Narrative:

Before departure; the captain had said that he hadn't flown much and his currency would expire in eleven days. Mine would expire in three days. The captain flew the first leg to sfo. I noticed in descent that his reactions seemed a bit slow in making crossing restrictions. We planned the FMS visual to 28R; briefed and set up for that.at about 10;000 we were cleared for the 28R ILS; and I was busy setting up for that. As we were on vectors down the bay; paralleling the runway; we were turned back onto a downwind and recleared via the FMS approach. On the step downs; we barely made the altitudes or were a bit high. I've flown the FMS approach several times recently as pilot flying but had never in recent memory flown it as pilot not flying. At cruise during briefing for the FMS; I had a question about whether or not I needed to manually tune the ILS. The pilot not flying had always taken care of that; and I couldn't recall. The captain said we used to have to tune it manually; but he thought that they'd 'fixed' that and now it tunes itself. As we made the turn from the angled part of the approach to the straight-in short final and I called 1;000 ft; I noticed the captain seemed to be having some issues with altitude; so I quickly checked the navrad page. We'd made sure earlier that the ILS was parked; but it was still parked; so I quickly tuned it as a backup; as we had visual; lights; and the nd vertical indicator; with 100 ft above the touchdown zone selected in the altitude window.I looked quickly back up and started to make the 500 ft call a bit early when I saw that the altitude had become excessively low. I don't recall the exact sequence; but the glide slope warning began to sound and; almost simultaneously; I saw that the airspeed was way below approach speed. I yelled 'airspeed' and the captain hesitated for a moment then tentatively advanced the throttles while he appeared to be trying to figure out what was going on. I was just about to slam the throttles forward when he made a positive movement sufficient for the situation.I realized then that I had yelled only 'airspeed' rather than 'go around-airspeed'. My instinct had been to fly the airplane; or to get the captain to fly the airplane. When later I examined that instinct; I concluded that my thought process had gone like this: in order to fly; we need airspeed. We also need to arrest the sink and at least stay level until we catch up to the glide slope altitude. In the position that we were in; we weren't able to go around. Now that power had been added; the first two things would occur before we could go around; and by that point; we would be over the runway and able to land. Also; I had been involved in a couple of go arounds for traffic on the runway during similarly busy times at sfo; and I know that the go around maneuver there is a high-workload activity.my split-second decision-making apparatus determined that at our low altitude and proximity to the runway; it would be safer to land than to take off on a go-around maneuver with someone flying the airplane that was that far behind the power curve. Although that is not the book procedure; I believe that it was the right thing to do in the circumstance; as was born out by the fact that we actually landed--after which; the captain thanked me for calling out 'airspeed' and said that he had had no idea until he heard me yell. He then said that the glide slope had never tuned. I clarified that; yes; it had; and the 'glide slope; glide slope' warning had been blaring.I've often read about pilots doing unstabilized approaches and wondered how it could happen; as I'd never seen one. Now; I have; although that might be an insufficient term for this one. It's a reminder to pay attention 100% of the time; as in flight instruction; where everyone is out to get you; because anything can happen. Beyond that; I have a short layover and; as soon as I can; I'll think more about what I've learned fromthis experience and what I might be able to do about it.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: An air carrier First Officer described her first experience with an unstabilized approach flown by the other pilot and the mental gymnastics involved with interpreting; reacting; and safely resolving the events that followed.

Narrative: Before departure; the Captain had said that he hadn't flown much and his currency would expire in eleven days. Mine would expire in three days. The Captain flew the first leg to SFO. I noticed in descent that his reactions seemed a bit slow in making crossing restrictions. We planned the FMS visual to 28R; briefed and set up for that.At about 10;000 we were cleared for the 28R ILS; and I was busy setting up for that. As we were on vectors down the Bay; paralleling the runway; we were turned back onto a downwind and recleared via the FMS approach. On the step downs; we barely made the altitudes or were a bit high. I've flown the FMS approach several times recently as pilot flying but had never in recent memory flown it as pilot not flying. At cruise during briefing for the FMS; I had a question about whether or not I needed to manually tune the ILS. The pilot not flying had always taken care of that; and I couldn't recall. The Captain said we used to have to tune it manually; but he thought that they'd 'fixed' that and now it tunes itself. As we made the turn from the angled part of the approach to the straight-in short final and I called 1;000 FT; I noticed the Captain seemed to be having some issues with altitude; so I quickly checked the NAVRAD page. We'd made sure earlier that the ILS was parked; but it was still parked; so I quickly tuned it as a backup; as we had visual; lights; and the ND vertical indicator; with 100 FT above the touchdown zone selected in the altitude window.I looked quickly back up and started to make the 500 FT call a bit early when I saw that the altitude had become excessively low. I don't recall the exact sequence; but the Glide Slope warning began to sound and; almost simultaneously; I saw that the airspeed was way below approach speed. I yelled 'Airspeed' and the Captain hesitated for a moment then tentatively advanced the throttles while he appeared to be trying to figure out what was going on. I was just about to slam the throttles forward when he made a positive movement sufficient for the situation.I realized then that I had yelled only 'Airspeed' rather than 'Go Around-Airspeed'. My instinct had been to fly the airplane; or to get the Captain to fly the airplane. When later I examined that instinct; I concluded that my thought process had gone like this: in order to fly; we need airspeed. We also need to arrest the sink and at least stay level until we catch up to the glide slope altitude. In the position that we were in; we weren't able to go around. Now that power had been added; the first two things would occur before we could go around; and by that point; we would be over the runway and able to land. Also; I had been involved in a couple of go arounds for traffic on the runway during similarly busy times at SFO; and I know that the go around maneuver there is a high-workload activity.My split-second decision-making apparatus determined that at our low altitude and proximity to the runway; it would be safer to land than to take off on a go-around maneuver with someone flying the airplane that was that far behind the power curve. Although that is not the book procedure; I believe that it was the right thing to do in the circumstance; as was born out by the fact that we actually landed--after which; the Captain thanked me for calling out 'airspeed' and said that he had had no idea until he heard me yell. He then said that the glide slope had never tuned. I clarified that; yes; it had; and the 'Glide Slope; Glide Slope' warning had been blaring.I've often read about pilots doing unstabilized approaches and wondered how it could happen; as I'd never seen one. Now; I have; although that might be an insufficient term for this one. It's a reminder to pay attention 100% of the time; as in flight instruction; where everyone is out to get you; because anything can happen. Beyond that; I have a short layover and; as soon as I can; I'll think more about what I've learned fromthis experience and what I might be able to do about it.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of April 2012 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.