Narrative:

This is day two of a two-day trip I was assigned to fly with this captain. On my initial flight with him I had noticed he had his own unique style of doing things in the cockpit. He called it the laid back approach; I called it too laid back as he wasn't doing anything as laid out in our training. I pointed this out to him; and reminded him these checklists and procedures are for our safety and the passengers. I told him we need to perform our briefings prior to each flight and also prior to each arrival. This was something he didn't take kindly to; further creating tension between the crew. I took it upon myself to perform a briefing and verifying fixes whether it was my leg or not as he was doing none of it. After taking off we were assigned a heading of 020; I noticed he started his turn 100 feet off the ground - something that made me uncomfortable as this wasn't what we were trained to do under these circumstances. There was a cloud layer over the area since the tat was -2 degrees and our speed was about 200 knots indicated. I proceeded to turn on the wings and cowl anti-icing as laid out in the ops manual. He promptly turned off the wings and insisted this was affecting our performance. I explained to him I turned this on due to the temperature outside there was bound to be icing. His explanation was he will wait for the ice indication before turning it on. I didn't think much as we were out of the clouds by this time; he then proceeded to deliver a lecture about how he refuses to be lectured by a junior first officer (first officer) as he has been flying this aircraft for more than 15 years and refuses to make everyone miserable by demanding the checklist and procedures as demanded by the company. I again reminded these procedures and checklists were put in place so we could trap any threats and errors on our part. I noticed our IAS was exceeding 280 knots something I had pointed out to him prior to our departure; the SID required us to not exceed 280 knots above 10;000 until advised. When I pointed this out his response was ATC is looking at our ground speed; he kept the speed at 300 knots. The good thing was ATC came on shortly and asked us to delete the speed restriction. Further into the flight we were cleared to proceed direct to destination airport instead of our filed route. Being the pm I repeated this instruction to him; he didn't react so I figured he might not have heard me; so I repeated it again. He still ignored me; I ended up repeating it four times with no reaction from him. Eventually ATC came on the radio and asked us to confirm if we were direct as instructed; that was when he made changes to the FMS. I believe if this captain was more embracing of the checklists and procedures set in place by the company and the FAA none of this will have occurred. Yes he has a lot of experience in the aircraft but that doesn't mean you throw out required procedure. Several times during the entire two-day trip a few times I could count when errors were missed because of the non performance of procedures. Being a junior first officer on this aircraft I have come across different captains and their styles in the cockpit. But due to an early incident during my time here; I have made a personal decision to fly and perform checklist and briefings as required of us. Something I believe in and wish all will believe in too; no matter how good you are as a pilot it's the little things that could get you; this is why we have checklists and procedures.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: Junior First Officer reports a lack of compliance with company procedures and ATC clearances by the Captain.

Narrative: This is day two of a two-day trip I was assigned to fly with this Captain. On my initial flight with him I had noticed he had his own unique style of doing things in the cockpit. He called it the laid back approach; I called it too laid back as he wasn't doing anything as laid out in our training. I pointed this out to him; and reminded him these checklists and procedures are for our safety and the passengers. I told him we need to perform our briefings prior to each flight and also prior to each arrival. This was something he didn't take kindly to; further creating tension between the crew. I took it upon myself to perform a briefing and verifying fixes whether it was my leg or not as he was doing none of it. After taking off we were assigned a heading of 020; I noticed he started his turn 100 feet off the ground - something that made me uncomfortable as this wasn't what we were trained to do under these circumstances. There was a cloud layer over the area since the TAT was -2 degrees and our speed was about 200 knots indicated. I proceeded to turn on the wings and cowl anti-icing as laid out in the OPs Manual. He promptly turned off the wings and insisted this was affecting our performance. I explained to him I turned this on due to the temperature outside there was bound to be icing. His explanation was he will wait for the ice indication before turning it on. I didn't think much as we were out of the clouds by this time; he then proceeded to deliver a lecture about how he refuses to be lectured by a junior First Officer (FO) as he has been flying this aircraft for more than 15 years and refuses to make everyone miserable by demanding the checklist and procedures as demanded by the company. I again reminded these procedures and checklists were put in place so we could trap any threats and errors on our part. I noticed our IAS was exceeding 280 knots something I had pointed out to him prior to our departure; the SID required us to not exceed 280 knots above 10;000 until advised. When I pointed this out his response was ATC is looking at our ground speed; He kept the speed at 300 knots. The good thing was ATC came on shortly and asked us to delete the speed restriction. Further into the flight we were cleared to proceed direct to destination airport instead of our filed route. Being the PM I repeated this instruction to him; he didn't react so I figured he might not have heard me; so I repeated it again. He still ignored me; I ended up repeating it four times with no reaction from him. Eventually ATC came on the radio and asked us to confirm if we were direct as instructed; that was when he made changes to the FMS. I believe if this captain was more embracing of the checklists and procedures set in place by the company and the FAA none of this will have occurred. Yes he has a lot of experience in the aircraft but that doesn't mean you throw out required procedure. Several times during the entire two-day trip a few times I could count when errors were missed because of the non performance of procedures. Being a Junior FO on this aircraft I have come across different captains and their styles in the cockpit. But due to an early incident during my time here; I have made a personal decision to fly and perform checklist and briefings as required of us. Something I believe in and wish all will believe in too; no matter how good you are as a pilot it's the little things that could get you; this is why we have checklists and procedures.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.