Narrative:

I was working local control. It was marginal VFR day. Ceilings were ragged between 2200 feet and 2400 feet and visibility was variable between 3 and 4 miles. The approach is a non-precision circling approach. Aircraft X broke out very close to the missed approach point; reported the airport in sight and advised it was beginning a circling maneuver. I had already taken a hand off on aircraft Y and they were about 12 miles out on the arc for the approach. I immediately called the TRACON controller and instructed him to break aircraft Y out because aircraft X was circling.the approach controller ordered me to force aircraft X to execute the missed approach. In my opinion due to the weather aircraft X's position relative to the field and their critical phase of flight I didn't believe I had the authority to force an aircraft to execute a missed approach; nor did I feel it was safe. Aircraft X was not lined up for the runway but on the downwind portion of the circling maneuver and once again reiterated that aircraft Y needed to be broken out. When I didn't see that happen I reached out for aircraft Y and was surprised to discover they were on tower frequency at 2900 feet descending. I immediately issued a climb to 4000 feet to aircraft Y and instructed to him to go direct to the VOR when able. I issued a traffic call to aircraft Y to inform him of the dangerous situation and aircraft Y increased his climb rate. Once separation was insured I then shipped aircraft Y back to TRACON for resequencing. Separation was not lost. The weather was the precipitating factor in the situation but in my opinion; poor planning on the approach controller's part was the actual cause. The approach controller did not allow sufficient spacing for the circling maneuver. I believe a mis-understanding of the rules and procedures governing non-precision approaches with circling maneuvers and a controller's authority concerning missed approaches was what caused the clash between controllers.we receive complaints on almost a daily basis from the users; complaining about the service they received from TRACON. This incident is one of many that highlights the issues concerned with consolidating. When the TRACON was at this airport; all of the controllers were local specialists. I personally had all of the sids; stars; approaches; and mvas memorized. When you consolidate so many tracons it becomes impossible for controllers to retain all the information needed to become proficient at each sector. And consolidations also leads to strife between the towers and the consolidated TRACON. Overall consolidations have led to a reduction in service to the users of the NAS. And have created an unsafe situation.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: The Tower Controller asked the TRACON to break an aircraft out because there was insufficient spacing with the preceding aircraft. The TRACON Controller refused and told the Tower Controller to break the first aircraft out. After the second aircraft contacted the Tower; the Tower issued a go-around instruction and put the aircraft back on the TRACON frequency.

Narrative: I was working local control. It was marginal VFR day. Ceilings were ragged between 2200 feet and 2400 feet and visibility was variable between 3 and 4 miles. The approach is a non-precision circling approach. Aircraft X broke out very close to the missed approach point; reported the airport in sight and advised it was beginning a circling maneuver. I had already taken a hand off on Aircraft Y and they were about 12 miles out on the arc for the approach. I immediately called the TRACON controller and instructed him to break Aircraft Y out because Aircraft X was circling.The approach controller ordered me to force Aircraft X to execute the missed approach. In my opinion due to the weather Aircraft X's position relative to the field and their critical phase of flight I didn't believe I had the authority to force an aircraft to execute a missed approach; nor did I feel it was safe. Aircraft X was not lined up for the runway but on the downwind portion of the circling maneuver and once again reiterated that Aircraft Y needed to be broken out. When I didn't see that happen I reached out for Aircraft Y and was surprised to discover they were on tower frequency at 2900 feet descending. I immediately issued a climb to 4000 feet to Aircraft Y and instructed to him to go direct to the VOR when able. I issued a traffic call to Aircraft Y to inform him of the dangerous situation and Aircraft Y increased his climb rate. Once separation was insured I then shipped Aircraft Y back to TRACON for resequencing. Separation was not lost. The weather was the precipitating factor in the situation but in my opinion; poor planning on the approach controller's part was the actual cause. The approach controller did not allow sufficient spacing for the circling maneuver. I believe a mis-understanding of the rules and procedures governing non-precision approaches with circling maneuvers and a controller's authority concerning missed approaches was what caused the clash between controllers.We receive complaints on almost a daily basis from the users; complaining about the service they received from TRACON. This incident is one of many that highlights the issues concerned with consolidating. When the TRACON was at this airport; all of the controllers were local specialists. I personally had all of the SIDs; STARs; approaches; and MVAs memorized. When you consolidate so many TRACONs it becomes impossible for controllers to retain all the information needed to become proficient at each sector. And consolidations also leads to strife between the towers and the consolidated TRACON. Overall consolidations have led to a reduction in service to the users of the NAS. And have created an unsafe situation.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.