limit for a 737 and that the 400 ft correction I needed to make in 12 miles was not achievable. Throughout the visual approach I was latching onto a few cues that were reinforcing my perception that I was about to come onto the glide slope and the approach was salvageable. As soon as I recognized I was losing situational awareness I should have gone around but each time I began to make the go around decision I would lock onto a visual cue that fooled me into thinking the approach was coming together and the problem was the nonstandard glideslope.I was flying with a pilot new to the company; but with flying experience at the commuter. Unfortunately; I believe he also lost situational awareness and was focused outside and he was not monitoring the instruments for go around triggers. I was fatigued going into the sequence; not from flying; but from external stresses. I have been waking up often at night and have trouble getting back to sleep. Next week I am going to contact medical to ask for a sleep aid prescription. I also mistook the sign in time for the departure time and showed up an hour early for the flight.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 Captain described an unstabilized approach into SAN that resulted in a landing beyond the 5;000 feet remaining marker.

Narrative: Prior to this flight I had not been to San Diego. Briefed approach and arrival 3 times during the flight and descent. We entered descent winds and checked all altitudes and talked about terrain. Started the Checklist at FL180. While over the mountains ATC gave us a direct to OKAIN; a 12 mile final. Now that we were off the arrival and the altitudes I became concerned with terrain. ATC stepped us down to 7000 then 5000 the 4000. They also instructed us to maintain 230 Kts till CIJHI. At 8 thousand feet I looked down at the checklist and noticed the First Officer (FO) was behind and I had not made the 'prepare for landing' call which I made at this time. As we approached VYDDA we were coming down on the glide slope and everything seemed to be coming together. I lowered the flaps to 5 at VYDDA and as we slowed between VYDDA and OKAIN we decelerated and lost the glide slope. I disconnected the auto pilot and went primarily visual for the approach. I extended the speed brake and extended the landing gear. About this time; although I did not realize it; I began to loose situational awareness and we entered the 'yellow'. I knew I was high and a bit fast but I was unsure how high we were above the 3.5 degree glide slope. I extended the flaps and at the first buffet I realized I had left the speed brake extended. I began to mentally chastise myself for this error and I should have asked for a go around at this time but I felt we were coming down on the glide slope. As we got closer to the runway it seemed the glide slope was coming in. At 1;000 feet I had final flaps and gear extended we were about 10 kts fast and decelerating I was thinking go around when I noticed the PAPI went one red and three white. I latched onto this visual cue thinking I was finally coming down on the glide slope and unfortunately decided not to go around. I knew I was high visually but the surrounding high terrain and the knowledge of a non-standard 3.5 degree glide slope deluded me that I was stabilizing. I never heard a 500 foot call I don't think he made one. At this point I desperately needed a 'Go Around' call to snap me out of the tunnel but I think the FO was as far behind as I was and I don't think he made one. Coming up on the threshold I lowered the nose I knew I was going to touchdown long but as I saw the 5000 foot remaining marker and mistakenly thought I was OK with runway remaining and landed. Of course now I had gained airspeed from lowering the nose and I floated and landed just beyond the 5000 foot remaining markers. I deploy the Thrust reversers and used manual braking. I could have turned off at taxiway [intersection X] but saw the terminal to the left and let off the brakes and turned off at [Intersection Y]. I should have broken off this approach at OKAIN; the 12 mile mark. I knew I was fast; 230 assigned; and high but I thought it was correctable. What I did not take into consideration was that the 3.5 degree glide slope was already close to the limit for a 737 and that the 400 ft correction I needed to make in 12 miles was not achievable. Throughout the visual approach I was latching onto a few cues that were reinforcing my perception that I was about to come onto the glide slope and the approach was salvageable. As soon as I recognized I was losing situational awareness I should have gone around but each time I began to make the go around decision I would lock onto a visual cue that fooled me into thinking the approach was coming together and the problem was the nonstandard glideslope.I was flying with a pilot new to the company; but with flying experience at the commuter. Unfortunately; I believe he also lost situational awareness and was focused outside and he was not monitoring the instruments for go around triggers. I was fatigued going into the sequence; not from flying; but from external stresses. I have been waking up often at night and have trouble getting back to sleep. Next week I am going to contact medical to ask for a sleep aid prescription. I also mistook the sign in time for the departure time and showed up an hour early for the flight.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.