Narrative:

Prior to this leg; had a problem with fadc channel B; caused autothrust to fail twice; including for the approach and landing runway; with a very stiff crosswind. Sent early alert and wrote up the autothrust on that aircraft. With this in mind the first officer decided to fly the approach with manual thrust for proficiency. We flew a dusk; hand flown approach; autothrust off; ILS. The weather; perfect; VFR; with a light crosswind; planned configure 3; autobrakes low; first officer as PF. During gear extension both pilots focused on triple indicator as needles indicated deflections as a part of an earlier discussion. The landing checklist was then interrupted by an ATC clearance to land. The checklist was not completed - the ECAM check on the checklist was omitted. We failed to notice the flaps were at 2. At approximately 200 feet AGL GPWS called 'too low; flaps'. The assessment of the situation was quick for both pilots. PF called for flaps 3. The captain/pm selected flaps 3. The GPWS was silenced. The landing was completed.there was a reduced level of awareness of 'the big picture' of aircraft configuration and indications because of the hand flown approach with autothrust off. This the PF instrument panel scan was nearly entirely consumed by the pfd for manual airspeed control and ILS course/path tracking. The landing checklist was interrupted by an ATC clearance to land. The ECAM check on the checklist was not completed. The pilots failed to maintain a full panel scan. At the time of the GPWS alert the correct call would have been for a go around by PF (or either) pilot.the PF approach briefing should add detail when flying a hand flown and/or autothrust off approach. The point that the flying pilot's scan will be very narrow during the hand flown phase; so the pm has a higher responsibility of scanning the big picture of aircraft config and status. It should be verbalized a level of redundancy is being removed during such an approach. Unexpected GPWS callouts should be added to sim training to reduce knee jerk reactions not to make a call to satisfy the GPWS alert - but to rather call for a go around. These should be introduced as unexpectedly as possibly to be realistic.the captain/PF understands the importance of SOP. The PF approach briefing should add detail when flying a hand flown and/or auto thrust off approach. The point that the flying pilot's scan will be very narrow during the hand flown phase; so the pm has a higher responsibility of scanning the big picture of aircraft config and status. It should be verbalized a level of redundancy is being removed during such an approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A distracted A321 crew quickly selected flaps 3 then landed after EGPWS alerted 'TOO LOW; FLAPS' because flaps 3 had not been selected on a manually flown visual approach with the autothrust off. Manual speed control and ILS tracking consumed the crew's attention.

Narrative: Prior to this leg; had a problem with FADC channel B; caused autothrust to fail twice; including for the approach and landing runway; with a very stiff crosswind. Sent early alert and wrote up the autothrust on that aircraft. With this in mind the first officer decided to fly the approach with manual thrust for proficiency. We flew a dusk; hand flown approach; autothrust off; ILS. The weather; perfect; VFR; with a light crosswind; planned configure 3; autobrakes low; FO as PF. During gear extension both pilots focused on triple indicator as needles indicated deflections as a part of an earlier discussion. The Landing Checklist was then interrupted by an ATC clearance to land. The checklist was not completed - the ECAM check on the checklist was omitted. We failed to notice the flaps were at 2. At approximately 200 feet AGL GPWS called 'too low; flaps'. The assessment of the situation was quick for both pilots. PF called for Flaps 3. The captain/PM selected flaps 3. The GPWS was silenced. The landing was completed.There was a reduced level of awareness of 'the big picture' of aircraft configuration and indications because of the hand flown approach with autothrust OFF. This the PF instrument panel scan was nearly entirely consumed by the PFD for manual airspeed control and ILS course/path tracking. The Landing Checklist was interrupted by an ATC clearance to land. The ECAM check on the checklist was not completed. The pilots failed to maintain a full panel scan. At the time of the GPWS alert the correct call would have been for a Go Around by PF (or either) pilot.The PF approach briefing should add detail when flying a hand flown and/or autothrust off approach. The point that the flying pilot's scan will be very narrow during the hand flown phase; so the PM has a higher responsibility of scanning the big picture of aircraft config and status. It should be verbalized a level of redundancy is being removed during such an approach. Unexpected GPWS callouts should be added to sim training to reduce knee jerk reactions NOT to make a call to satisfy the GPWS alert - but to rather call for a go around. These should be introduced as unexpectedly as possibly to be realistic.The captain/PF understands the importance of SOP. The PF approach briefing should add detail when flying a hand flown and/or auto thrust off approach. The point that the flying pilot's scan will be very narrow during the hand flown phase; so the PM has a higher responsibility of scanning the big picture of aircraft config and status. It should be verbalized a level of redundancy is being removed during such an approach.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.